Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT

Speed Limits

Mr. Bowden: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will make a statement on his intentions as regards the 50, 60 and 70 mph speed limits.

Mr. Knox: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will make a statement on his intentions as regards the 50 and 60 mph speed limits.

Mr. Marten: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he will now abandon the 50 mph speed limit imposed during the oil crisis.

The Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. John Horam): My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Energy—the hon. Member for White-haven (Dr. Cunningham)—told the House last week that the Government intend to circulate a consultation document seeking the views of representative organisations on the national 60 mph and 50 mph speed limits. The decision on the future level of limits will be taken when the consultation is complete. In the meantime, the present limits will be renewed for a further six months. I have no present plans to review the 70 mph limit on motorways.

Mr. Bowden: I congratulate the Minister on his appointment and thank him for that reply. Does he not agree that there is grave confusion about the speed limits, that many motorists do not know the limits for the road on which they are travelling, and that the police are finding it extremely—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is asking a question. Will he please come to the point?

Mr. Bowden: Is the Minister aware that the police are not finding it easy to enforce the law, and will he do everything possible to expedite the review and change the existing limits?

Mr. Horam: I agree that some people do not know the limits. Nevertheless, compliance remains extremely high, and in July this year 81 per cent. of people were observing the law on the 50 mph limit. None the less, I take the general point that in the consultation procedure we must consider whether people are willing to take account of the law. I am anxious that we must not put motorists in a position in which they are overburdened by rules and regulations of which they are only hazily aware.

Mr. Knox: Since the speed limits involved were introduced only as emergency measures, why does the Minister not abolish them now, since the original reasons have disappeared?

Mr. Horam: The original reasons have not disappeared. Petrol is more readily available than it was at an earlier period, but it is still expensive, and by these measures we are making substantial savings on our balance of payments. None the less, we think that there is a case for abandoning them, and that is why we are embarking on the consultation procedures.

Mr. Alexander Wilson: Is my hon. Friend aware of the tragic accidents, many of them fatal, that occur regularly on the A74? Rather than abolish these speed limits will he ensure that drivers adhere to them?

Mr. Horam: My hon. Friend makes a good point. This subject has a road safety content, and is not purely a matter of energy saving. He will be interested to know that on 50 mph and 60 mph limit roads the accident rate, as a result of these limitations, has improved by 10 per cent. I assure him that I am fully cognisant of the point that he makes.

Mr. Marten: How can the Minister say that 81 per cent. of drivers are observing the speed limits? Since the Department, the motoring organisations


and other interested bodies must by now have marshalled all their arguments, will he now seek to cut the consultation time to about three months? How many months' consultation was there before the order was imposed?

Mr. Horam: We should like to cut down the period concerned. The period of six months is the maximum, but if the process can be completed at a faster rate, all well and good. The reason why I quoted a figure of 81 per cent. was that it was the proportion that came out of a sample survey in July.

Mr. Tebbit: Is the Minister saying that he regards as satisfactory a situation in which 19 per cent. of motorists ignore the speed limits? Is that the Government's standard for what is desirable or acceptable in obeying the law?

Mr. Horam: It is about the level of compliance that has been observed the whole time. It is very good when applied to the general area of speed limits.

Railway Unions

Mr. Skinner: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he has any plans to meet the leaders of the rail unions; and if he will make a statement.

The Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. William Rodgers): Yes, I have met them informally already and I plan to meet them again soon.

Mr. Skinner: When my right hon. Friend next meets the rail unions, will he tell them that the Government's consultative document is now discredited, as a result of the passage of time, and that several Ministers have refused to debate the issues involved? Will he give them a guarantee that in future under his guidance there will be full consultation before any other documents are produced dealing with the future of the railways? Will he also give a guarantee that, within that policy, there will be an effort to hold down rail fares?

Mr. Rodgers: I take note of my hon. Friend's soft and persuasive words, but he is a little unfair to the document to which he refers, which was not my direct responsibility. It was a consultative document, supported by a consultative process, and there was a great deal of

written evidence. I am seeing a number of the bodies which submitted evidence. I hope that we shall arrive at a policy that makes sense, and I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to approve it.

Mr. Moate: When the new Chairman of British Rail was appointed he said that one ultimate objective was a reduction in manning by a figure of 40,000. Is that objective shared by the unions?

Mr. Rodgers: I do not think I can discuss matters that are really very much for the Chairman of British Railways, with all his responsibilities. I hope very much that the unions and management will get together to try to solve some of the problems of which the House is fully aware.

Mr. Flannery: Will my right hon. Friend take on board very seriously the question of railway fares? Will he accept from all of us who travel regularly on the railways—in fact, most of us do so—that if fares go up much more it will begin to look like a plot to get rid of the British Rail system? We are all aware that if there is a threat to strike for even half a day the whole country is plunged into chaos. Will my right hon. Friend take note of that and consider putting fares down for once, instead of putting them up?

Mr. Rodgers: What my hon. Friend says is plausible. I have a great deal of sympathy with him and with all those who travel by rail and have to pay higher fares. However, if the necessary revenue is not raised in fares it must be paid in subsidy. If it is paid in subsidy, the burden falls upon the taxpayer or ratepayer. There is no way round that, unless services are cut. It is a difficult dilemma. I share my hon. Friend's view that we should try to reach a level of proper stability.

Mr. Norman Fowler: First, I welcome the right hon. Gentleman to his new post. I must warn him that he has taken over at a time when rail commuters face a crisis. Does he realise that over the past few years rail fares have doubled? The major reason for that has been the Government's failure to tackle inflation early enough. Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the long-term solution must lie in controlling inflation and making improvements within British Rail?

Mr. Rodgers: I share the hon. Gentleman's view about the need to control inflation. That is at the heart of the Government's economic policy. However, whether or not rail commuters are facing large fare increases, we cannot get away from the fact that the revenue comes in fares or in subsidy. If we are to hold down fares, we shall have to increase public expenditure. I understood that the Opposition were not in favour of increasing public expenditure; on the contrary, they want to cut it still further.

Transport Policy

Mr. Ioan Evans: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what consideration is being given to establishing an integrated road and railway transport system; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Montgomery: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will now make a statement on the transport consultation document.

Mr. Durant: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will now make a statement on the transport consultation document.

Mr. Robin F. Cook: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he expects to publish a White Paper on transport policy.

Mr. William Rodgers: Over 1,000 comments have been received on the transport policy consultation document and I have now begun a programme of oral hearings with the principal organisations to explore their views more fully. I hope to publish a policy statement, probably in the form of a White Paper, in the spring of next year.

Mr. Evans: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his appointment. When he has considered the representations that he has received on the consultation document, will he consider suggesting, in a White Paper, the setting up of a National Transport Council, as outlined in the consultation document, its terms of reference being to integrate the road and rail systems? Will he bear in mind that if we had an integrated road and rail system some of the heavy freight traffic that is now carried in juggernaut lorries on highly congested roads could be taken on

to the underused railways, and that that would be a far more effective and efficient system for the country?

Mr. Rodgers: My hon. Friend puts his finger on a number of important aspects of the consultation document, on which, as I have said, we have already received evidence and which we are now discussing with some of those who made particular points to us. I cannot possibly start to make policy-type statements now, tomorrow, or very soon. The important thing is to consider all these matters thoroughly. I hope that it will be possible to devise a formula by which we shall have stability for the whole transport industry for 10 years, 15 years, or perhaps even to the end of the century.

Mr. Durant: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that a delay until the spring is not good enough, bearing in mind that British Rail has already proposed to put up fares again in the spring? Some of my constituents will then face fares of over £400 a year to get to work. Does the right hon. Gentleman realise the social and economic problems that this causes in a town like Reading?

Mr. Rodgers: I appreciate the social and economic problems that affect all those who are obliged to pay sharply rising fares. I do not wish to underrate that problem. However, I hope that the hon. Gentleman and others will reflect that if we are to make the right policy decisions, and if we are to have the consultation on which I have already been pressed today, the period of a year from the publication of the consultation document to the publication of a White Paper is not really a very long time.

Mr. Cook: Does my right hon. Friend accept that many of his right hon. and hon. Friends welcome the lengthy period of consultation that he is going through, but regard the proposed substantial increase in fares in the meantime as pre-empting his policy options? Is lie aware that as recently as May British Rail indicated that many passengers had stopped travelling by rail as a result of the fares increase, and that any further increase in passengers leaving rail and going on to the roads would be bound to increase subsidies and increase the cost of the road programme?

Mr. Rodgers: I am anxious not to preempt any of the options that I may have. For that reason I shall be less forthcoming that I might otherwise have chosen to be in making announcements in the meantime. I must put it to my hon. Friend that these are difficult decisions for management. It is a question of finding a balance, and this must be found within the public expenditure figures that are clearly set out in the White Paper that was published early this year. It will be hard enough for me to defend the existing rail subsidy; there can be no question whatever of increasing it.

Mr. Stephen Ross: Contrary to the answer that the right hon. Gentleman gave to the previous Question, does he accept that an integrated road-rail system would help to keep fares at a sensible level? Will he publish a summary of the representations that have already been made to him on the consultation document?

Mr. Rodgers: I have considered whether to publish a summary, but it would be very difficult to carry out. I think that most of those who submitted evidence have published it themselves, which they were entitled to do. I think that any summary I made would be open to argument, and would probably be as much condemned as the consultation document was by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner).

Mr. Spearing: Is my right hon. Friend aware that one of the unsatisfactory features of the consultative document was the bad way in which waterways were described and treated? Will he assure the House that his review will include a review of the capital funding of common roadways and common waterways, which at the moment are not on a similar basis?

Mr. Rodgers: Alas, waterways were omitted from the responsibilities that I inherited rather over a month ago. However, I take my hon. Friend's point and shall consult accordingly.

Mr. Gwynfor Evans: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there would be an integrated system in Wales and increased prosperity and efficiency for rail and road services if we had a Welsh National Transport Board? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that is still an urgent necessity?

Mr. Rodgers: I note the hon. Gentleman's special pleading. I do not complain, but I do not believe we shall solve these problems by inventing boards and authorities to take on the responsibilities of decision-making, which I think is properly the role of Government and Parliament.

Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles: Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that he will not delay the rebuilding or improvement programme for strategic roads, especially those serving the ports, while awaiting any formal integrated policy for transport?

Mr. Rodgers: I shall delay no necessary decisions, but, equally, I shall keep my options open.

Road Safety

Mr. Goodhart: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what consultations he has had since taking office on the subject of road safety.

Mr. Horam: We have had several informal consultations on road safety and we have also started a programme of formal consultations with a wide range of bodies on transport policy in general. Road safety is one of the subjects discussed in these consultations.

Mr. Goodhart: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept the judgment of previous Transport Ministers that up to three lives a day could be saved by the introduction of compulsory seat belt wearing? If so, why have the Government allowed the seat belt legislation to collapse?

Mr. Horam: The Government have not allowed the seat belt legislation to collapse. It is our intention to press ahead, if we possibly can, at the earliest possible opportunity.

Mr. MacFarquhar: Will my hon. Friend reconsider the advice given by his Department to county authorities on the rationalisation of speed limits? Is he aware that in many rural areas people are extremely disturbed when they find that 30 m.p.h. limits are raised to 40 m.p.h. or 50 m.p.h. without, in their opinion, due care for the safety of themselves and their children?

Mr. Horam: I take my hon. Friend's point. I think that the criteria for fixing


speed limits are fairly clear, but I hope that we shall be able to make more progress on that issue.

Mr. Jessel: As the seat belt Bill received a Second Reading on a free vote by a majority of 110 as long ago as 1st March, should the Government fail to get it through in this Session by failing to provide suitable time in which its remaining stages can be completed, will they accept responsibility for the 20 people who are killed every week and who otherwise would be saved?

Mr. Horam: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support for the Bill and the remarks that he made on the morning after we had to adjourn the debate on 14th October, but I cannot agree that the Government have to take responsibility for road deaths of that kind.

National Freight Corporation

Mr. Sainsbury: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he will introduce legislation to eliminate the National Freight Corporation's deficit.

Mr. William Rodgers: As the House knows, legislation will be introduced to provide specific statutory backing for grants paid to the Corporation to enable it to meet its financial obligations. Further proposals for eliminating the Corporation's deficit will follow when I have completed my consideration of its financial position.

Mr. Sainsbury: Can the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the aggregated losses of the nationalised parcels and small carriers services—those of the National Freight Corporation, British Rail and the Post Office—are running at the rate of about £100 million per annum? Does he agree that such a situation is totally unacceptable and places an unnecessary burden on the taxpayer, and that management action to stop it must be taken?

Mr. Rodgers: I cannot confirm the precise figure that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned hut, as the House knows, the National Freight Corporation's transactions last year resulted in a deficit that is much greater than we can tolerate. However, the current figures show an improvement. although there is still room for more. I see no reason why, in the

long run, the Corporation should be in receipt of a subsidy.

Mr. Bradley: Has my right hon. Friend any plans to return two of the subsidiaries of the Corporation—National Carriers Limited and Freightliners Limited—to British Rail?

Mr. Rodgers: I have no such plans, but that does not mean that I may not have such plans. I put it in that perverse and roundabout way because this is one of the aspects that I must consider in reviewing the Corporation's present position and, equally, as part of my consideration of the consultative document. I shall bear in mind the point made by my hon. Friend.

Mr. Gow: Does the right hon. Gentleman share the view of the Chairman of the Corporation that the present financial structure of the Corporation is
… a bad practice reminiscent of medieval usury."?
Does he think that the loss of the Corporation this year will be greater or less than the £31 million it lost last year?

Mr. Rodgers: I do not wish to compete in language or in hyperbole either with the Chairman of the Corporation or with the hon. Gentleman, whose speech yesterday I missed but have read. I am led to think that the deficit will be substantially lower this year than last.

Mr. Robin F. Cook: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that in every year to 1974 the Corporation made a profit on its trading account? Will he consider legislation removing from the Corporation the expensive commitment to pensioners whom it never employed and which was the basis of the comment by the Chairman about medieval usury?

Mr. Rodgers: I am also aware of the eloquent speech that my hon. Friend made yesterday. I shall take note of the point he has made. I am willing to consider anything, including that suggestion.

Mr. Norman Fowler: Is it not the case that the taxpayer is being asked to pay £100 million a year to support the National Freight Corporation and the deficits on British Rail freight operations? Does the right hon. Gentleman remember that the consultation document said that there was no justification for subsidising


freight by road or rail? Does he accept or reject that view?

Mr. Rodgers: I think that I have already said that I do not believe that in the long run we can afford to have subsidy for freight operations. But that does not mean that there are not short-term problems, which, I hope, we shall solve on a commonsense and practical basis and not assume that they can be remedied overnight.

Cycling

Mr. Steen: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what is the Government's policy towards the encouragement of cycling in cities.

Mr. Horam: Cycling policy is essentially a matter for local decision. Local authorities must decide whether measures to make cycling safer in their areas are feasible and worth the expenditure involved. The Government encourage well-planned and economical measures to improve conditions for cyclists.

Mr. Steen: If the Government recognise the importance of promoting cycling in inner city areas, why are only 11 lines of the document on transport policy devoted to cycling?

Mr. Horam: Although only 11 lines were devoted to cycling policy, I am assured by my right hon. Friend that he learned to ride a bicycle in the hon. Gentleman's constituency. I am sure, therefore, that the subject will get adequate coverage in our consideration of transport policy.

Mr. Spearing: Despite his remarks, is my hon. Friend aware that the carriage of even a light-weight bicycle by train costs half the adult fare, whereas heavy luggage is carried free? When he next sees the Chairman of British Rail, will he draw this anomaly to his attention and tell him that those who use the railways for this purpose are not impressed by the ridiculous excuses that British Rail gives for this bad practice?

Mr. Horam: I am impressed by that point.

Railways

Mr. Cohen: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he will make a state-

ment on the progress made towards working out a new plan for the railways, as outlined in Volume I/7.6 of the recent transport policy consultation document.

Mr. William Rodgers: Plans for the railways are an important part of transport policy. They are much in my mind as I consider responses to the consultation document.

Mr. Cohen: Will my right hon. Friend accept that the time factor in terms of the White Paper will be regarded by many of us as disappointing, but that at least there is an indication that the Government are prepared to consider seriously a timetable for this very important question? Will he assure us, as we have waited since 1948 for a definitive statement on the framework of transport policy, that it will be seriously considered, since it will be the subject of careful scrutiny by many hon. Members on both sides of the House and throughout the country?

Mr. Rodgers: I share all my hon. Friend's views on the matter. I am completely aware of the vital rôle of the railways in the life of the country and also of the uncertainty which has inevitably been with the railways during a period of contraction, but it would be wrong to try to forecast now what conclusions the White Paper will come to. Like my hon. Friend, I believe that a longer process of consultation and decision-making is more likely to produce the right answers.

Mr. Hoyle: Will my right hon. Friend consider making investment available for new rolling stock on branch lines, a lot of which is in poor condition and difficult to maintain? In the case of North-East Lancashire, unless something is done we shall not have an efficient rail service at all.

Mr. Rodgers: I am willing to talk to the Chairman of British Rail about any matters that are properly my responsibility rather than his, but I must add that all decisions on investment anywhere in the public sector must be considered very carefully in terms of the revenue they will produce and of the alternative possibility that they would entail increased subsidy at a time when subsidy cannot be increased.

Mr. Moate: In the context of co-ordinating policies for road and rail, can the right hon. Gentleman explain why increases in bus fares are subject to public inquiry whereas increases in rail fares are not?

Mr. Rodgers: No, I do not think I can. It is an interesting question, and I shall find a better answer next time.

Mr. Bagier: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the present size and structure of the railway system is a national asset? Does he further agree that it would make national sense to have it fully utilised? Does he appreciate that the present costing policy of British Rail is tending to have two effects—first, that in the commuting areas, such as the highly industrialised areas of South-East England and Birmingham, it puts a heavy cost on the commuter, with effects on the social contract, and, secondly, that in country areas it tends to put lines in danger by driving customers away from them?

Mr. Rodgers: My hon. Friend has vividly described the acute problem faced by the railways. There are problems here which no one has been able to solve, and the situation affects all those who travel by rail and others who might like to do so. We shall have all these things in mind when we formulate our policy.

Mr. Thorne: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what are the prospects for expansion of British Railways over the next two years.

Mr. William Rodgers: It is difficult for me to say. Expansion is really a matter for British Railways commercial judgment, based on their assessment of traffic prospects.

Mr. Thorne: Does my right hon. Friend recognise that it is part of the Government's responsibility to invest in British Rail? Would it not solve some of our employment problems, as the multiplier would apply in this case? Will my right hon. Friend take this up as a matter of urgency now that he is a member of the Cabinet?

Mr. Rodgers: I agree that we should always look for opportunities in British Rail for worthwhile investment, but to invest irrespective of the likely return is not in the best interests of anyone. It

does not meet the necessary criteria of having a transport system which contributes both to economic growth and social need. We have to be discriminating, whatever the final decision may be.

Mr. Neubert: Does the Minister agree that to maximise revenue at the expense of the volume of traffic would result only in contraction? Would it not be better for British Rail to concentrate on cutting costs and boosting traffic by more attractive fares?

Mr. Rodgers: That is a difficult question. I would like to believe that if fares were cut there would be such a surge of additional passenger traffic that revenue would increase, but the facts do not point in that direction. The substantial increase in fares over the last year resulted in only a small falling off in passenger miles. I do not recall the exact figures, but there was a 50 per cent. increase in fares and only a 5 per cent. falling off in passenger miles. I would like to believe otherwise, but I ask the House to accept the realities of life even when they are uncomfortable.

British Railways Board (Capital Projects)

Mr. Buchanan: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he intends to alter the methods for the appraisal of BRB capital projects.

Mr. William Rodgers: Not at the moment.

Mr. Buchanan: I add my congratulations to my right hon. Friend on his appointment. The Minister responsible for transport has been left out of the Cabinet for too long. In any reappraisal, will my right hon. Friend recognise the tremendous export potential in transport technology being developed in the workshops of British Rail? Will he take steps to ensure that the know-how and the patent rights are not sold to overseas competitors? Will he also ensure that the workshops are utilised to the fullest capacity?

Mr. Rodgers: I very much appreciate my hon. Friend's kind remarks, and the similar remarks made by other hon. Members this afternoon. I am glad that my hon. Friend has drawn attention to the high technology embodied in British


Rail workshops and throughout British Rail generally. We have every reason to be proud of this and I shall do all I can to encourage the export potential.

Mr. Marten: As profitability is relative to capital investment, will the Secretary of State tell us when British Rail will make up its mind about the proposed discontinuation of the carriage of racing pigeons by rail?

Mr. Rodgers: British Rail was halted midway in its decision. In view of representations made, it is now formulating a view which may or may not be different from the one which it held hitherto.[Interruption.] I put it that way because this is one area in which a certain neutrality by the Minister is desirable.

National Bus Company (Chairman)

Mr. Costain: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he last met the Chairman of the National Bus Company; and what proposals he has for further consultations.

Mr. William Rodgers: A month or so ago, and I expect to see him again shortly.

Mr. Costain: When the Secretary of State met the Chairman of the National Bus Company, did he draw attention to the relative positions in the 1974 and 1975 balance sheets. which show that the company owns fewer buses and has undertaken 137,000 fewer passenger journeys? Despite this, the company was clever enough to take on 847 more staff to do this. That is a crazy situation, and it is why bus fares are so high. It is also the reason for the concern felt by busmen about losing their jobs, because the overheads are so great.

Mr. Rodgers: The position is slightly more complicated than that. If the hon. Gentleman looks at the annual reports of the company—not just last year's report, but each year, taking one with another he will see that since 1969 the company's staff has been reduced by about 10,000. I have great confidence in the chairman of the company. He, like other chairmen, in both the private and public sectors, is facing difficult problems at the present time.

Mr. Cyril Smith: When the Minister met the chairman, did he discuss the

increase in the number of muggings of bus drivers, especially in my part of the world? Also, did he discuss the possible remedies which he or the Home Secretary might suggest in order to deal with this problem?

Mr. Rodgers: The answer to the first part of the question is "No"; therefore, the second part is not applicable. However, I shall draw the attention of the chairman to the point made by the hon. Gentleman, which is of very great concern not only to all those in the bus service but to all Members of this House and all those who are concerned with the prevention of crime.

Mr. Fry: I congratulate the Secretary of State on his appointment. When he does see the chairman, will he tell him that the Government have had the courage to reconsider the delicensing of certain public service vehicles so that operators can use minibuses to provide a better service in rural areas? At the moment, the National Bus Company is failing to meet public demand.

Mr. Rodgers: I would not think of speaking to any chairman in such a peremptory manner. I am ready to discuss with the chairman all the problems of the bus service, particularly the way in which the company can be ready to meet the needs of the rural areas as well as those of the towns.

Drinking and Driving

Mr. Hal Miller: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what action he proposes to take on the Blennerhasset Report on drink and driving.

Mr. Horam: My hon. Friend, the former Minister for Transport—the Member for Dudley, East (Dr. Gilbert)—announced on 4th August 1976 that the Government accepted the Blennerhasset Report as a basis for new drinking and driving legislation, which will be introduced as soon as practicable. We have nothing to add to that statement at present.

Mr. Miller: Has the Secretary of State's Department consulted the police about the possibility of enforcing such legislation? Can he tell us, in particular, whether he accepts the view of my own chief superintendent that checks will be made only for one distinct offence at a


time—that is, for seat belts, stolen cars, or drinking, and not an amalgam of all the offences at once?

Mr. Horam: We are in constant consultation with the police on the workings of the law, and their views are taken into account. The point that the hon. Member has raised is a valid one, and I shall certainly look into it.

Sir Anthony Boyle: How does the Minister square this with the statement by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Robert Mark, who said that in his view motoring offences should be made civil offences and not criminal ones?

Mr. Horam: I have no information about that point at the moment, but shall write to the hon. Gentleman.

Driving Test

Mr. McCrindle: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what further changes he proposes to improve the standard of the driving test.

Mr. Horam: My right hon. Friend will make an announcement when he has completed his consideration of the comments made by interested organisations on proposals for changes circulated by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment earlier this year.

Mr. McCrindle: As many people who pass the driving test seem quite incapable of parking a vehicle properly, will the Minister pay particular attention to including this additional requirement in the driving test when the requirements are next reviewed?

Mr. Horam: That is a point which is in the consultation document, and I agree that it is an important one.

Mr. Michael Latham: Will the Minister disregard that suggestion by my hon. Friend? I, for one, would have my licence taken away tomorrow if parking were included in the test.

Swindon-Oxford-Milton Keynes Road

Mr. Madel: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he expects the results of the feasibility study of the Swindon-Oxford-Milton Keynes road to be made available to his Department,

bearing in mind that this study was started in 1972; whether the study will include reference to the need for the southern relief road for Leighton Buzzard; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Horam: The study is still in progress: and we hope to be able to make an announcement on its findings next year.

Mr. Madel: Is the Minister aware that the delay in reaching a decision on this route is holding up finalisation of the Bedfordshire County Council's structure plan? As the southern relief road for Leighton Buzzard is part of that plan, and this would be a great help to local industry and the grand design of Milton Keynes, will the Government speed up the decision?

Mr. Horam: I am sorry that it is taking so long, but it should not affect the council's plan, because it relates to the late 1980s. As far as Leighton Buzzard is concerned, as the hon. Gentleman knows, an inner relief road has recently been constructed, and the county council is now doing a traffic study of the southern relief road, which study will be published shortly.

British Railways Board (Chairman)

Mr. Ovenden: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he next intends to meet the Chairman of British Railways.

Mr. Wyn Roberts: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he next plans to meet the Chairman of British Railways.

Mr. Moate: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what recent discussions he has had with the new Chairman of British Railways.

Mr. William Rodgers: I met him recently and expect to see him again soon.

Mr. Ovenden: When he does next meet the Chairman of British Rail, will the Secretary of State make it clear that a 15 per cent. increase in fares when wage increases are limited to 5 per cent. is totally inconsistent with the social contract? The majority of hon. Members on the Government side of the House believe that we should be thinking of


increasing rail subsidies rather than phasing them out. Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he has no intention of proceeding with the idea of reducing the subsidy to the London commuter area?

Mr. William Rodgers: My hon. Friend puts his finger on the dilemma. He says that a 15 per cent. increase would be inconsistent with the social contract. It is true that any increase in fares bears on travellers, and this presents them with problems, but the alternative is an increase in subsidies or a cut in services. An increase in subsidies means increasing the amount that the taxpayer must pay. I can only say that within the foreseeable future the figures that are contained in the public expenditure White Paper are the only ones upon which I or the Chairman of British Rail can work. There can be no others, and certainly no higher figures than those. There are many claims on public expenditure. but decisions must be made and priorities determined.

Mr. Roberts: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is deep concern in North Wales at the proposal by British Rail to withdraw the old-established "Emerald Isle" service between Euston and Holyhead? Will he give an assurance that the Chester-to-Holyhead section of the line is not jeopardised?

Mr. William Rodgers: I am afraid that I am very short of assurances today for any hon. Member on any question. This matter is for the judgment of the Railways Board, but I am sure that it will take note of the hon. Gentleman's remarks and that it is fully aware of the background to the problem of this well-known and well-regarded train.

Mr. Cledwyn Hughes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the historic train to which the hon. Member for Conway (Mr. Roberts) referred is one of the vital lines of communication for business and industrial purposes between North Wales and Euston? Is he aware that I am currently making arrangements to meet the officials of British Rail to discuss the service, and will he be good enough to take a continuing interest in the matter?

Mr. William Rodgers: I shall be happy to take that containing interest, particulady

if my right hon. Friend tells me that this is his means of arriving in London and joining us in the House.

Mr. Moate: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that many commuters will agree with Mr. Peter Parker's statement that we are in danger of getting lousy services at luxury prices? If there must be higher fares, does the right hon. Gentleman accept that there is a greater chance of their being accepted by commuters if the loss-making lines are properly identified and if there is consultation with the commuters about what the proper and appropriate fare should be on individual lines?

Mr. William Rodgers: That is an interesting suggestion. I sympathise with the hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) and with my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesend (Mr. Ovenden) about the feelings of commuters. I hope that these issues will be presented to commuters in a way that will enable them to see the real options. It is wrong for people to feel that they are being unfairly treated, but it is right that they should recognise the alternatives that face them, this House and the country about the level of fares, the level of services and the alternative means of finding subsidies.

Mr. George Rodgers: Does my right hon. Friend agree that no major railway system in the world survives without substantial subsidy? Will he give an assurance that there is no intention of reducing the existing level of subsidy?

Mr. William Rodgers: I agree with my hon. Friend. It is true that throughout the world railways have provided significant problems in self-financing. We have a great deal to be proud of here in the dedication of railwaymen to the railways over many years and the fine services that are still frequently provided. My hon. Friend will know of the public expenditure White Paper and will know, too, that it provides for a constant level of subsidies over the five-year period. I hope that it will be possible to maintain them, but no one can forecast the future.

Mr. Fry: May I take up both the pertinent question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) and the Secretary of State's remarks? Is it not essential that rail commuters should have some idea of the


allocation of actual costs per route? At the moment the global figure is given. Will the Minister ask the Chairman of British Rail to return to the former method of showing a profit and loss on individual routes, so that commuters may feel satisfied about where the subsidies are going?

Mr. William Rodgers: The allocation of costs is one of the great theological questions facing the railways. It is difficult to determine the allocation of costs and to decide how far, by making a saving on one Inter-City line, for example, there are ripple effects elsewhere. However, I see the point of identifying individual rail services where there is a particularly large gap between revenue and costs, and of decisions being made in a clearheaded way about what ought to be done. I am sure that the Chairman of British Rail will have all this in mind.

Subsidies (Yorkshire)

Mr. Richard Wainwright: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what representations he has received following his instructions to the South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Councils to cut public transport subsidies or risk losing their transport supplementary grant.

Mr. William Rodgers: I have asked all metropolitan authorities to reconsider their estimates of expenditure on local transport in 1977–73, and I am awaiting their replies.

Mr. Wainwright: When the Minister considers these replies will he bear in mind that these two metropolitan counties in Yorkshire have developed distinctive transport strategies which are only part way through development and that it would be ruinous to interrupt them? Will he bear in mind that in these counties the overwhelming number of bus journeys is for the purposes of productive work?

Mr. Rodgers: I agree that the two adjoining counties, under distinguished leadership, have developed distinctive and remarkably different systems. Obviously, I am most reluctant to use the authority I have through the transport supplementary grant to interfere with reasonable local option. I have to make clear to them, as I have to other metropolitan

counties, that it is impossible to pour a quart into a pint pot. I am afraid that all the local authorities in the country must closely examine their total transport spending—the balance between revenue support and capital.

Mr. Stan Crowther: Will my right hon. Friend accept that in these heavily industrialised counties industry is a major contributor to the rate fund? Does he agree that, in the main, buses tend to be used more by the poorer members of the community and that, in view of these two factors, subsidising bus tares out of the rate fund is a sound Socialist measure, for the benefit of the less well-off?

Mr. Rodgers: I am well aware of my hon. Friend's distinguished leadership in local government. He has made a persuasive point. I am reluctant to seek to undermine a legitimate local option, because it is part of our own distinctive system. It remains the case, however, that all spending, whether raised on the rates or through taxation, is part of the total of public expenditure, and whether or not we believe that the present levels are right, and whether or not we accept the priorities, if we spend more in one direction we must spend less in another.

Miss Maynard: Does my right hon. Friend not agree that the policy of the South Yorkshire County Council is paying dividends, in that more people are travelling on public transport there, and that is what we need? Is it not more sensible to do that than to have buses standing idle in a garage because people cannot afford the fares? Is not this also a way of holding down the cost of living and helping people whose wages are restricted, and who are therefore facing considerable difficulties?

Mr. Rodgers: It is very desirable to see more people travelling on the buses. It is true that the bus often meets the needs of those who are least privileged and most deprived. However, if revenue from the buses does not meet costs there must be a charge on the rates. That may be a legitimate decision, but it is not consistent with public expenditure objectives. Let no one pretend that there is a soft option. If people pay less in fares they must pay more in rates.

Humber Bridge

Mr. Brotherton: asked the Secretary of State for Transport if he will make a statement about progress on the construction of the Humber Bridge.

Mr. Horam: The Humber Bridge Board still expects the bridge and its immediate approach roads to be opened to traffic in late 1978. A recent milestone in the building of the bridge structure was the essential completion of the towers to a point where superstructure work can proceed.

Mr. Brotherton: With all the money that is being wasted on this white elephant, will the Minister give an assurance that the construction of a decent road structure on the south bank will not be prejudiced?

Mr. Horam: On the contrary, it will accelerate it.

Mr. McNamara: My hon. Friend has put the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Botherton) well and truly in his place. Is he aware that most people on Humberside are proud with the progress in the building of the bridge? We are particularly glad that work on the superstructure has started. Will my hon. Friend approach the postal authorities to see whether a suitable commemorative stamp can be issued to mark the completion of this considerable architectural achievement, which is the biggest bridge in Europe?

Mr. Horam: I shall have a word with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry, who I believe bears some responsibility for the Post Office.

Public Inquiries

Mr. Adley: asked the Secretary of State for Transport what steps he intends to take to prevent further violent disruptions of public inquiries into road projects, particularly those such as were held at Winchester, which have already been the subject of extensive public participation and inquiry.

Mr. William Rodgers: The conduct of an inquiry is a matter for the inspector concerned, who can seek the assistance of the police in maintaining public order if he wishes.

Mr. Adley: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that most regional trade union leaders and, I suspect, most hon. Members utterly deplore the mob tactics used in the recent inquiry at Winchester, whatever the merits of the case? Will he give an assurance that he regards the uncompleted part of the motorway route to Southampton—the link between the M3 and the M27—as a necessary part of the trunk road system of this country?

Mr. Rodgers: I deplore the use of violence of whatever kind—words or physical action—in motorway inquiries. It is destructive of a great deal that is valuable in our way of life and I hope that those responsible will be thoroughly ashamed. We have to distinguish between such action and the legitimate grievance of those deeply disturbed by a motorway route or perhaps not even too sure whether our overall plans are right. But there is a difference between Arguments of that sort and the ugliness that we have seen.
On the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, the behaviour that we have seen recently will not deter us from objectives that we believe to be right.

Mr. Dodsworth: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that part of the public concern is caused by suspicion of the existing forms of procedure and what people regard as the bureaucratic steamrollering tactics used by some Government Departments? Does that not give him cause for concern that there is no proper communication of the processes of government?

Mr. Rodgers: It certainly gives me cause for concern if reasonable people believe that they are not being fairly treated. I wish to make that clear. However, there is a distinction between reasonable people and those who use methods of which I do not believe the House could conceivably approve.
I hope that people with reasonable objections to the procedures will let me know, not by overt, foolish action but by telling me why they find the procedures objectionable and suggesting ways in which they might be changed. There has already been a change following the setting up of the Department of Transport. The appointment of inspectors is


now a matter for me and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment.

Sir Anthony Royle: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his statement will be very much welcomed? Is he aware that many of us in the London area are concerned about the way that the Greater London Council is steamrolling the use of widening and diverting major lorry routes throughout South London? Is he aware that his attitude will be very much welcomed by residents throughout London?

Mr. Rodgers: It is obviously a question of finding a balance between allowing proper grievances to be aired and decisions to be made wisely and not so restraining the necessary decisions as to cause undesirable economic and social consequences. I am sure that this is the principle that should move us in these matters.

British Railways (Hotels)

Mr. Peter Morrison: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will give a general direction to British Railways to sell their hotels.

Mr. Horam: No, Sir.

Mr. Morrison: What are the hon. Gentleman's reasons for that reply? Is it simply that the hotels are the only profitable part of British Rail?

Mr. Horam: The hotels are extremely profitable, and I regard them as an excellent investment for the public sector. I deplore the continual denationalisation attempts from Opposition Members. Does this mean that they no longer believe in a mixed economy?

Mr. Heffer: Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be a great shame if, for example, the Adelphi Hotel, Liverpool, which has always given excellent service, were taken out of public ownership? Is this hotel not a good example of the best type of public ownership?

Mr. Horam: The Adelphi is a splendid hotel and has been the scene of many Labour triumphs. My only preference, architecturally, is the Royal Station Hotel at York.

Mr. Bagier: Will my hon. Friend resist the modern-day Dick Turpins in the

Opposition and recall that they gave away to their friends the road haulage industry, Thomas Cook Limited, and the Carlisle State breweries? Does my hon. Friend agree that the Opposition always have their eyes on the profitable parts of the public sector? If they want a deal, let us offer them British Rail.

Mr. Horam: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I wonder whether we can get some assurance from the Opposition that they really do believe in a mixed economy.

Mr. Norman Fowler: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in the transport consultation document it was said to be Government policy to extend nationalisation in the road haulage industry and the ports? Is that still Government policy, or do they believe that in the sort of economic crisis that we now face it would be in the nation's interest publicly to abandon such rubbish?

Mr. Horam: My right hon. Friend's policy remains as it has always been.

Lorry Drivers (Hours of Work)

Mr. Fox: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will make a statement on implementation of EEC regulations on drivers' hours.

Mr. Horum: Application within the United Kingdom of EEC Regulation 543/69, which is the one that the hon. Member referred to, has been deferred until 1st March 1977. My aim is to postpone implementation until an amended regulation, including suitable transitional arrangements, has been agreed.

Mr. Fox: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I welcome what he said about delay? May we have an assurance that the Ministers who take part in these negotiations will be as robust as possible to ensure the maximum flexibility for member States in these matters?

Mr. Horam: I may be rather pale and not very tall, but I am fairly robust.

Mr. Marten: Why do we need these regulations?

Mr. Horam: They flow from the assent which this House gave in 1972 to Common Market entry. We and


Opposition Members accepted the position then.

National Lorry Route

Mr. Madden: asked the Secretary of State for Transport when he expects to announce any proposals for a national lorry route; and if he will make a statement.

Mr Horam: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to him on 4th August by my hon. Friend the former Minister for Transport, the Member for Dudley, East (Dr. Gilbert).

Mr. Madden: Can my hon. Friend indicate when this statement will be made? Is he aware that it is causing concern, not least among local authorities? May we have an assurance that no road, such as the A646, which runs parallel to a motorway will be included in any proposals for a national lorry route?

Mr. Horam: Consultations are still going on about the proposed national lorry route and I cannot say when there will be some clear guidance. One problem is that there is no consensus on the question of such a route.
Much as I would like to be able to do so, I cannot give my hon. Friend the assurance for which he asks, but the A646 is unlikely to be one of the roads that will be considered, as it runs parallel to the M62, which would be the obvious lorry route.

Mr. Hal Miller: Does the hon. Gentleman realise the concern caused by the delay in reaching a decision to those working in the motor and commercial vehicle industry? Will he prevail on the Department and his right hon. Friends to reach a decision and announce it speedily, in order to remove the grave uncertainty that already affects the motor industry as a result of the transport policy document?

Mr. Horam: I understand and sympathise with the point made by the hon. Member, but serious issues are involved, on which people are taking contradictory views. We have to allow adequate time for them to be resolved. However, we

can make progress on local bottlenecks and difficulties. The regulations that many local authorities are passing under the impetus of the Dykes Act, for which I was partly responsible as a Back Bencher, are making a real contribution.

Road Construction

Sir A. Meyer: asked the Secretary of State for Transport whether he will review present methods of financing road construction by central Government and local authorities in England and Wales so as to ensure that financial and material resources are concentrated on the early completion of a dual-carriageway primary road system covering the whole of England and Wales.

Mr. William Rodgers: Not unless I am persuaded that there is a particular case for doing so.

Sir A. Meyer: Will the right hon. Gentleman develop the excellent start he has made in his new post by having discussions on the system that has given this country probably the best minor roads and certainly some of the worst major roads in Europe?

Mr. Rodgers: I believe that part of my responsibility is to look at the motorway network and to discuss its adequacy and see how best it can be improved towards the end of this century, bearing in mind the other claims on resources of which we have heard today. I shall bear in mind what the hon. Gentleman has said.

Mr. Jay: Has my right hon. Friend noted that this is yet another suggestion from the Opposition for large public expenditure?

Mr. Rodgers: Yes. We have had many suggestions this afternoon for large public expenditure, though I am afraid they have not all been from one side.

Mr. Cormack: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his frank answers today have been a refreshing change from many that we have received from Ministers? Will he accept our congratulations?

Mr. Rodgers: The hon. Gentleman should not speak too soon.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (BUSINESS)

The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Dr. David Owen): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about business to be taken in the Council of the European Community during November. The monthly forecast for November was deposited yesterday.
The Heads of Government of the member States will meet in The Hague on 29th and 30th November. There is no formal agenda for these meetings, but I would fully expect that fisheries will be discussed. We shall also ensure that EEC relations with Japan are discussed. We expect Heads of Government to consider the Tindemans Report and the terms of reference for a review of the Commission which its new President is to be asked to undertake.
At present seven meetings of the Council of Ministers are proposed for November. Transport Ministers will meet on the 4th, Finance Ministers on the 8th and 22nd, Development Ministers on the 8th, Foreign Ministers on the 15th and 16th, Agriculture Ministers on the 22nd and 23rd, and Budget Ministers on the 23rd. There will also be a meeting of Education Ministers on 29th November.
At the Transport Council, Ministers will be exchanging views on issues relating to maritime transport. They may also consider roadworthiness tests; a minimum level of training for road transport drivers; adjustments of national taxation systems in relation to commercial vehicles; and a progress report on the draft third social regulation.
Finance Ministers at the 8th November Council will have their usual monthly discussions of the economic situation in the Community. They will also consider the Duisenberg proposals on exchange rate co-ordination and economic convergence.
At the Finance Council on 22nd November, Ministers will consider the adoption of the annual report on the economic situation in the Community and of the fourth medium term economic policy programme.
At the Development Council, Ministers will discuss financial and technical aid

by the Community to non-associated developing countries. They will also consider the harmonisation of development polices within the Community.
Ministers at the Foreign Affairs Council will continue their study of the Tindemans Report, and will consider progress of the work in the four Commissions and the overall negotiating objectives for the final phase of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation. Minissters will also discuss the internal and external aspects of the common fisheries policy, the generalised preference scheme for 1977, the uniform passport, and relations between the Community and the COMECON countries—Iran, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Israel. They will have before them a report on negotiations between the Community and the Mashraq countries.
Agriculture Ministers will consider the Commission's proposal for reducing surpluses in the dairy sector. They are also expected to discuss proposals for a potatoes régime, measures for improving agricultural structure and marketing, the water content of frozen chickens, and Community animal health legislation.
At the Budget Council, Ministers will consider amendments and notifications proposed by the European Assembly to the draft 1977 Community Budget.
Education Ministers will consider the Education Committee's Report on the transition from school to working life.

Mr. Hurd: It is certainly an exciting programme of work.
The Foreign Ministers who are to meet on 15th and 16th of next month seem to have no fewer than 13 subjects on their agenda. Is not that an absurdly overloaded agenda, particularly when the vital question of fisheries policy, both internal and external, is to be discussed? May we have an assurance that there will be proper time to settle it, if it has not already been settled, and that, if necessary, the right hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend will keep himself and his colleagues up all night to reach agreement on a Community basis?
Secondly, where on earth is the Minister of Agriculture? Surely we deserve a statement by him on what he has been up to in the last few days—he has been very


free with statements in other places—particularly as a year ago he was campaigning for Britain to come out of the Community and to stand on its own feet. Now he is hailing as a triumph the fact that we are pensioners of the Community to the extent of more than £1 million a day. When will the Minister of Agriculture be making a statement?

Dr. Owen: Concerning the hon. Gentleman's comments about an overloaded agenda, the fisheries policy will be discussed on Friday and, if necessary, on Saturday of this week. Many of the items on the agenda are formal and there is no major disagreement on them. Some of the items, which have already been dealt with at official level, come up for endorsement at the Council.
I should have thought that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture was deserving of the congratulations of both sides of the House. No decisions were taken on the green pound or on the Commission's ideas on longer-term measures regarding monetary compensatory amounts. There was a full debate on Friday, and my right hon. Friend maintained the position of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Thorpe: May I ask whether the Heads of Government or the Finance Ministers will be discussing the continued role of sterling as a reserve currency to which the Prime Minister made an important allusion?
Secondly, will Foreign Ministers be discussing the current negotiations about Rhodesia and the progress of the talks at Geneva?
Thirdly, when will the second United Kingdom Commissioner be appointed and announced?

Dr. Owen: The last question should be directed to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. I have nothing to add to the assertions I made when foreign policy questions were last raised at Question Time.
The question of sterling may be discussed by the Heads of Government at any time. It does not have to be raised formally on the agenda. There will be a meeting of the Finance Ministers to discuss the Duiserburg proposals, one of which relates to medium- and short-term policy.
Rhodesia was discussed at the last Council of Foreign Ministers. The Community of the Nine issued a statement endorsing Her Majesty's Government's policies on Rhodesia, and they have generally helped and been consulted at all stages.

Mr. Roper: Will my right hon. Friend tell us whether the discussions in the Council of Development Ministers on aid to non-associates are likely to reach an agreement on this important matter?

Dr. Owen: The Commission has produced a proposal for the expenditure of 20 million units of account voted by the Assembly in 1976. The Foreign Affairs Council recently agreed, by a qualified majority, to insert 30 million units of account into the budget in 1977 for this purpose, although this will be frozen until the Council takes a formal decision on detailed proposals by the Commission under Article 235. I am not sure when that will come up next.

Mr. John Davies: Will the discussions on the COMECON arrangements relate to a draft reply from the Community to the COMECON countries? The Minister of State will be aware that a reply has been awaited for a considerable time. It would be extremely interesting to the House to know whether that reply is shortly to be forthcoming.
Secondly, in view of the deteriorating future prospects for the assurance of energy needs in the Community from its own resources, will the right hon. Gentleman indicate when and in what conditions an Energy Council meeting will be taking place, as he has not mentioned one in this agenda?

Dr. Owen: An important discussion took place at the Energy Council meeting last month and I am glad to report that some progress was made. But there are still problems relating to the MSP which have been pursued. No formal meeting has been arranged for next month.
The COMECON countries took 16 months to produce a response to the Community's initiative of November 1974. I agree that these are important discussions, but they are complex. It is difficult to know whether we shall reach final agreement at the meetings next month. We hope to


produce a reply to the COMECON countries as soon as possible.

Mr. Watt: May we have an assurance that the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Agriculture will give top priority in the forthcoming negotiations to the problems of the fishing industry so that we shall be in a position to declare a 200-mile limit at the end of the year with an exclusive 50-mile limit for our own fishermen within that 200-mile limit?

Dr. Owen: I can give a positive assurance that that matter will be given the utmost priority. We have made our position clear on external arrangements. We hope to introduce legislation to enable us to introduce the 200-mile limit by 1st January. The House knows that the internal regime is still being discussed, but the Government's position is clear.

Mr. Spearing: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, although he may have deposited the business notice, I have been to the Vote Office twice today and it is not there?
Does my right hon. Friend recall that, in the discussions leading up to our membership of the EEC, it was specifically stated that education would not be covered? Is he aware that the Education Ministers are meeting not as a Council but as a curious meeting within the Council? Is my right hon. Friend further aware that this House declined to approve the education regulation which will probably be discussed at the next meeting?

Dr. Owen: I apologise to the House if the business notice is not in the Vote Office. It was deposited yesterday. I will look into that matter. Clearly it is to the benefit of hon. Members that it should be in the Vote Office.
The Education Ministers' meeting will be a meeting of the Nine. They will be meeting as a council within the Council. My hon. Friend was right to point that out.
I am aware of the decision that has been taken by the House, but the problem of school leavers starting work is important and should be discussed. I see no disadvantage in the meeting of the Nine Education Ministers.

Mr. Wigley: Does the Minister agree that it is a chronically congested programme ahead of Ministers in the coming weeks, and that in view of this it is important for the Government to stress to the EEC the total irrelevance of bringing in harmonisation on things such as eviscerated chicken and the proposals for margarine, and that the EEC would do itself and everyone else more good by looking at broader problems rather than at such trivial details?

Dr. Owen: The Community operates at many different levels. There is no doubt that this House is often more interested in the broader political issues, but experience shows that when the Ministers meet they order their priorities and they concentrate on those items which are of greatest importance. For example, fisheries took up a very large proportion of the Council of Ministers' meeting last month, and may well do so in future. Other business was laid aside to take account of priorities. These are meetings of politicians.

Mr. Pym: Is the Minister aware of the great disappointment in the House about the fact that the Minister of Agriculture has not come here today to make a statement? We had a debate last Friday, as a result of which and in the light of which the Minister of Agriculture has been negotiating for two days. I understand that he is back in London. We feel that the whole point of these visits is that the House should have a statement thereafter.
In the absence of that statement, will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the adjustment of the calculation of monetary compensatory amounts for the pig industry was discussed, and if no conclusion was reached, will that be included in the agenda for the next meeting? Does the right hon. Gentleman's reference to marketing refer to marketing boards, and what progress has been made in those discussions?

Dr. Owen: I take account of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman feels that a statement should be made. I shall draw that to my right hon. Friend's attention. However, the main reason why no statement has been made is that no substantial changes have occurred.
The main burden of the need was to discuss a proposal which would have incurred a considerable change for this country. My right hon. Friend maintained throughout that that change could not take place.
Discussion on marketing boards will take place. I think that it is unlikely that a decision will be reached next month.

Mr. Pym: On Friday we debated eight documents, not just one in relation to the green pound. There are others, in relation to the dairy sector and other aspects. What progress has been made on them?

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr Speaker: I shall be calling all those who have already stood up, but they will help me if they ask a brief question. I take very seriously my responsibilities with regard to the rights of this House in the Common Market. That is one reason why I intend to call everyone who has already stood up.

Mr. Robinson: Is the Minister aware that when the issue of fisheries is being discussed we shall be expecting a common fisheries policy as advantageous to the United Kingdom as the common agricultural policy is advantageous to France?

Dr. Owen: I am well aware of the need to make changes in the present common fisheries policy. It would have been easier if those changes had been made before we acceded to the Community.

Mr. Mills: Does the Minister realise that by the Government's failure to make even a small start on the adjustment of the green pound, they have thrown away every goodwill card that they had as regards the Community, and that at some time in the future it will be necessary for the British Government to ask for some help from the Community? The Government have lost every bit of good will.

Dr. Owen: I do not accept what the hon. Gentleman has said. My right hon. Friend made it clear in the Council that the whole question of the green rate changes raises very wide issues and it would be very difficult to deal with this by an automatic mechanism of adjust-

ment. No doubt the hon. Gentleman has spoken in the interests of the farming community—

Mr. Mills: No.

Dr. Owen: —which he has helped in the House throughout, but Ministers must take into account the effect that this would have on prices, on the whole of the social contract and, indeed, on the whole of the Government's economic policy at the present difficult time.

Mr. Leadbitter: During the discussions next month will some attention be paid to the very serious visible trade imbalance between the United Kingdom and the rest of the Community partners? Secondly, is any progress being made on the JET prototype site proposals in connection with fusion experiments in nuclear energy, which have now been going on for a period of more than a year without an answer being given to this House?

Dr. Owen: The JET was discussed at the last meeting. Some progress was made on the technical details of costing and other aspects but no decision has been made on the site. Although I agree with my hon. Friend that it is urgent that a decision should be taken on this matter, I cannot see that that is likely to be made next month.
On the overall question of the balance of trade, this arises in discussions in many of the Councils, not least in the Council of Finance Ministers, and it will be raised again.

Mr. Welsh: On the proposed potato regime, is the Minister aware of the prime importance to my constituency and to Scotland in general of the ware and seed potato trade? Will he, therefore, ensure particular Scottish representation whenever these discussions are taken to protect legitimate Scottish interests in these matters?

Dr. Owen: I assure the hon. Gentleman that Scotland's interests will be borne in mind at any meeting of the Council of Agriculture Ministers, as the interests of Scotland have been borne in mind at all meetings on fishing.

Mr. Skinner: Will my right hon. Friend ensure that when the Energy Ministers meet they will have a look at a question


that I have raised with his predecessor on occasions such as this, namely, the large stocks of coal in Britain and the fact that many of our so-called partners in the Common Market are buying their coal from third countries, which I should have thought was not in accordance with the spirit of the Common Market? [HON. MEMBERS: "It is cheaper."] The coal that they are buying is not cheaper. In fact, with the pound's exchange rate as it is at present, our coal costs are way below that of third countries and it looks as though the cost will get lower.
Secondly, why do we not have regulations on the question of getting rid of stocks of this kind, and regulations or directives about early retirement for coal miners, so that this could be consistent with the average retirement age of coal miners in the other Common Market countries?

Dr. Owen: I look forward to the day when my hon. Friend supports a directive on that matter. He has taken a great interest in this particular issue, which is currently being discussed. The question of coal was raised by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy at the meeting. I think that there is a much greater recognition that countries such as the United Kingdom which has substantial coal deposits and a rich supply of coal for many decades to come have a considerable contribution to make to Community energy policy. It is not just oil in which we are rich.

Mr. Costain: Does the Minister appreciate that this method of giving the catalogue of meetings in the Common Market creates difficulties for Back Benchers in making a worthwhile contribution? Will he discuss with his right hon. Friend the Leader of the House the possibility of these matters being printed on the Order Paper so that we know what is coming up? This House could not run without forward information. Why should we not have this in relation to the Common Market?

Dr. Owen: That is an interesting suggestion. I am well aware of the dissatisfaction that is felt on both sides of the House about the procedures. Over the last two years my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House has tried to make many changes for improving communication

for Back Benchers. I shall draw the hon. Gentleman's suggestion to his attention.

Mr. Ioan Evans: Is my right hon. Friend aware that we on the Labour Benches would also welcome a statement from the Minister of Agriculture, if only to give us the chance to congratulate him on the stand that he has taken, which has kept down food prices?
As regards the discussions with Japan, will the Government be making formal proposals for selective controls of imports generally, but particularly into Britain?

Dr. Owen: I am grateful for the congratulations given to my right hon. Friend, who has upheld at the recent meeting the interests that have been pressed upon him by hon. Members on both sides of the House. We hope that the Council will look at the wider problem of the EEC's trade relations with Japan and the need for these to be conducted on the basis of a more balanced flow of trade. This matter was raised bilaterally recently by the Prime Minister with visitors from Japan.

Mr. Marten: My hon. Friend the Member for Devon, West (Mr. Mills) said that the Government have lost the good will of our European partners over the green pound. Did not the Germans support the British stand yesterday on the green pound? Will the Minister consider the difficulty of hon. Members in understanding what is going on if statements are not made in the House after European meetings? Will the Government assess the value of the meetings? Should not Ministers be in this country looking after the shop here?

Dr. Owen: As to the meeting of the Council of the Agriculture Ministers, it is publicly known that the German Government and other European members have shown great understanding of Britain's problems. This applies to Chancellor Schmidt and right down through the German Government. We are grateful to them for understanding our problems. I shall look at the question of overloading, but the fact of life is that we live in an inter-dependent world. Most issues relating to trade and economics cannot be decided by any individual national Government. The United Kingdom is a member of many trading organisations, not just the EEC. It helps greatly in


the Community if the Nine co-ordinate their approach to all international negotiations. That often means that Britain's voice is very much stronger because it expresses the view of nine major trading countries instead of one country in these negotiations.

Mr. Lee: Does not the presence of the milk surplus on the remarkably varied agenda of the agriculture meeting indicate a dawning consciousness of the asinine nature of the common agricultural policy? Is there likely to be an opportunity to discuss the absurdities of the poultry slaughter regulations so that relief can be given to the veterinary services in this country?

Dr. Owen: The Government's policy on the dairy surplus—and on the whole question of surpluses—has been clear all along. We believe that a combination of price disincentives and structural incentives is the best way of dealing with it. To reduce the surpluses and eventually eradicate them would be in the interests of consumers throughout the Community. We are not pursuing only a national objective here. There are consumer interests throughout the Community, and we are following a policy which will benefit the whole Community. It will take time to do that. I do not think that the veterinary regulations will have the consequences foreseen by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Forman: With regard to the meetings of EEC Finance Ministers, has it been made clear to the right hon. Gentleman that one reason why the West German Government are so reluctant to look sympathetically upon the Prime Minister's idea of funding sterling balances is that so much of the public sector borrowing—the so-called overhang—is the result of the Government's irresponsible borrowing policies ever since February 1974?

Dr. Owen: The hon. Gentleman is confusing two problems. One is the public sector borrowing requirement and the other is the rôle of sterling as a reserve currency—a separate problem. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear his view on "Panorama". That view is held by many hon. Members. I myself have held it for more than 10

years. The view is that the sterling liability has forced Britain to take internal measures for its economy which it otherwise would not have had to take. If we could persuade other nations to give international help with sterling balances, that would help us to deal with our internal situation and would be welcomed by both sides of the House.

Mr. James Johnson: I accept all the Minister said about the Government's attitude towards the common fisheries policy. Is he aware that an all-party meeting with the fishing industry held in the House decided to send a letter to Mr. Ortoli to be circulated to the Nine Ministers pointing out that we were unanimous in asking the Government to stand firm on a 50-mile fishing zone?

Dr. Owen: As my hon. Friend knows better than almost any other hon. Member, this subject has occupied the attention of Ministers for a considerable period, and any steps taken to make clear to the other Community countries the importance which the United Kingdom attaches to this issue are welcomed. There is no doubt that we face considerable difficulty in convincing the other members of the Community of our case. We should be deluding ourselves if we pretended otherwise. The Government's policy remains as stated to the Community in May by my predecessor. I assure hon. Members that we shall continue to try to negotiate a common fisheries policy which more adequately reflects the long-term interests of the fishermen in this country than does the present policy.

Mr. Rost: Why are the Government so proud of their veto of the revaluation of the green pound? Should not they be afraid of this further damaging humiliation and the admission that our European partners are expected to subsidise the mismanagement of our country?

Dr. Owen: That is a gross travesty of what is at issue. We all realise that this is a complex issue, but a factor that has to be faced is that the common agricultural policy involves considerable cost for the United Kingdom. That was recognised when the debate took place on our entry into the EEC. Many people were very frank about it and explained that the common agricultural policy raised problems


for this country. At the moment we happen to be benefiting from one of the legitimate structural arrangements of the CAP. We recognise that the CAP raises complex issues, and we have received considerable understanding of our difficulties from other members of the Community. Opposition Members would do better to support the Government in their stand over this policy.

Mr. Spriggs: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the clothing and footwear industry in the North-West is facing severe difficulties because of the import of finished clothing and footwear? Will he arrange for an item to be placed on the EEC agenda to deal with the re-exporting of clothing and footwear from Common Market countries to the United Kingdom? If my right hon. Friend can deal with this matter he will greatly assist the unemployment problem.

Dr. Owen: I know of my hon. Friend's concern, which is shared by many hon. Members, particularly those with industries in their constituencies which are heavily dependent on the cotton industry. I shall draw this matter to the attention of the Secretary of State for Trade. Some of these issues will be raised on the Community generalised preference scheme. Much has been done to protect these industries, but I know that people feel that more could be done. We shall certainly put this subject on the agenda for future discussion.

Mr. Hal Miller: In the discussions on relations with the COMECON countries, will the right hon. Gentleman tell us whether the question will be raised of the basis on which their commercial trade with this country is conducted? Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that Her Majesty's representative will raise the issue of subsidised trading in motor vehicles?

Dr. Owen: The important aspect is to achieve a Community response to the main proposals put by the COMECON countries. The details will come when we decide which sectors to discuss. I shall bear in mind the sector to which the hon. Gentleman referred. The basis on which trade is conducted is one of the aspects that will come up in the discussions.

Mr. Jay: Is my right hon. Friend aware that Norway faces none of the fishery policy difficulties he mentioned because she stayed outside the EEC?

Dr. Owen: Yes, I am well aware of that. I went to Norway at the time that country was considering entry into the Community. A factor in the decision made by the Norwegian people at the time of the referendum was the great importance of Norway's fishing industry. This issue was well known to the British people at the time of our referendum. It was raised and discussed in my part of the country—in the South-West—and we knew about the anxieties of the fishermen. The referendum decision in the United Kingdom was taken in the full knowledge that adequate preparations to safeguard the fishing industry had not been made at the time of accession.

FIREARMS (VARIATION OF FEES) ORDERS

Mr. Ridley: May I raise with you, Mr. Speaker, a point of order arising out of this morning's proceedings in the First Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments when the two Firearms (Variation of Fees) Orders were defeated. This puts the House in a difficult position because the result of those defeats upstairs presumably means that the Government will have to return to this matter in order, if they wish, that the House should reexamine the verdict of the Committee. Can you, Mr. Speaker, inform us how we proceed in the matter?
There is a second point in respect of this. That is that these orders have been in force since 1st October and people have been asked to pay the higher scale of fees for certificates since the beginning of this month. As the order has no validity after this morning's defeat, may I ask through you, Mr. Speaker, what arrangements are being made to refund excess payments to those people who have already made them?

Mr. Speaker: I nearly rose at the beginning of the hon. Gentleman's point of order, but I thought that I would give him a fair run. That is not a matter for me. It is a matter for the Government. I cannot rule upon it.

Mr. Peyton: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. While I do not wish in any way to infringe your ruling, I hope that you will consider that under the procedures, which were designed for the convenience of the Government rather than the House of Commons, this Prayer was taken upstairs this morning. After some time the Committee decided that it had not considered it. Far from liking this order, it actually refused to consider it at all.
Parliament then finds itself in a bit of a difficulty. I am sure that the Home Secretary, as acting Leader of the House, is the last person to wish to find himself in the appalling position of inflicting upon the population, in the name of the House of Commons and of Parliament, a measure that the properly constituted Committee of Parliament has said it will not even consider. With the greatest respect, Mr. Speaker, this is a position which I hope you will agree to consider a little further.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Merlyn Rees): Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I have a double interest in this matter as acting Leader of the House and Home Secretary. I am having inquiries made about the result of the defeat on the motion—as I understand it—this morning. An interesting point has been made and I shall get advice as soon as I can about the implication, as the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) says, in respect of the collection of fees. I do not think that that is the result, but I would rather have fuller advice, and I am looking at it.

Mr. Peyton: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will undertake to report to the House.

Mr. Rees: Of course.

Mr. Kimball: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I seek your guidance? As a result of what the right hon. Gentleman has said, would it be in order for me now to put my Prayer down again so that the whole House can have an opportunity to consider it and, perhaps, have a chance to express an opinion on it?

Mr. Speaker: There are two points of order that I have to deal with. In reply to the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr.

Peyton), I will, of course, consider whether there is anything that I ought to rule upon. I will inform the House tomorrow.
Secondly, any hon. Member or right hon. Member may put a Prayer on the Order Paper whenever he likes, but I do not decide when it is called.

Mr. Ridley: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. With great respect, the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) has put to you is a procedural point. There can be little point in a Committee upstairs considering a Statutory Instrument and being asked at the end of the debate to vote on whether it has considered that Statutory Instrument. May I suggest that this might be a procedural matter which you, Mr. Speaker, felt could he referred to one of the two Select Committees concerning procedure which are still sitting, so that the House, when it appoints a Committee to consider a Statutory Instrument, delegates to that Committee not only the discussion but also the decision on the matter?

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman probably misunderstood what I said to his right hon. Friend. I said that I would make a statement tomorrow.

COURTAULDS LIMITED (SKELMERSDALE)

Mr. Michael McGuire: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
The announcement today by Courtaulds that it will close the Skelmersdale factory which employs 1,000 people.
The announcement itself is specific, and its importance cannot be exaggerated. Coming on top of the closure of the Thorne tube factory earlier this year, with the loss then of more than 1,350 jobs, it means that the male unemployment rate in the new town of Skelmersdale will increase to over 25 per cent. That is an unacceptable figure for any town, but in a new town like Skelmersdale it is a scandal.
Courtaulds was an oasis of employment in a desert of unemployment. If this


closure goes ahead, Skelmersdale will be a wilderness. It will not be a new town it will be a ghost town, and the hopes of the thousands of workers encouraged to go to the new town will be blighted. They went to the new town, following Government policies, believing that Skelmersdale offered them the chance of a better life. I believe that the House needs as a matter of urgency to debate the Government's regional strategy and, above all, their economic strategy.
I know that I cannot debate the matter now in anticipation of your granting my application, Mr. Speaker, but bound up with the Government's economic and regional strategy is the question of import controls and other such important matters. It is essential for us to have the chance to debate this matter in the House, because the Government have the power—I want them to have the will—to prevent this closure.
I want the Government to give us the opportunity to debate these matters and to prevent calamity for some 1,000 people who were persuaded to go to Skelmersdale. It is the creature of Government and I want the Government to do something to help in this tragedy. That is why, Mr. Speaker, I hope that you will be able to grant my request.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Ince (Mr. McGuire) has given me notice and asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing

a specific and important matter that he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely,
The announcement, today by Courtaulds of the closure of their factory in the new town of Skelmersdale".
As the House knows, I do not have to decide whether this matter should be debated. I have to decide whether it is to be given precedence over all other business. Under Standing Order No. 9 I am directed to take into account the several factors set out there but to give no reasons for my decision.
I have given careful consideration to the hon. Gentleman's representations, but I have to rule that his submission does not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order and, therefore, I cannot submit his application to the House.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Mr. Speaker: In order to save the time of the House, unless there is an objection I propose to put the two motions relating to the Statutory Instrument and the Measure together.

Ordered,
That the Improvement of Live Stock (Licensing of Bulls) Act 1931 Suspension of Operation (Scotland) Order 1976 (S.I., 1976, No. 1491) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.
That the Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.—[Mr. Thomas Cox.]

EDUCATION ACT 1944 (AMENDMENT)

4.10 p.m.

Mr. Hal Miller: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend sections 39 and 55 of the Education Act 1944; and for connected purposes.
The sections involved concern the statutory walking distance and the obligations on local authorities to provide free transport for children living further than those distances from their schools. I realise that it is late in the Session to introduce a Bill affecting policy to such a degree and that there is little chance of its reaching the statute book before Prorogation. I should also stress that this is not an official initiative; it comes from a private Member and many colleagues—to whom I pay tribute—drawn from a wide geographical and political spectrum.
The object of this initiative is to serve notice on the Department that something has to be done about this matter; that there exists, to quote a letter from my county council,
the determination we all share about the need to try to break the present impasse nationally on school transport.
That impasse has persisted since my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition set up an inquiry in 1972, which reported in 1973. No Secretary of State since that time has managed to grapple with this very real problem. To put it in its context, this seems, judging from my postbag, to be the single most important subject to my constituents.
I realise that there are difficulties, which is why the matter has lain without resolution for so long. There are difficulties about denominational schools, about safety as opposed to distance, and about administration. I want to try to show how they may be resolved.
My Bill would not go so far as the recommendations of the Hodges Committee, which would have removed the statutory distance altogether. As a first step, I propose to reduce the statutory distances by one mile in each case. One reason for the retention of the distance is the fear among local authorities of the difficulties that would ensue in prosecuting cases of truancy if there were no

statutory distance at all. In other words, it is a peg on which to hang actions in that area.
We must also think of cost. Under my amendment to Section 55, I would provide power to make the regulations, which would include the levying of a flat-rate charge for everybody using school transport provided over the statutory distance.
To give some illustration of what that involves, I am informed that in my county it would result in a charge, per pupil per term, of about £7, which we may roughly express over a 12-week term as about 60p a week. That compares with the fare of £12·80 per child per week on the Midland Red for a distance of just under three miles in my constituency.
The anomalies are no longer tolerable to parents. In one case, the two doors of a semi-detached house are on different sides of the dividing line. In another case, the bus stop up the street is outside the limit but the houses are within it. In yet another case, a dispute has arisen on the question whether the surveyor's wheel—which has travelled over the course from the front door not to the school door but to the nearest approach to the school—was lifted by the surveyor while crossing at traffic lights, and whether he sneaked across the road rather than using the pedestrian crossings. I accept that my reduction of the mileage will not do away with such anomalies, but it will substantially reduce them.
There are also considerable anomalies in the treatment afforded by different authorities to considerations of safety and hazard. We need to work towards a uniform scheme covering the whole country. In some cases in my constituency, parents have banded together because they have found it cheaper to employ a taxi to take their children to school, at the cost of £1·10 a week. However, the bus company came under pressure from the drivers and brought an injunction against the taxi operator for running an unlicensed public service. So real controversies and confusions often arise among the population.
I am seeking to bring in a Bill whose main provisions would reduce the statutory distances by one mile and introduce a flat-rate charge for all making use of


that service. The regulating powers would also include powers for a remission scheme, perhaps on the lines of that given for school meals. There would also be a commencement date in order to allow local authorities to gear up for the necessary machinery. In that spirit of trying to move this log jam, I commend this modest proposal to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Hal Miller, Mr. Robert Boscawen, Mr. David Crouch, Mr. Fred Evans, Mr. Ian Gow, Mr. Roderick MacFarquhar, Mr. Charles Morrison, Mr. John Watkinson and Mr. William Wilson.

EDUCATION ACT 1944 (AMENDMENT)

Mr. Hal Miller accordingly presented a Bill to amend sections 39 and 55 of the Education Act 1944; and for connected purposes: and the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 239]

RACE RELATIONS BILL

Lords Amendments considered

Clause 1

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Lords Amendment: No. 1, in page 2. line 1, leave out "he cannot show to be" and insert "is not".

4.18 p.m.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Brynmor John): I beg to move, That this House cloth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.
There are two concepts which are new in this Bill. The first is that the burden of asserting rights has now shifted to the individual, away from the system previously adopted, which was that of reporting to the Race Relations Board and of that Board taking up the matter on behalf of the individual. We believe that it is right that that should be so, but of course it leads to the problem that, for example, in employment cases, he would assert those rights without the benefit of legal aid.
The second point which is new is the concept of indirect discrimination. It is new because it deals with a question where there is nominal equality but de facto inequality. For the concept of indirect discrimination to be established, five primary issues of fact have to be decided first, whether a condition or requirement has been applied to the complainant; second, whether the complainant has failed to comply with it; third, whether the failure has operated to the detriment of the complainant; fourth, whether the condition is such that the proportion of those of his racial group who can comply is considerably smaller than those not of his racial group; fifth, whether the condition or requirement is justifiable, irrespective of the racial group.
In another place, an amendment was moved whereby the onus was placed on the complainant for all five of the primary issues of fact whereas in the Bill, as it left the House earlier, the onus remained upon the complainant for the first four of the conditions but shifted in the fifth to the respondent.
The House should consider the position which arises if the complainant


proves the first four of the conditions. If he satisfies those four requirements it is proved that a condition acts in a racially discriminatory way against a person. We believe that where that racially discriminatory position is established by the complainant, the onus should then shift to the respondent to prove the fifth condition, namely whether the condition or requirement is justifiable irrespective of the racial group to which it applies.
The Lords put in the amendment mainly because of the burden of proof argument. We believe that they were wrong because of a number of factors. In the Lords, the impression was given that the onus was on the respondent to prove his innocence on all five of the grounds, whereas in four of them the onus is still on the complainant. The second reason that the Lords were wrong concerns their references to guilt and the connotation of criminality. The Bill deals with civil liability.
The Lords were also wrong in their argument about the burden of proof. Lord Hailsham said that the burden of proof is always on the person who seeks to assert a right, but that is not always so. As the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) appears to agree, the burden of proof is not constantly upon the complainant.
I can give examples from civil law. Under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, a complainant must establish that he has been dismissed and once he has done that the onus shifts to the employer who must justify that dismissal. Lest hon. Members should think that the 1974 Act is too recent an example, I give another—Section 30 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, which has a longer pedigree. Under that Act the onus passes to the respondent to prove that he has given value.
Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hailsham should have considered the situation in the criminal law more carefully because it is not always the prosecution which must discharge the burden of proof. An example is the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. In the Sexual Offences Act 1956 the burden of proof shifts to the defendant accused of living off the immoral earnings of a prostitute. Under Section 5 of the Magistrates'

Court Act 1952, the onus of proving exception or exemption rests with the defendant.
It is right to shift the burden in this case, because the facts are particularly and peculiarly within the knowledge of the respondent. Let us revert to the present example—that of indirect discrimination. Take the example of preventing a Sikh from gaining employment in an engineering factory, for instance, because he will not wear a safety helmet. That man is not able to fulfil a vital requirement or condition. In some cases such a condition of employment would not be justifiable on other than racial grounds. The complainant would not be able to establish easily whether the condition was justifiable. The employer has the expert knowledge of the industry and is the person who lays down the conditions.
One could call the evidence of an expert but such cases will be dealt with by the industrial tribunals, to which legal aid does not apply. That is why the Government believe that in cases of indirect discrimination the onus in respect of four of the primary issues of fact should be fairly laid upon the complainant. In the fifth, the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the respondent, and the onus in that issue should be on the respondent. I invite the House to disagree with the Lords in their amendment.

Mr. Percy Grieve: The Lords have done a great service to the law and the administration of the law in our country in restoring the burden of proof where it should be. It is all very well for the Minister to say that this is not a penal matter, but the series of Acts and this Bill concerning race relations, constitute, rightly or wrongly, a substantial inroad into the rights and liberties of the ordinary citizen. Those who think that they are aggrieved by what they deem to be discrimination can now go to the court under the Bill and seek ever wider and ever greater remedies. I strongly believe that when such people go to court the burden should be on them when they are challenging the citizens of this country. The burden should be on them to show that what they choose to term discrimination is not justifiable.
The Minister said that whether it is justifiable or not, the circumstances are


peculiarly within the knowledge of the person who is alleged to have discriminated. If that criterion was applied to any offence in which the motive or intent has to be proved, the burden of proof would be reversed. It would be a sad day indeed for the country.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Is it not the case that the burden of proof is always on the prosecution in cases of identity or when establishing whether a person was in a particular place at a particular time? In such cases, the accused has knowledge because he knows whether he was there.

4.30 p.m.

Mr. Grieve: My hon. and learned Friend's contribution exactly meets my point. We do not serve the cause of good race relations well by changing the burden of proof and subjecting our citizens to a plethora of legislation.
There was recently in the Midlands, near to my constituency, a case which showed the error, difficulty and vice of imposing upon people legal restraints which the great bulk of the population think to be wrong. There is no doubt that in putting up outside this house a notice which brought him before the courts Mr. Relf was in breach of the law, and he was wrong to be in breach of the law. There is no doubt that when he refused to obey an order to take the notice down the learned judge had no alternative but to send him to prison for contempt of court.
But what happened? Mr. Relf went on hunger strike and was in danger of death. He was released from prison and got away with that breach of the law. If he had not, those of us who represent Midland constituencies know that there was a grave possibility of riots in the Midlands. That is the consequence of imposing upon the people a vast code of law which does not meet with their approval, which makes vast inroads into their liberties and which now, in this zeal for race relations legislation, seeks in an important, material particular to reverse the burden of proof.
Lest I should be misunderstood, I say at once that I do not impugn the motives of any of those in the House, the Government, the great Departments of State or elsewhere who think that one can serve the cause of race relations by legislation.

But I believe that they are wrong. That the burden of proof should be reversed shows the lengths to which they are prepared to go in defiance of what I believe to be the beliefs of ordinary people, certainly in defiance of liberties and freedom which the people have enjoyed for centuries.
It is tragic that, with the vast problems we face today, the race relations industry is probably one of the few industries to be flourishing.
I end as I began, by saying that another place has well served the cause of law, esteem for law and in the end—because good race relations depend upon those things—the cause of race relations itself by reversing the burden of proof provision. I hope that the House wilt decide that the amendment should remain.

Mr. Dudley Smith: The House and the Home Office would do well to mark the words of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve).
The Minister of State said that the Bill provided a new concept. The concept that the amendment would remedy is a very undesirable concept. Parliament should be very careful about placing extra burdens on an accused person, whether in a criminal or a civil case. If the accused must prove his innocence, rather than officialdom having to prove his guilt, we shall be taking a long step towards the final erosion of democracy as we have practised it.
My hon. and learned Friend referred in general terms to the race relations industry. This is the third race relations measure on which we have been engaged in recent years. I yield to nobody in my desire to improve race relations. That is why I sit on the Select Committee on the subject and why I try to represent the some 6,000 immigrants who live in my constituency. But, alas, race relations are not improving. As we have all seen, in recent months there has been a definite deterioration.
I believe that this legislation, ambitious as it certainly is and desirable as some people think it is, is counter-productive. Some of the provisions have worked against good race relations. The more we try to strengthen certain aspects of race


relations, the more we shall provoke certain people to break the law.
My hon. and learned Friend referred to the case of Mr. Robert Relf. I suppose one should always try to speak well of constituents. He is a constituent of mine, but I regard him as a rather pathetic and very undesirable person in many respects. Not for a moment do I condone what he did. He carried out an act of complete provocation. I should be among the first to condemn what he was trying to achieve In my view it was not a genuine attempt to sell his house but an attempt to draw attention to his case and promote his own racial ideals, but the race relations industry encouraged him and enabled him to become a martyr.
By going on hunger strike, in the end Mr. Relf won. He beat the judge who had sent him to prison for contempt of court and he received a great deal of publicity and a great deal of support from some people who did not understand the issues. He provoked a great deal of racial tension and hostility in the West Midlands area. My hon. and learned Friend did not exaggerate when he said that if the man had died, if he had not been released, there could well have been riots in the Midlands. That is unthinkable.
We must consider carefully when we legislate. We must try to produce legislation that the man in the street understands and regards as fair. On Second Reading of the Bill in another place, Lord Harris referred to it as "long and complex". Lord Hailsham called it
ill-timed and ill-thought out."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20th July 1976; Vol. 373, c. 739.]
He thought that the effect of some provisions would be counter-productive. I agree. The Bill contains some good provisions which could assist, but there are many others that the House should not approve. One is the fundamental point that the Lords seized upon, that the onus of proof was to be on the accused individual. The Home Office would be doing a service if, as a gesture of good faith early in these proceedings, it accepted this Lords amendment.

Mr. George Cunningham: I agree with the hon. Member for Warwick and Learnington

(Mr. Smith) to this extent, with regard to the value of what the Lords did to this Bill. They performed a service in debating a point which is certainly a fundamental one affecting the rights of the citizen. I am glad that they did so, whether or not one agrees with the outcome of that debate. My inclination on this point was to read their deliberations carefully, to listen to this debate and, at any rate, to make up my mind at the end. My mind is not yet entirely closed.
I was a little surprised, listening to the Minister of State, to hear him so firm in his view that the burden of proof can in certain circumstances be shifted. I recall the debates on a much less important matter that we had a few months ago on a Private Bill, the British Railways Bill, when some of us were trying to defend the practice whereby the burden of proof lies upon the defendant when he is found with property for the possession of which he cannot give a satisfactory explanation. By a fairly long-established law, in those circumstances the burden of proof lies on the defendant.

Mr. Grieve: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but what he has said—and I say this with the utmost humility—is not strictly accurate. The defendant is called upon for an explanation. If he does not give an explanation which the jury accepts or believes or thinks may be true, it may take that into account in bringing in a conviction. It may convict. There is not a complete shift of the burden of proof.

Mr. Cunningham: That is comparable to the situation that would exist under the Bill before it was amended by the Lords, because the party would have to show to the court that he had these other reasons for doing what he did. I think that it is very comparable although not exactly comparable. There are other differences as well.
A few months ago the Home Office was rather keen to get rid of provisions on the statute book where the burden of proof attaches to the defendant. The Minister of State seems to be taking a different line today. We are not supposed to be engaged in a discussion of where there ought to be a law on race relations. We are on a narrow technical question, about the partial burden of proof. I


found it interesting to read the remarks of Lord Molson at column 39 of the Lords Hansard of 27th September. The noble Lord instanced the case of a person who might be letting his house furnished and might wish to impose a condition to the effect that the person who took it would not not cook highly spiced materials in the house. He implied that that could be a reasonable condition to impose because the smell of the spice would attach to the curtains and the furniture and that would be a legitimate reason for wanting to impose what would amount to a racial discrimination. That very well illustrates the kind of creeping discrimination which we have to try to stop. It is vitally important that, before discrimination has a cancerous and long-term effect, we nip it in the bud. God knows we must not trample on the fundaments of our legal system. In doing so we would do more harm than good.
That example well shows the kind of thing we have to try to catch.
It is because I think we shall manage, with proper and sufficient safeguards, to catch that type of discrimination with the Bill as it stands, and would have greater difficulty in catching it if the Lords amendment is accepted that I am inclined to vote against it.
Finally, I raise a point which has been been made in the House and in another place, namely that this kind of provision already exists with regard to sex discrimination. I do not recall that people felt that in that instance there was great objection in principle to its introduction.

4.45 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Bell: The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) has rightly said that this is a very narrow point, but I think that he has widened it a little because the problem he posed, of a condition requiring somebody not to cook highly spiced foods, would not be caught by this provision at all since a person from India who liked curry could, nevertheless, comply with the condition perfectly well. It is not something inherent in him but a practice which could be objectionable in particular circumstances.
The Minister of State, too, widened the debate a little by saying that we should not bother about the shifting of

the burden of proof because we were dealing with civil jurisdiction. He implied that we were making rather heavy weather of it. I shall not repeat what I have often said about the extreme harshness of the civil procedure in this context. I shall merely summarise it by saying that it is much much harsher than a criminal procedure in this context, for reasons which I have given seriatim.
This has been illustrated in one way in the case of Mr. Relf. For an act of discrimination under this legislation one may, in theory, find oneself imprisoned for the rest of one's life. A person is quite likely to be sent to prison and if he is not, the damages and the costs awarded against him are very much higher than any fine that any court would impose. There are other factors, but that is enough to show that we are dealing with something serious.
There is another point which arises out of the Bill and that is that a person who has committed an act of discrimination is to be deemed for certain purposes to be a person of generally bad character. He is labelled as such for the rest of his life. This goes far beyond any of the provisions of the criminal law. Let us not be misled by the Minister's speech into thinking that we are on a small point here. We have to treat it seriously and arrive at the right solution.
The Minister of State justified his resistance to the Lords Amendment by quoting other occasions in the civil and criminal law where the burden shifts to the accused. I know that to be true. I have resisted many of those instances during their passage through the House, as have other hon. Members. Hon. Members have always used the argument, rightly, that each one is used as a precedent for the next. Each one is justified on its special circumstances and then used as a precedent. The Minister of State gave an example of a person consorting with prostitutes and living on immoral earnings. He has to explain that. There were other cases like that.
In Clause 1 we are discussing indirect discrimination where it may be assumed that a person is not discriminating directly or intentionally. He is putting requirements forward for a job—without any intention to discriminate—with which it would be more difficult, perhaps, for a


West Indian immigrant to comply than a native Briton.

Mr. Emlyn Hooson: Would the hon. and learned Member give concrete examples?

Mr. Bell: One easy thing would be for someone to say that he wanted two passes at A-level. That would certainly rule out most West Indian immigrants.
There are plenty of other features that I could mention, qualifications with which an African immigrant would find it very difficult to comply—and a good many Asiatic immigrants, too. There is no difficulty about imagining those, but it may be more agreeable and tactful not to go through the list.
If such a requirement is to the detriment of an immigrant applicant because it would be more difficult for him to comply than it would be for others, the person being complained about is guilty—I use the criminal word, I do not know what other word I can use to describe an act of discrimination—unless he can show that it is justifiable irrespective of the matters alleged in the subsection. How can one make a comparison between that and a situation involving consorting with prostitutes or of being in possession of a bill of exchange which has been fraudulently negotiated? How can one bring in examples presented to us by other laws?
In this case we have somebody who is acting in the most normal and, without this legislation, justifiable way, without even the requirement of intention. He is put into the position of being in peril, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that such action was justifiable in relation to the job.
The definition in this provision is not very exact. An employer may say "That is the sort of person I want because this involves only a small operation." We must remember that there is no exemption in the Bill for smallness, as there used to be. If there are only one or two people employed, the employer may say "I want that person because he is a complaisant and agreeable collaborator." However, that will not get him very far.
We are dealing here with the most extreme clause in the Bill. We are saying that a citizen can be called before the

courts and put in peril of a damaging financial experience, and that if he is obdurate he will be sent to prison for doing something which, until now, would be considered the most normal action anybody would be entitled to, namely, to specify the requirements for a job without reference to race or colour but merely by saying "These are the qualifications which I shall be seeking in an applicant".
Because of the obsession of some people with discrimination, this requirement is to be rooted out. It is being said that any penumbra of a shadow of discrimination must be proceeded against in the courts. Therefore, by this extreme clause the Government are saying that if a person is hauled before the courts, he will have to fight his own way out.
If this provision goes through, it will add one big log to the fire of legitimate resentment which is felt by the population at this constant battering by people whom they must think are anti-British to the core by people whose view is that anybody who is coloured can do nothing wrong and that anybody who is white can do nothing right. That is the impression that is being gained, and this kind of legislation justifies it. It is outrageous and is deeply resented by the British people. The Minister will be foolish if he does not take the opportunity afforded to him by the Lords of accepting this minimal and extremely sensible amendment.

Mr. John Lee: This discussion will be a long vigil and I shall not burden the House with a lengthy speech from the Labour Benches. Indeed, it behoves hon. Members on both sides of the House to be as brief as possible in their remarks, and I propose to observe that rule.
It is evident that a number of hon. Members, including the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell), have no desire for this legislation to be effective. That is the principal reason for their taking the line they are adopting today—and I suspect that it was the principal reason why the other place railroaded through the enormous number of amendments now before us, amendments which, taken in totality, would emasculate the Bill.
Having said that, let me say by way of contrast that I have some misgivings about any provision in any law which, however laudable, seeks to erode a fundamental principle in the burden of proof. It seems strange that we should choose to do this not as part of an act of law reform when the whole matter can be seen in the whole perspective of English law, but as a side wind. I suspect that when the courts come to determine cases under this law we shall run into difficulties with the judges.
Judges over a long period of time tend to lean against certain concepts. For example, judges have leaned against statutory offences, for the very good reason that it is a fundamental ingredient of English criminal law that there should be mens rea—a guilty intent with regard to a particular offence.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman's remarks in this context, but I think he meant to refer to absolute statutory offences.

Mr. Lee: I am obliged to the hon. and learned Gentleman. That is what I meant to say.
When we try to go beyond this area there is a tendency to seek redress. Let me give an example. I used this example when the House discussed the deplorable Sexual Offences Bill, a measure which will put all kinds of hazards in the way of somebody wrongfully convicted of rape. I was the one Member of the House who fought against that legislation all the way.
I then mentioned the case of Sweet v. Parsley when the House of Lords rightly reversed the decision of the Divisional Court. That case involved an owner of premises who was found guilty because cannabis had been smoked on her premises. If we accept this amendment inserted by the Lords, whatever their motives—and I suspect that for the most part they were deplorable motives—it probably will not make much difference, and indeed, paradoxically, it may be easier for this law to be made effective because there will be less resistance by the judges in the appellate courts when these matters are considered at a higher level.

Mr. Sydney Bidwell: My hon. Friend knows that I regard any

contribution he makes as of far greater significance than any contributions on this subject that we are likely to hear from the Opposition Benches. I agree with my hon. Friend that these provisions in the amendment are in line with what was sought to be done in the Sexual Offences Act. I am sure my hon. Friend will have in mind that those who are engaged in anti-racialist activities and who seek to extend racial harmony believe that eventually the two agencies that cover these subjects should be amalgamated. It would be quite wrong to have a sense of outrage, even from a legal point of view, about this aspect if such a view were not expressed when we considered the other Bill.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Lee: I understand my hon. Friend's reasoning. This is an arguable proposition but I am not expressing a, sense of outrage. My view is that the Minister's whole approach is commendably correct. My fear is that we should be pushing our luck with the courts if, as a side wind of this piece of legislation, we were to take such a course.
My hon. Friend has mentioned another piece of legislation which has run in parallel with the Bill. It is part of a laudable campaign that we have run to eliminate discrimination from our public life. When cases come to be considered under that Act it may well be that we shall come up against the problem that I shall describe—I hope not with impropriety—as the psychiatry of judges.
Perhaps I should say straight away that I have no intention of voting against the Government, although I have not the slightest inhibition about doing so when I feel that it is the proper course. I have voted against the Government on many occasions, but generally speaking I have done so for far worthier causes than that now before us.
I suggest in the friendliest possible spirit to my hon. Friend that it might not be bad tactics to accept the amendment and some of the others that follow that are on similar lines. That acceptance would cause the filibusters to fall flat on their faces. If my hon. Friend took that couse, they would not be able to argue at such great length.
My hon. Friend assisted the promoters of a ridiculous and oppressive piece of


legislation—namely, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill. When the House considered that measure, he persuaded my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Corbett) to accept an amendment to delete the words "conspiracy to rape". It was an otiose provision, but the fact that it was there enabled me to argue at greater length. If my hon. Friend had not been persuaded to accept the amendment, it is possible that I might have succeeded in talking out that piece of legislation. That was my desire but my hon. Friend the Minister of State sabotaged my attempt. I suggest that he might sabotage the tactics of the filibusterers on the Opposition Benches if he accepted the amendment before us.
On a rather more serious plane, it would do. no harm—possibly, paradoxically, it might do some good—if my hon. Friend were to accept the amendment.

Mr. Hooson: I have come to the firm conclusion that the Government are right in the attitude that they have taken towards the amendment. The real test for the House is whether it wants this legislation to be effective. It would ill become the House to give the impression that it wanted to pass a Bill but did not want it to be effective. That is the impression that would be given if the House were to leave loopholes that allowed racial discrimination to take place in the absence of effective sanctions.
Like the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve), I have spent my life at the Bar. When I approach legislation which transfers an onus of proof from one side to the other my whole instinct is to be against it. When I first considered the issue in the context of the Bill, I thought that I should probably be against it. However, the more I looked at it, the more it seemed that there would be no real chance of injustice, and that is the real test.
When the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) was speaking I asked him to give an example of the sort of discrimination that he thought might result in some injustice. The best he could do was to suggest that if a job were available for someone with two A-levels and an advertisement were displayed to that effect, that might in some

way be interpreted as discrimination on the ground of race, colour or something of that sort. With the greatest respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I have never heard such nonsense in my life. If that is the best example he can suggest, heaven help us.

Mr. Grieve: I appreciate what the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying, but if the test which he is asking the House to apply in this case is right it would be right to apply it to every criminal case where intent is a necessary ingredient of the crime.

Mr. Hooson: I respectfully disagree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. I refer him to the speech that was made in another place by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham. Lord Hailsham gave three reasons for departing from the normal rule to which the hon. and learned Gentleman is so attached, namely, that the onus should be placed firmly on the man who complains that there has been a breach of the law. Lord Hailsham said:
Secondly, it is generally recognised, and I have every sympathy for this and support it where the, principle is applicable, that where a matter is distinctly within the knowledge of the accused and not within the knowledge of the party asseverating the ingredient in the crime or the delict, then the possession of that knowledge—for instance, the possession of a licence in certain cases—is something which the accused ought to bring forward and establish to the satisfaction of the court on the balance of probabilities. This is perfectly good justice and I would not object to it as a general principle."—[Official Report. House of Lords, 27th September 1976; Vol. 374, c. 30.]
The point has already been made that Lord Hailsham constantly referred to this provision as though he were dealing with the criminal law. We are dealing with civil proceedings but the principle he adumbrated is important and seems to be entirely applicable to this debate.
The person who brings an action under these proceedings has to prove four things. The onus of proof transfers to the other side on one matter only when the person who has taken the action has proved all the other things. There is that requirement when an act cannot be shown to be justifiable, irrespective of colour, race, nationality or the ethnic or national origin of the person to whom it is applied. The onus is on the other side to prove that there has


been an act of discrimination. All that is required of the person against whom the allegation is made is to establish that he has done it for a perfectly valid reason unconnected with colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origin.
Nothing is said in the Bill about the standard of proof. A great deal of difficulty has arisen in these discussions because of the absence of standard of proof. Everyone knows that in a defamation case in the High Court the onus of proof is on the plaintiff, but in an issue involving qualified privilege the onus—it may be a lesser onus—rests with the defendant.
What is the standard to be applied by the judges? That is a matter for the judges to decide. I think that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Handsworth (Mr. Lee) was right when he said that the judges would have something to say about the standard as opposed to the onus of proof.
The reality is that the Race Relations Bill is passing through the House and it is the desire of most Members that the Bill be effective. If it is to be made effective, it is necessary to have the onus put upon the other side, namely, the person against whom an act of discrimination has already been proved, to make it effective. I do not think that that will result in any injustice.

Mr. Ronald Bell: The point of the illustration I gave about an advertisement specifying two A-levels was not that it would be irrespective of race, and so on. The qualification for that is in a different clause. I do not think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has been studying the text of the Bill very closely. I remind him of the wording of Clause 1(1):
… a requirement or condition …
(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of the same racial group as that other who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it".
That is the point of my reference to A-levels. It gives the burden of proof.

Mr. Hooson: I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has misapprehended the provision. I do not think that any court will suggest that an advertisement requiring someone to have two A-levels is a clearly valid reason that the standard of

attainment required for the job will be regarded as colour discrimination. This is clearly an important matter. We are not here departing from the normal standards of our law. The onus of proof is normally always on the person who avers that there has been a breach of the law. That has always been the general rule, although there have been exceptions since the Bills of Exchange Act 1880, and I think that this is one of the exceptions.

Mr. John Stokes: In the debate so far we have heard many lawyers, but if the Bill becomes an Act it will have to be understood and obeyed by the vast bulk of the population who are not lawyers. I think that the ordinary Englishman believes, as his ancestors have believed for centuries—since the English law first came down to us from our Saxon and Norman kings and their councils—that a man is innocent until proved guilty. That, of course, still applies, thank goodness, in most instances of grave offences against our law—even the gravest, such as treason, murder, rape and robbery with violence.
Therefore, the ordinary man, whom we all represent, will ask himself why this matter of racial discrimination is so overwhelmingly important that it must have different legal principles applied to it. If they could be here, our constituents would be astonished that this debate is taking place at all. When the nation is in the greatest economic crisis since the war, and when, above all, everyone is looking for a lead from the Government and the House, they would be astonished that we are having to spend the greater part of the day on legislation which most people think is vexatious, unwise and unfair to English people. One will not hear any man or woman in the street criticise the other place for these important amendments, which show, I believe, that the Lords are, in this instance, more trustees for the rights of ordinary English men and women than are hon. Members opposite.
Clause 1 shows how unsuitable for law-making this sort of thing is. I suspect that that is one of the reasons why the Lords did not accept this part of the Bill. Why are we in this House repeatedly called upon to pass laws which exaggerate the importance of racial


discrimination in our lives, making it a worse offence than anything else? Why do we have to alter the rules of evidence, which are understood throughout the country, just in this case? I fear that if we allow this clause to go through without the Lords amendment, in time, whatever view the judges may take innocent people will be found guilty. I believe that the attempt to put this provision back as it was is grossly unfair to the vast majority of the people whom we represent, and is another attack on their ancient liberties.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. Nick Budgen: It is an ancient and well-tried principle of the English common law that the representative of the prosecution or the plaintiff shall prove his case from first to last. The Minister of State conceded that in general the burden of proof should always rest either upon the prosecution or upon the plaintiff, but he argued for the proposition that the burden of proof in this case should rest upon the respondent or the defendant. He said, first, that this was not a penal matter. That is true. In theory at least, we are dealing with something that can properly be described as a tort. The usual consequence of a citizen being found guilty of a tort is that he pays damages or costs.
In this case, however, the consequences of a breach of the tort of discrimination will be far more serious. Here, I do not just want to take up the points that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) made about the enormous monetary consequences of being found guilty of discrimination. It goes much further than that.
From Clause 12, it is obvious that any organisation which seeks to discriminate as defined in the Bill will be found guilty of an offence, and very serious consequences will flow from that. Again, if a person wishes to be a dentist or a barrister or a solicitor—to belong to any of the professional bodies in the country, indeed—the fact that he has been guilty of discrimination is a factor which, under Clause 12, the professional body concerned has to take into account, and it may well refuse him entry into that closed shop. We are dealing with something that may give rise to a man being unemployed

for the whole of his life, and which may make an organisation totally ineffective.
For example, the State spends 60 per cent, of the gross national product. Let us suppose that a firm producing certain goods is found guilty of discrimination. It may well be that it will never again sell its goods to a Government body. Although theoretically we are dealing with what is a tort, the consequences of being found guilty of that tort are far more serious than the consequences of being found guilty of many crimes. So the Minister of State is wrong in suggesting that an exception to the vitally important principle of the common law can be considered on the ground that this is merely a tort.
The Minister's second argument was that this part of the tort of discrimination concerns a matter wholly within the knowledge of the respondent. That is not a good argument for breaching the fundamental principle of the common law. Under the criminal law, the prosecution has to prove the intention to defraud, for example. Plainly the question whether the accused man intends to defraud is something that is peculiarly within his knowledge. Nevertheless, the prosecution has to point to the elements of the evidence and persuade the jury that the intention of the accused was to defraud. So once again, the Minister cannot breach the overriding principle on that second ground.
The third argument was put forward by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson), who, although a lawyer of great eminence, did, I suggest respectfully, take a bad point here. He said that in the tort of discrimination there are five constituent parts. In the first four, the onus of proof is on the plaintiff or the prosecution, but on the fifth it is on the respondent. That is not a good argument. In many criminal charges, there are three, four or even five constituent parts, each of which has to be proved by the prosecution. The fact that there are a number of constituent parts does not allow the prosecution to say that having proved four, which was pretty hard work, the onus should now be shifted on to the respondent to prove the fifth. That is plainly a bad argument.
The other argument put forward by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery was that the law must be effective. Just what does he mean? That is a good parrot cry, but it does not stand up to serious analysis in relation to a well-tried common law principle like the need to force the prosecution to put its case. If we want this law to be effective—and that always has been the cry of the authoritarian throughout the ages—we could say that anybody who is accused would automatically be found guilty by virtue of being accused. That would be extremely effective. But effectiveness has nothing to do with it. The legal principles have been hammered out in an attempt to get a balance between the authoritarian demands of the State and the rights of the individual. To talk about the need to be effective is not a good argument against the central proposition accepted here by the Minister of State. The importance of great common law maxims is that they have been hammered out over the years by the experience of many people, and they are proof against the fashions and the emotions of the moment.
We are dealing here with fashionable legislation. It is fashionable among the south-east proponents of the civilised society. I do not denigrate their views, which are put forward with great elegance and force. But these people with fashionable views will, on occasions, walk over people who hold less fashionable views.
The principles of common law are proof against the emotions of the moment as well. Supposing, for example, that in a rush of blood this House decided to introduce a new criminal offence of mugging, and in order to make it effective, put the onus of proof on the accused. I bet there would be plenty of hon. Gentlemen on the Government Benches who would say, quite rightly, that this was a disgraceful Fascist attempt by the Right Wing to accuse black people of muggings. If we say that it is disgraceful that black people should be treated in this way and subjected to a standard of proof different from that applied to anyone else in this country, the same argument must apply to this fashionable tort of discrimination. These legal principles should be applied as a safeguard for the rights of individual citizens against the efforts of arbitrary people to impose their will.

Mr. George Cunningham: But surely we have done this in the last year or two. We have responded to a very dangerous situation by introducing the antiterrorism legislation. That was not a response to emotion. It was a response to the particular needs of the time. Surely that is what we are doing here.

Mr. Budgen: The anti-terrorism legislation was introduced for a short period, and it is renewable each year. Undoubtedly it takes away the rights of individual citizens, but the same argument was applied to some war-time legislation which was also introduced for a short period. This race relations legislation is being introduced for ever, presumably, and it is not being introduced in response to transitory conditions in which the State takes away individuals' rights in the face of a greater evil. In this case, we must adhere to the fundamental principles of English common law.
I take up an important point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hands-worth (Mr. Lee), about dealing with judges' attitudes to this sort of legislation. Surely all legislation must be based on consent. If it is not, there is a risk that those who have to apply it will not do so. The most obvious example of legislation on the statute book which was not applied was the highly offensive penal legislation against the Luddites. Time and time again, when these people were being charged before the criminal courts, juries refused to convict them in the face of overwhelming evidence, because they thought that these unhappy people should not be convicted and transported for breaches of the criminal law which the juries regarded as wholly unfair.
There was a story about a case on the circuit on which I practise. It is reputed that this is a true story, and I am sure it is, although I have not researched it. There was one action at the assize court in which a dear old farmer defended himself against allegations that he was in breach of planning regulations. He defended himself with great vigour but very little relevance. At the end of the day, the judge summed up in these terms:
Members of the jury, Mr. X is accused of an offence under the planning regulations. There is, in law, no defence to the prosecution case. But I am bound to tell you that if you find Mr. X not guilty, there is nothing


I can do about it and nothing the law can do to Mr. X.
So, against all the evidence and as a consequence of the judge's acting with great humanity but total impropriety, the accused was found not guilty.
If we stick this sort of legislation down the throats of county court judges and our fellow citizens, we will reach the stage where the law is not being properly applied by those whose duty it is to apply it. I believe that the Minister of State should take account of the fact that the fundamental principle behind this legislation is highly contentious.
I believe profoundly that there is no general consent for the legislation. The Government believe otherwise, but if they wish to get consent for the general principle they will do well to make sure that the details are seen to be as fair as possible. It is by adherence to the fundamental principles of English common law that the Government will demonstrate their desire to be fair about the details.

5.30 p.m.

Mr. Patrick Mayhew: We believe that the Lords amendment ought to stand. It reflects what we argued in Standing Committee and on Report. It is plainly right, notwithstanding that the mischief which it is aimed to overcome is also to be found in the Sex Discrimination Act, which was referred to by the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham). At risk of spoiling everybody's fun, not least that of the Minister of State, I shall break a hallowed convention and say that I wish that I had paid a bit more attention to that Act when it went through the House. It contains blemishes which are lovingly relied upon by the Government, who say that the House is stuck with these blemishes in all parallel legislation for ever more. That is to say that
the struggle naught availeth …
And as things have been, things remain.
That is hardly an encouraging approach to adopt. Because I have driven over one red traffic light by mistake I do not feel obliged to drive over the next on purpose. I therefore am not persuaded by the unlovely precedent of the Sex Discrimination Act in anything that I have to say.
We are concerned with the offence of discrimination, to which the Bill will apply, and with the way in which it should be proved. I make no apology for calling it the offence of discrimination. Discrimination is the mischief at which the Bill is aimed. Under the Bill sanctions against discrimination have already been touched upon by several of my hon. Friends. I am not surprised because those sanctions are formidable. In case we get it into our heads that this is a sort of liars' party, that it is a pedantic and somewhat unrealistic debate, which is being conducted primarily for the lawyers, we should remember that we are debating a Bill that provides substantial sanctions for those who discriminate on racial grounds. We are not dealing with a Bill which is merely exhortation and which provides for a mere rap over discriminating knuckles. Part 2, which deals with employment, imposes a subjection to the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal. At present the tribunal can impose what is, in effect, a fine up to a maximum of £5,200. That may have been extended by order; I do not know. It is called compensation, but in effect it is a fine. It is payable to the person discriminated against, but in effect it is a fine imposed by the tribunal.
Under Part III, which deals with education, the supply of goods, services and premises, one can be hauled before a county court or, in Scotland, a sheriff court, and there made to pay substantial damages. There is no legal aid for a respondent before an industrial tribunal. In practice, he never gets his costs even if he wins. Before both the industrial tribunal and the county and sheriff courts the Bill provides that the complainant, but not the respondent, may claim advice and help of the most comprehensive kind from the Commission. To this had to be added—before their Lordships happily deleted it—the right for the prospective complainant to interrogate his prospective opponent as to his reasons for doing any relevant act before he so much as formulated the complaint that he might in good time have thought it right to bring.
As if that were not enough, there is the sanction of branding the respondent as the perpetrator of an unlawful act. In these days, when so much patronage is


exercised by government—both local and central—in commercial and as well as many other fields, that is not a negligible sanction. Therefore, I believe that we could properly say that under this Bill discrimination has to be looked at as an offence and that the complaint of discrimination takes on the nature of a charge. In the face of such a charge, attended by such potentially enormous sanctions, we believe it would be repugnant that any man should have to prove himself innocent.
I appreciate the argument of the Minister of State that in one important particular that cannot be said of this clause, but it is worth reminding ourselves why this is a principle of English common law, whether civil or criminal. It has been the bedrock of our common law for centuries that one is not allowed, as a complainant, to say "I said you did; now prove you did not". The reason this has been the bedrock of our law is quite simple. It was well expressed in another place by Lord Foot. He said:
Once the prosecution have proved the fact that he imposed this condition upon the taking of such a job, then the court before whom this matter comes have got to ask themselves, 'Has the defendant nevertheless satisfied us and shown that this was justifiable irrespective of matters of race and the like?' Supposing the court is in doubt. Supposing the court says, 'We really do not know. We have listened to the prosecution, who have said that this is obviously discriminatory. We have listened to the explanation given to us by the defendant, and he says that it was not intended to be discriminatory but was imposed for quite different reasons'. If they should come to the conclusion that the burden of proof has not been satisfied by the defendant, then they are obliged to convict."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 27th September 1976; Vol. 374, c. 40.]
We therefore believe that it is unjust that a Bill with these virtually criminal sanctions of great potential severity should impose a burden of proof upon the defendant. One has only to test the provision against the practical example of what will happen if the court is left in doubt to see why we have had this principle at the root of our criminal law for all these years.
Once this House legislates in that way it produces an Act of Parliament which is seen to be unfair. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) said that it did no good to the cause of racial tolerance to legislate in a

way that was seen to be unfair. By doing that one minimises confidence in the law, and, most important, resentment builds up against the beneficiaries. For the greater part those beneficiaries will be coloured people, and resentment against them is the last thing we would want to see. I question whether the Minister of State is right when he says that the clause as it was before the Lords amended it does not propose any significant departure from what is already in our civil or criminal law.
The hon. Gentleman reminded us of Lord Hailsham's reference to the three classes of cases where the burden was shifted and the one case where the matter at issue was solely within the knowledge of the accused. The Minister also gave us the result of much midnight oil-burning by those who sit beyond the Bar, and quoted a number of examples of statutory provisions where the burden was shifted. We heard about Section 30 of the Bills of Exchange Act, Section 81 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, and others. It is common ground that there are these statutory examples, but this Bill is not in that category.
We are concerned with the question whether an act is justifiable irrespective of colour, race, nationality or ethnic origin. We are not concerned with how the respondent would justify it and the question whether it is justifiable is not solely within his knowledge.
It is not a difficult burden for the complainant to discharge. In an open-and-shut case, he has only to point to the facts and show that an action was plainly unreasonable and could not be justifiable. Not all cases will be open-and-shut. There will be debatable cases, with matters of balance and judgment for the courts to weigh.
What possible justification can there be for the complainant not having to prove his case or not having to establish a prima facie case? It is not very difficult, but he should have to point to some evidence that is not capable of being justified without relation to race and the rest of it.

Mr. Bidwell: As a buttress to their arguments, hon. Members on the Opposition Benches have cited that put-up job, the Relf case. in which the public were


naturally interested. Does the hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that the original wording in the Bill has no bearing on that case?

Mr. Mayhew: I do not wish to be diverted into a consideration of that case, which was solely a matter of the best way to deal with contempt of court. Of course it generated a great deal of resentment, ill-feeling and anxiety, in exactly the same way as I indicated could happen where there is unfair and manifestly unjust legislation.
The Minister of State said that this legislation was on all fours with the list he gave us and that it came within the categories propounded by Lord Hailsham, but that is not so. Whether an action is justifiable may be debatable and the person who makes a complaint should have the burden of establishing a prima facie case. It is not a difficult burden to discharge.
It is wrong that a statute with these sanctions should transfer, in an important particular, the burden of proof so that we could get the situation described by Lord Foot of a court being in doubt and having to convict. It is also extremely dangerous for this House ever to legislate to put the burden on a defendant because a precedent is created and it become much harder to resist it on the next occasion. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Handsworth (Mr. Lee) voiced fairly his misgivings about any suggestion that the burden should be shifted.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) has left the Chamber after voicing a thoroughly illiberal sentiment. Nothing less liberal can be imagined than seeking to justify such a provision by saying that we must make the law effective. The more hideous the offence, the more important it is that the law does not permit an innocent person to be convicted of it. We shall not run the risk of such an injustice occurring.
There are rare cases in which the burden of proof can be transferred, but this is not one of them. We ought to be particularly careful not to add to that very small number of cases in which this is done unless we are driven to it by overwhelming necessity. No such necessity exists here, and I hope that my hon. Friends will support the Lords amendment.

5.45 p.m.

Mr. John: The Opposition must single out what is criminal responsibility and what is civil responsibility. The two became confused in their minds and their terminology. Words such as "guilty" and mens rea are matters of criminal evidence. We are dealing with civil liability. I heard such ringing declarations about the state of the law that I began to think that the most subversive doctrine in English law must be res ipsa loquitur under which, in effect, a defendant is called upon to explain a point.
Before the stage which we are now discussing is reached a complainant must prove that a racially discriminatory condition has been set up. It is all very well for the Opposition to say that the burden of proof is a mere nothing, but if they analyse the clause—and far too few of them have done so—they will see just how difficult it is for a person who alleges indirect discrimination to succeed in raising that presumption.
The hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Smith) said that legislation must be intelligible to the layman, but I find that the people who are potentially the victims of indirect discrimination recognise that condition. The hon. Gentleman, from his experience of the Select Committee, will know that the idea against which the clause is directed is perfectly well known to them. Racial discrimination is a complex matter and the statutory armaments against it must sometimes necessarily be complex.

Mr. Dudley Smith: I agree with what the Minister has said. It is a fair point. However, he must surely understand that while other laws affect highly-educated and ill-educated people it is more likely that—apart from the people are evilly motivated and endeavour deliberately to create discrimination—less intelligent people will commit racial discrimination, partly, perhaps subconsciously. They may find themselves in breach of this legislation, and it is surely our duty to make the law as clear as possible to them and everyone.

Mr. John: I have never found breaches of the law necessarily categorised as by people of either less or more intelligence. I have met people whose intelligence was not in doubt who have committed the


most simple breaches of the law in complete ignorance but in complete confidence that they knew what the law was. The hon. Gentleman has not given a fair example. We are talking about a condition which has been imposed and which militates against the complainant because it militates against his racial group more severely than others.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) talked about two passes at A-level. There are jobs for which two A-level passes are necessary. If so, that is a justifiable condition which the person concerned would be able to impose and that would dispose of the matter, but if the condition of two A-level passes had as the motive not qualification for the job but to keep out, for example, West Indians who the prospective employer knew could not fulfil the condition in the same numbers as others, that would be potentially discriminatory.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Surely the Minister appreciates that motive is irrelevant in this clause. It has nothing to do with motive. I made this point in relation to the question: what do we mean by "justifiable"? I postulated an employer who wanted a person of that kind to work for him. The suggestion was that the qualification may not have been necessary for the job in the strict sense, but that, because it was a small unit, and without any thought of racial discrimination, he may have wanted somebody with that educational standard. How would he be placed?

Mr. John: If the condition was justifiable, he would be excused. If not, and if it has the effect of being racially discriminatory, it ought not to be protected and neither should he.
In passing, I say to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen), who talked about there being no general consent for this legislation, that

we are considering Lords amendments. Frankly, general consent for the legislation has been given, according to the usages of this House, on Second Reading, in Committee, and on Report.

The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) referred to discrimination and raising resentment almost by inadvertence through the law heightening rather than lessening tension. Before that situation arises, a condition must be laid down which is proved to be potentially racially discriminatory. The complainant must prove a racially discriminatory act. On the other hand—I hope that hon. Members will not try to minimise this—the respondent has to discharge only one of the five tests. The onus is on him to prove that the condition laid down, which is racially discriminatory, is justifiable. This is not a great breach of the principle, nor is it a great injustice, because it is he who has laid down the condition and therefore he knows the reason for it. If it is not found to be justifiable on examination, the person who laid down that condition ought not to be exempted or sheltered in any way.

I did not seek to put things on all fours, nor did I cite the doctrine of precedent, because I did not mention the Sex Discrimination Act, having taken an oath early in Committee to mention it as little as possible, but there are circumstances in which it is right, where a person has laid down a condition, for him to be asked to prove that it is justifiable. I believe that this is such a case. Therefore, I submit that their Lordships were profoundly wrong in putting in this amendment and I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to join me in rejecting it.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 213, Noes 160.

Division No. 344.]
AYES
[5.56 p.m.


Abse, Leo
Bates, Alf
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)


Allaun, Frank
Beith, A. J.
Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)


Anderson, Donald
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Buchanan, Richard


Archer, Peter
Bidwell, Sydney
Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)


Armstrong, Ernest
Bishop, E. S.
Campbell, Ian


Ashley, Jack
Blenkinsop, Arthur
Cant, R. B.


Ashton, Joe
Boardman, H.
Carmichael, Neil


Atkinson, Norman
Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
Cartwright, John


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Clemitson, Ivor


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Bray, Dr Jeremy
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)




Cohen, Stanley
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Coleman, Donald
John, Brynmor
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)


Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Rowlands, Ted


Corbett, Robin
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
Ryman, John


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Sandelson, Neville


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Sedgemore, Brian


Crawshaw, Richard
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)


Cronin, John
Judd, Frank
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony
Kaufman, Gerald
Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)


Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Lambie, David
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Lamborn, Harry
Silverman, Julius


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Lamond, James
Skinner, Dennis


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)
Small, William


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Lee, John
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Dempsey, James
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)


Doig, Peter
Luard, Evan
Spearing, Nigel


Dormand, J. D.
McCartney, Hugh
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)


Eadie, Alex
McElhone, Frank
Stoddart, David


Edge, Geoff
MacFarquhar, Roderick
Stott, Roger


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
MacKenzie, Gregor
Strauss, Rt Hon G. R.


English, Michael
Mackintosh, John P.
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Maclennan, Rober
Swain, Thomas


Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
McNamara, Kevin
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Faulds, Andrew
Magee, Bryan
Thompson, George


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Flannery, Martin
Marks, Kenneth
Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marquand, David
Tinn, James


Ford, Ben
Marshall Dr Edmund (Goole)
Torney, Tom


Forrester, John
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Tuck, Raphael


Fowler Gerald (The Wrekin)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Urwin, T. W.



Mellish, Rt Hon Robert



Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Mikardo, Ian
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)


Freeson, Reginald
Millan Rt Hon Bruce
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)


Freud, Clement
Moonman, Eric
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Garrett, John (Norwich S)

Ward, Michael



Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)



Garrett, W. E. (wallsend)
Morris Rt Hon J (Aberavon)
Watkins, David


Ginsburg, David
Moyle, Roland
Watkinson, John


Golding, John
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick
Watt, Hamish


Gourlay, Harry
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King
Weetch, Ken


Graham, Ted
Newens, Stanley
Wellbeloved, James


Grant, George (Morpeth)
Oakes, Gordon
Welsh, Andrew


Grant, John (Islington C)
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Ovenden, John
White, James (Pollock)


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Pardoe, John
Whitehead, Phillip


Hardy, Peter
Park, George
Whitlock, William


Harper, Joseph
Parker, John
Wigley, Dafydd


Harrison, Walter (Wakefleld)
Parry, Robert
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Hatton, Frank
Penhaligon, David
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)


Henderson, Douglas
Perry, Ernest
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


Hooley, Frank
Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)


Hooson, Emlyn
Radice, Giles
Wilson Alexander (Hamilton)


Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)
Woodall, Alec


Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Reid, George
Woof, Robert


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Robinson, Geoffrey
Young, David (Bolton E)


Hunter, Adam
Roderick, Caerwyn



Irvine, Rt Hon Sir A. (Edge HIM)
Rodgers George (Chorley)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford)
Rooker, J. W.
Mr. John Ellis and


Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Roper, John
Mr. A. W. Stallard.


Jeger, Mrs Lena
Rose, Paul B.





NOES


Adley, Robert
Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Finsberg, Geoffrey


Alison, Michael
Carlisle, Mark
Fookes, Miss Janet


Arnold, Tom
Channon, Paul
Forman, Nigel


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)


Awdry, Daniel
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Goodhew, Victor


Bell, Ronald
Clegg, Walter
Gorst, John


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)


Benyon, W.
Cope, John
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)


Berry, Hon Anthony
Corrie, John
Gray, Hamish


Biffen, John
Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Grieve, Percy


Biggs-Davison, John
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Griffiths, Eldon


Body, Richard
Drayson, Burnaby
Grist, Ian


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Durant, Tony
Hall, Sir John


Bottomley, Peter
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.


Brittan, Leon
Elliott, Sir William
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Eyre, Reginald
Hampson, Dr Keith


Brotherton, Michael
Fairbairn, Nicholas
Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Fairgrieve, Russell
Havers, Sir Michael


Budgen, Nick
Farr, John
Hawkins, Paul


Bulmer, Esmond
Fell, Anthony
Hayhoe, Barney







Heseltine, Michael
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Sainsbury, Tim


Hicks, Robert
Mayhew, Patrick
St. John-Stevas, Norman


Higgins, Terence L.
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Holland, Philip
Miscampbell, Norman
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Hordern, Peter
Moate, Roger
Shersby, Michael


Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Molyneaux, James
Silvester, Fred


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Monro, Hector
Sims, Roger


Hunt, John (Bromley)
More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Sinclair, Sir George


Hurd, Douglas
Morgan, Geraint
Skeet, T. H. H.


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Admiral
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)


James, David
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Speed, Keith


Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd&amp;W'df'd)
Morrison, Hon Peter (Chester)
Spence, John


Jessel, Toby
Mudd, David
Sproat, lain


Jones, Arthur (Daventry)
Neave, Airey
Stanley, John


Jopling, Michael
Nelson, Anthony
Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Neubert, Michael
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Kershaw, Anthony
Newton, Tony
Stokes, John


King, Evelyn (South Dorset)
Onslow, Cranley
Stradling Thomas, J.


Kitson, Sir Timothy
Page, John (Harrow West)
Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)


Knight, Mrs Jill
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Tebbit, Norman


Lamont, Norman
Paisley, Rev Ian
Townsend, Cyril D.


Latham, Michael (Melton)
Percival, Ian
Vaughan, Dr Gerald


Lawrence, Ivan
Pink, R. Bonner
Viggers, Peter


Lawson, Nigel
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Wall, Patrick


Le Marchant, Spencer
Raison, Timothy
Walters, Dennis


Lloyd, Ian
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Weatherill, Bernard


Loveridge, John
Renton, Rt Hon Sir D. (Hunts)
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Luce, Richard
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Wiggin, Jerry


McCrindle, Robert
Ridsdale, Julian
Wood, Rt Hon Richard


Macfarlane, Neil
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Macmillan. Rt Hon M. (Farnham)
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)



Marten, Neil
Rodgers Sir John (Sevenoaks)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mates, Michael
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Mr. Cecil Parkinson and


Maude, Angus
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)
Mr. Jim Lester.


Mawby, Ray
Royle, Sir Anthony

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 2

DISCRIMINATION BY WAY OF VICTIMISATION

Lords Amendment: No. 2, in page 2, line 16, after "brought" insert "in good faith".

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton): With this we may discuss Lords Amendments No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Mr. John: As you have indicated, Mr. Deputy Speaker, we are taking a group of amendments. It might be convenient for me to indicate that I should like to deal with Lords Amendments No. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8, which are substantially on the same point, and then deal separately with Lords Amendments No. 5 and 7.
In opening this debate I am tempted to say that many of the arguments that will arise during the debate arose in the last debate and were covered by that. However, we are dealing with a different clause, which deals with the question of a person who asserts his right under this

legislation. It affords his protection against less favourable treatment on the ground of that assertion of his right.
I hope that it will be commonly agreed that if a person were to take advantage of an Act of Parliament conferring certain rights to test those rights in the courts he should not be victimised by the person against whom he has asserted those rights merely by taking advantage of the Act. To do otherwise would be to countenance a breach in the rule of law, which I am sure no hon. Member would wish to do.
The amendment concerns also the scope of the protection which is afforded. The other place, by the amendment, has considerably narrowed the protection which is given. The main dispute between the Government and those in the other place who inserted the amendment concerns the circumstances in which a claimant should forfeit the protection he has for asserting his rights under the Bill. The Government say that he should forefeit that protection only if he makes allegations falsely and not in good faith.
Hon. Members who are lawyers or who have experience of the law know that many people genuinely, though mistakenly, believe that they have a good defence or a good case to bring to the courts and often they are so advised. The


lawyers who advise them are as surprised as they are when the decision goes against them. It would be wholly unacceptable if, by reason only of failure—although the case was brought in good faith—a person should forefeit that protection.
The Government say that to place the burden of proof on the complainant to prove that he is giving true information in good faith places the burden wrongly, because it excludes protection which should not be excluded. I fully agree that a person is entitled to protection against anyone who brings a bad case in bad faith, but I do not believe that a person who is sincere but mistaken as to the effect of the law should be denied protection.
The other place has fallen into the error which I outlined previously, namely, the misleading use of "guilty" when we are talking about a civil not a criminal offence. What was said in the other place gives the impression that the whole burden under the clause falls upon the respondent to disprove. That is not so.
Under the clause three questions have to be decided. First, has the complainant been treated less favourably within Parts II to IV of the Bill? Secondly, is the reason for this that he did something which falls within Clause 2(1)(a) to Clause 2(1)(d)—that is, asserted a right under the Bill? In both those cases, the burden of proof is on the complainant.
Before we get to the third question, whether he brought the action falsely and in bad faith, the complainant has to discharge the very heavy onus of proof that he was victimised under Clause 2. To add to it the further burden of proof that he had given truthful evidence would be unfair, because that is what the court is there to test. Failure to prove truth or accuracy might result in his losing a case in which he might have been sincerely motivated. That would be a severe penalty. The effect would be that a person who, on any normal reading of the situation was victimised by another, would be denied protection because he would be afraid that he could not discharge the burden of proof upon him.
6.15 p.m.
Lords Amendment No. 5 deletes Clause 2(1)(c):

otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act in relation to the discriminator or any other person".
The effect of that amendment is to deny protection from victimisation to anyone who had helped the Commission in the course of a formal hearing provided for by the Bill, or who had sought the advice of the Commission or other legal advice. That would be an imposition upon the person concerned. It is to the advantage of good race relations that the complainant should afford help to the Commission in a formal hearing. To be able to victimise him because of that would be a monstrous injustice.
I find Amendment No. 7 totally illogical and indefensible. The effect of the Clause is that a person who knows that another has taken steps under the Bill can nevertheless be guilty of victimisation if he takes a discriminatory act against that other person. There would be no discriminatory act if there were only a suspicion. A person who sacks another because he reported a matter to the Commission could be guilty of victimisation. If the amendment stands, a person who sacks another because of a suspicion that he is the chap who blew the whistle to the Commission could not be said to have been victimised in any circumstance. The normal view would be that that suspicion is the lesser not the greater ground. I suggest that the amendment is wholly illogical and indefensible.
None of us believes that a person should be victimised. If he is victimised because he has taken advantage of the provisions laid down by an Act of Parliament he should be entitled to protection from that victimisation unless he has given false evidence and acted in bad faith.
On that basis, and in the belief that it is for the respondent to prove that the complainant has shown bad faith, I invite the House to disagree with the amendment

Mr. Mark Carlisle: I think that we would all agree that this is a small point. The Minister of State criticised their Lordships and said they had it wrong because they used terminology which implied that these were criminal and not civil offences, but towards the end of his speech the hon. Gentleman referred to people being found guilty of


victimisation. These matters are quasi-criminal, in that they carry with them a degree of moral stigma against the person who is said to be exercising discrimination.
There is little difference between the Minister's approach and my approach. I am sure that we would both agree that a person who exercises rights provided by statute should be entitled to protection from victimisation merely because he exercises those rights. The Minister also said that if a person exercised this right maliciously it was not unreasonable that the protection should be removed. Again I agree with him. In the end we therefore come down to only this narrow difference about whether or not proof of good faith should lie with the defendant or with the plaintiff.
If a person is discriminated against by someone else who has brought proceedings against him it is reasonable that the court or the tribunal before which the issue will appear should be required to satisfy itself that those proceedings were brought sincerely and in good faith. A person may say "I know that I have been discriminated against but, frankly, this was a wholly malicious use of the provisions and rights under the Bill. An attempt is being made to blacken me and put me in a bad position". Once that issue is raised it seems reasonable that the person who makes the complaint that he is being discriminated against, because he has brought the proceedings, should be required to show that he brought those proceedings sincerely and in good faith, to use the words of the Minister, rather than have the burden put on the defendant.
However, as the Minister will agree, it is not an easy matter to prove good faith, because it usually depends on what the intention is in the mind and thinking of the individual. It is, therefore, often difficult to prove that a person acted in good faith. Although I agree with the Minister that this is a small point, it is one on which arguments can be advanced on either side. I believe that, on balance, the other place was right to take the view that it did, and I therefore hope that the House will agree rather than disagree with the Lords in their amendments.

Mr. Dudley Smith: The Minister made great play, as he did in respect of the previous amendment about the question of whether the provisions in the Bill are criminal or civil. I am not a lawyer but I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), who made the point that he himself had fallen into the trap with regard to guilty and not guilty. Whatever the technicalities of the situation, the public at large will regard this as a criminal Bill. We all know of the civil law—it is well defined—but in some respects we are breaking new territory here. We are dealing with considerable amounts of money—up to £5,000 in extreme cases— and undoubtedly the public will regard them as fines if they are imposed.
We also heard in an earlier debate that some of the provisions in the Bill, when applied by the courts, could be extremely harsh. The Bill enters into an atmosphere of criminality even though technically it remains a civil matter. I would have thought it sensible for Parliament to pay heed to the amendments which have been written into the Bill by the Lords. They strengthen the Bill in the interest of those who may in due course be accused, by the insertion of the words "in good faith" and by the reference to "accurate" evidence. This will assist the individual who may be placed in a situation where he appears before the Court and has to prove that he is, in fact, not guilty.
We know that over the years a large number of people who will appear before the courts will be innocent, not only innocent in being able to discharge themselves but also innocent in law. What worries me about the Bill—this is why I suggest it is right to have amendments of this kind—is that, whatever view one takes about legislating on race relations, this is an emotive Bill. It must eventually be an emotive Act of Parliament. It is unlike many other aspects of our criminal or civil law. It will be used to a certain extent by extremists. There is no doubt whatever that extremists will take advantage of it and endeavour to bring proceedings against other individuals.
The extremists are always shouting that racial laws should be enacted against those who, often in public life, dare to


criticise immigrants or immigration. We may well disagree with the views put forward by certain individuals, but in our kind of society it is right to have all kinds of expression of opinion. There are many extremists, some of whom are engaged in race relations, who at the drop of a hat would say that people, even hon. Members of this House, should be prosecuted and should be taken before the appropriate race relations court. We are in great difficulty because more and more of these people—they are unwise and are reprehensibly motivated—will automatically brand anyone who takes a contrary view to themselves as racialists or suggest that they are racially biased.
We have to guard against such people when we start providing courts and laws to deal with genuine cases. I am aware that many of the proceedings that will come before the appropriate courts in due course will be perfectly genuine. It is right in certain circumstances that those who have been wronged—black people to a large extent, but also other groups—may feel they have been wronged racially and that they should have the right to state their case sensibly. We would be doing a disservice to the country if we did not recognise that there will be extremists who will try to exploit the system and the situation.
That is why I want the Bill to be as strong as possible. In these circumstances, despite what the Minister has said, the words which the other place has written into the Bill would stand future defendants in far better stead than would otherwise be the case.

Mr. Stokes: I wish to make one short point. In England's long history we have had periods of what one can only call mass hysteria. It is therefore most important that even today we should have maximum safeguards to protect individuals against malicious or even frivolous charges, or charges which happen to fit the fashionable vogues of the day.
The period to which I am referring was in the reign of King Charles II at the time of the Popish plot. We all remember the fabrications of one Titus Oates, and one recalls how many innocent people went to their death because of his lying charges. Not even the King himself was able to save those innocent people.
So much feeling is whipped up today in the matter of race relations, in an attempt to make those who protest against immigration feel that they are in some way guilty or morally wrong, that it is important that in public or private life, where we all influence each other, we can speak quite freely. If the provisions in question are brought back into the Bill, they will further restrict free speech and infringe on what a man may say, not only in his club but possibly also in his home.
The House would be most wise, therefore, to make sure that these provisions are not put back into the Bill and that we give every possible safeguard to individuals to speak frankly and freely on vital questions of the hour.

6.30 p.m.

Mr. Mayhew: We are again talking mainly about the burden of proof, and it is not necessary to go over the arguments that we advanced on the last amendment.
As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) said, this is a quasi-criminal statute and the question of burden of proof cannot be lightly passed over. If one accepts the overall scheme of the Bill, it is logical to provide against victimisation of those who use its provisions or who become associated with its procedures. Such victimisation is described as discrimination, and we do not complain about that.
There must, however, be an exception where the provisions of the Bill have not been used by the complainant in good faith. The Bill recognises that idea—for example, where someone persistently alleges that he has been sacked in the past for racial reasons when his real purpose in so doing has been simply to stir up trouble.
If a prospective employer sees someone coming in the front door whom he knows to have been a persistent and malicious pain in the neck to other local employers, he must be entitled to refuse to employ him, notwithstanding that his reason is that that person has brought proceedings against someone else under the legislation in the past. This is recognised in Clause 1(2). However, before their Lordships amended that subsection the burden of proving bad faith was


placed on the respondent. We say that that was completely unrealistic.
The Minister placed the greatest weight in his last argument upon the proposition that, where the matter with which the tribunal is concerned lies wholly within the knowledge of the respondent, the respondent should have the burden of proving it. In this case, surely the question of whether there has been bad or good faith must lie wholly within the knowledge of the complainant. If the Minister's argument was sound on the last amendment, how can he oppose this one?
The Lords say that he who says that he was in good faith should prove the matter; no one else can prove that he acted in bad faith. It is quite unrealistic to say that someone may be exempt from this liability provided he can show that the complaint was made in bad faith. It cannot be done. It would be hard enough to do so when the complaint was made against oneself, but where it was made against another person the burden is far too heavy to be justly imposed upon the respondent. It is not unreasonable for someone who claims that he is being victimised in these circumstances to prove that he acted in good faith.
We say that it would be absurd to permit such a person to say that he had made any kind of allegation under the legislation and had subsequently been victimised in consequence and thereby allow him to place upon the respondent the burden of showing not only that the allegation had been rejected by the tribunal which dealt with it but that it was all along made in bad faith. Without the amendments, the respondent would be convicted of victimisation and, therefore, of discrimination when he was innocent.
The Minister said that it would be wrong for a complainant to be penalised through having made a mistake in the law. I did not follow his argument. Whether or not one has made a mistake in the law has nothing to do with whether one acted in good or bad faith.

Mr. John: One of the amendments quoted by the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) dealt with accurate evidence.

Mr. Mayhew: That is a different matter. Accurate evidence is distinct from making a mistake in the law, which is what the Minister referred to. Certainly no lawyer would claim that anyone who had made a mistake in the law was ipso facto guilty of bad faith. It is true that Lords Amendment No. 4 relates to accurate evidence. One can be confident that the courts, in construing that, will apply the de minimis rule and will not penalise a complainant who in some tiny and immaterial respect gave evidence which was inaccurate. Courts are capable of a sensible and realistic approach.
We agree also with Lords Amendment No. 5, which deleted paragraph (c). The category of activity which was expressed there is far too vague to be included in a quasi-judicial statute.
Lords Amendment No. 6 has added the words "in good faith" to make paragraph (d) read;
alleged in good faith that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which (whether or not the allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of this Act".
We say that that would merely place the burden of proof where it belongs.
Their Lordships were also right to delete the words "or suspects" from line 28. It is impossible to prove whether anyone had acted because he suspected that something might be the case.
But our major argument in support of their Lordships relates to the burden of proof. We do not doubt that the Government's intentions in drafting the Bill were entirely honourable and that they were motivated only by a desire to see that justice was done. We believe, however, that they have got it wrong and that unless they put the burden of proof where it belongs—on the person complaining, to show that he has acted in good faith—they will be letting a genie out of this bottle which they will come dearly to rue. It will not be a benign genie but an oppressive one, capable of wreaking lasting injury on innocent people who will be helpless to prevent it.

Mr. John: With the leave of the House, I should like to reply. This has been an interesting, though short, debate. In answer to the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes), I


must point out that the clause deals not with what a man says but with what he does. It would be as well to remind hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Benches—this is where I part company with them and believe that they have got it slightly wrong—that this provision arises only after a person has treated someone less favourably.
The initial point is that someone who has brought proceedings under the Act is, in consequence, treated less favourably by another person. It must be much less unacceptable to hon. Members to say that the burden must then be on the person who has done the punishing, in that sense, to prove that the person he has punished had acted in bad faith. If they consider it in that light, hon. Members will see that the punishment has already taken place. It is not a matter of oppression. The person has taken the step and must then prove the bad faith which led him to take the step which has victimised another. That is perfectly permissible and right.
The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) addressed a question to me: how can one prove bad faith? Let us take the hon. and learned Gentleman's own example of a man who goes to a factory for a job and the employer knows that he has maliciously brought prosecutions against other employers. The complainant has knowledge of whether such allegations were made maliciously. Others might have told the employer that allegations were made purely out of spite. That is capable of proof by outside evidence, unlike the example which I gave earlier where an employer seeks to impose a highly complicated condition based on technical knowledge which is out of the ken of the complainant.

Mr. Mayhew: The employer may think that a complaint or action is taken in bad faith but will be unable to prove it. One must distinguish between a complaint that is tried and is failed and a complaint that is failed because of bad faith. How

would the employer be able to say that the complaint was made out of spite? That might be his opinion but it would not be capable of proof.

Mr. John: It is capable of proof because the employer will have discussed it with another employer and will have established the situation on the basis of the evidence.
The hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge complained that I was speaking as a lawyer. Many lawyers have taken part in the debate, and there is a danger because we think that we understand the meaning of "onus of proof". It certainly does not mean that the complainant is free from cross-examination about the good faith or bad faith involved. On the balance of probabilities, the respondent must prove that the complainant acted in bad faith rather than in good faith.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: The Minister does not seem to have appreciated two matters: first, that we are worried about professional complainants, those who come from organisations or societies; and, secondly, that these cases will occur after the event. The question of discrimination will arise at a time when no one may know anything about the facts. The employer will not be in a position to prove bad faith, because one cannot rely on tittle-tattle. There will not be a shorthand note of proceedings in the case. Therefore, the employer will never be able to establish bad faith.

Mr. John: If an employer victimises a person, the complainant may assert his rights under the Act, and it is for the employer to prove the bad faith of the complainant rather than the other way round.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment: —

The House divided: Ayes 198, Noes 150.

Division No. 345.]
AYES
[6.44 p.m.


Allaun, Frank
Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Boardman, H.


Anderson, Donald
Bates, Alf
Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur


Archer, Peter
Beith, A. J.
Boyden, James (Bish Auck)


Armstrong, Ernest
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Bray, Dr Jeremy


Ashley, Jack
Bidwell, Sydney
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)


Atkinson, Norman
Bishop, E. S.
Buchanan, Richard


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Blenkinsop, Arthur
Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)




Campbell, Ian
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Robinson, Geoffrey


Cant, R. B.
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Roderick, Caerwyn


Carmichael, Neil
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Rodgers, George (Chorley)


Cartwright, John
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Rooker, J. W.


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Hunter, Adam
Roper, John


Clemitson, Ivor
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Rose, Paul B.


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Jeger, Mrs Lena
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Cohen, Stanley
John, Brynmor
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)


Coleman, Donald
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Rowlands, Ted


Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
Ryman, John


Conlan, Bernard
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Sandelson, Neville


Corbett, Robin
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Sedgemore, Brian


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Judd, Frank
Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)


Crawshaw, Richard
Kaufman, Gerald
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Lambie, David
Silverman, Julius


Cryer, Bob
Lamborn, Harry
Skinner, Dennis


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Lamond, James
Small, William


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Lee, John
Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Spearing, Nigel


Dempsey, James
Luard, Evan
Stallard, A. W.


Doig, Peter
Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Dormand, J. D.
McCartney, Hugh
Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Stott, Roger


Dunnett Jack
McElhone, Frank
Strauss, Rt Hon G. R.


Eadie, Alex
MacFarquhar, Roderick
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Edge Geoff
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Swain, Thomas


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
MacKenzie, Gregor
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Ellis John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
Mackintosh, John P.
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Maclennan, Robert
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Evans, loan (Aberdare)
McNamara, Kevin
Thompson, George


Filch Alan (Wigan)
Magee, Bryan
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Tuck, Raphael


Flannery, Martin
Marks, Kenneth
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marquand, David
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)


Ford, Ben
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Forrester, John
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Watkins, David


Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Watkinson, John



Mellish, Rt Hon Robert
Watt, Hamish


Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Mikardo, Ian
Weetch, Ken


Freud, Clement
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Wellbeloved, James


Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Moonman, Eric
Welsh, Andrew


Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Gilbert, Dr John
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)
White, James (Pollock)


Ginsburg, David
Moyle, Roland
Whitehead, Phillip


Golding, John
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick
Whitlock, William


Gourlay, Harry
Newens, Stanley
Wigley, Dafydd


Grant, George (Morpelh)
Oakes, Gordon
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Grant, John (Islington C)
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Ovenden, John
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Park, George
Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)


Hardy, Peter
Parker, John
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Harper, Joseph
Parry, Robert
Woof, Robert


Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Perry, Ernest
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Hatton, Frank
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Young, David (Bolton E)


Henderson, Douglas
Price, C. (Lewisham W)



Hooley, Frank
Radice, Giles
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Hooson, Emlyn
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
Mr. David Stoddart and


Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Mr. James Tinn.




NOES


Adley, Robert
Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Gray, Hamish


Alison, Michael
Cope, John
Grieve, Percy


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Craig, Rt Hon W. (Belfast E)
Griffiths, Eldon


Awdry, Daniel
Crowder, F. P.
Grist, Ian


Bell, Ronald
Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Hall, Sir John


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Drayson, Burnaby
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.


Berry, Hon Anthony
Durant, Tony
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)


Biffen, John
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Hampson, Dr Keith


Biggs-Davison, John
Elliott, Sir William
Havers, Sir Michael


Body, Richard
Eyre, Reginald
Hawkins, Paul


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Fairbairn, Nicholas
Hayhoe, Barney


Bottomley, Peter
Fairgrieve, Russell
Heseltine, Michael


Brittan, Leon
Farr, John
Hicks, Robert


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Finsberg, Geoffrey
Higgins, Terence L.


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Fookes, Miss Janet
Holland, Philip


Budgen, Nick
Forman, Nigel
Hordern, Peter


Carlisle, Mark
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey


Channon, Paul
Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Churchill, W. S.
Goodhew, Victor
Hunt, John (Bromley)


Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Gorst, John
Hurd, Douglas


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Hutchison, Michael Clark


Clegg, Walter
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
James, David







Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd &amp; W'df'd)
Monro, Hector
Speed, Keith


Jessel, Toby
Morgan, Geraint
Sproat, Iain


Jones, Arthur (Daventry)
Mudd, David
Stanbrook, Ivor


Jopling, Michael
Neave, Airey
Stanley, John


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Page, John (Harrow West)
Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)


Kershaw, Anthony
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Kitson, Sir Timothy
Paisley, Rev Ian
Stokes, John


Lamont, Norman
Parkinson, Cecil
Stradling Thomas, J.


Latham, Michael (Melton)
Percival, Ian
Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)


Lawrence, Ivan
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)


Lawson, Nigel
Raison, Timothy
Tebbit, Norman


Le Marchant, Spencer
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Temple-Morris, Peter


Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Townsend, Cyril D.


Lloyd, Ian
Nippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Loveridge, John
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Vaughan, Dr Gerald


Luce, Richard
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Viggers, Peter


McCrindle, Robert
Ross, William (Londonderry)
Wakeham, John


Macfarlane, Neil
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Wall, Patrick


Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham)
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)
Walters, Dennis


Madel, David
Royle, Sir Anthony
Weatherill, Bernard


Marten, Neil
Sainsbury, Tim
Wells, John


Mates, Michael
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Whilelaw, Rt Hon William


Maude, Angus
Shelton, William (Streatham)
Wiggin, Jerry


Mawby, Ray
Shersby, Michael
Wood, Rt Hon Richard


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Silvester, Fred
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Mayhew, Patrick
Sims, Roger



Meyer, Sir Anthony
Sinclair, Sir George
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Miscampbell, Norman
Skeet, T. H. H.
Mr. W. Benyon and


Moate, Roger
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)
Mr. John Corrie.


Molyneaux, James

Question accordingly agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments disagreed to.

Clause 3

INTERPRETATION

Lords amendment: No. 9, in page 2, leave out line 41.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment meets a simple drafting point by moving "nationality" to the more general definition clause and keeping "racial grounds" and "racial group" in this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5

EXCEPTIONS FOR GENUINE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Lords amendment: No. 10, in page 4, line 30, leave out "special ambience" and insert "particular setting".

7.0 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. John Grant): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This is primarily a drafting amendment. It removes from the Bill the

phrase "special ambience" which was criticised in another place on the ground that it might be misunderstood. I think it was also criticised on the ground that it might not be understood at all because it is French. The phrase "particular setting" serves to express the idea that is needed simply and succinctly without altering in any way the scope of the exception.

Mr. Dudley Smith: Is it the case that the original phrase had never before been used in legislation?

Mr. John Grant: I am not quite sure that I can answer the hon. Gentleman. I think that it has been used on one other occasion. At any rate, we are getting rid of it from this Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6

EXCEPTION FOR EMPLOYMENT INTENDED TO PROVIDE TRAINING IN SKILLS TO BE EXERCISED OUTSIDE GREAT BRITAIN

Lords amendment: No. 11, in page 5, line 7, leave out from "employer" to "wholly" in line 10 and insert:
for the benefit of a person not ordinarily resident in Great Britain in or in connection with employing him at an establishment in Great Britain, where the purpose of that employment is to provide him with training in skills which he appears to the employer to intend to exercise".

Mr. John Grant: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern): With this we may also discuss Lords Amendments Nos. 12, 16, 21 and 23, together with the amendment to the words which would be restored to the Bill if Lords Amendment No. 39 were disagreed to.

Mr. Grant: I shall shortly be proposing, when we come to Lords Amendment No. 39, to restore Clause 73(1)(a) to the Bill. It will be helpful to discuss now an amendment to that amendment which is consequential on Lords Amendment No. 12.
Anxieties have been expressed in this House and in another place that the exception in Clause 6 was insufficiently clear or restrictive and, therefore, open to abuse. It was feared that, as the exception stood, it would, for example, enable an employer lawfully to exploit his employees by, say, using them as a source of cheap labour. There were also criticisms that it was unclear who had to show that the training acquired was intended for use abroad.
The Government have carefully considered the points that were made and they believe that Clause 6 is improved by the amendment now before the House which was made in another place. It ensures that the exception can be claimed successfully as a defence to a complaint of unlawful discrimination only where its use is justified.
The amendment makes sure that an employer who reserves certain training places at his establishment for persons not ordinarily resident in Great Britain will be able to do so only on terms and conditions which will benefit the overseas trainees. He will not, therefore, be able, say, to pay them lower wages or give them less favourable benefits than he would provide for other employees in similar circumstances.
The amendment also makes it clear that the onus of showing that the trainee intends to use the skills acquired outside Great Britain rests with the employer who, in the event of a complaint, will seek to claim the exception. It is likely that an employer would usually be able to show this by reference to either the

individual employee's written contract of employment or a wider training agreement concluded with an overseas company, authority or Government. This amendment makes sure that the scope for abuse is removed.
Lords Amendment No. 12 excepts a principal from the provisions of Clause 7 where he allows one or more contract workers who are not ordinarily resident in Great Britain to do work the purpose of which is to provide him with skills which he appears to the principal to intend to exercise wholly outside Great Britain. This is a technical amendment to ensure that principals of contract workers are, in the event of a complaint of unlawful discrimination, afforded the same defence as that available to employers under Clause 6 of the Bill.
Lords Amendments Nos. 16, 21 and 23 are technical consequential amendments which follow from the inclusion in the Bill of Clause 7(4).
As I said that I would be asking the House to disagree at a later stage with Lords Amendment No. 39. I now hope that the House will agree that, if subsection (1)(a) of Clause 73 is restored to the Bill, the list of exceptions it contains should include the exception we have earlier discussed in relation to contract work intended to provide training skills to be used outside Great Britain. This exception is in substance the same as the exception provided for employment by Clause 6. The exception in Clause 6 is already included in the list in subsection (1)(a).

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendment agreed to.

Clause 11

TRADE UNIONS ETC.

Lords Amendment: No. 13, in page 8, line 2, after "applies" insert
or any person concerned with the affairs of such an organisation,

Mr. John Grant: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: With this we can also discuss Lords Amendment No. 14.

Mr. Grant: Lords Amendment No. 13 was originally debated in Committee and withdrawn when I undertook to look again at the scope of the clause. Having re-examined the provision in the light of the points raised I can assure the House, as my right hon. and noble Friend gave an assurance in another place, that the amendment is unnecessary. Any complaint of discrimination which might arise in respect of membership of an organisation covered by Clause 11 could already have been resolved within the terms of the Bill as it stood before it was amended.
Decisions as to whether an individual is admitted to membership of, for example, a trade union rest only with persons acting with the authority of the union. No shop steward can take a decision on this without such authority. The Bill ensures that when anyone acts with the authority of a trade union, or other organisation covered by Clause 11, then both he and the organisation are liable for any unlawful discriminatory acts committed which are authorised by the organisation.
I doubt whether it is likely to occur in practice, but if a shop steward, acting without the union's authority, discriminates on racial grounds by declining, for example, to process an application for trade union membership, the aggrieved person could take his complaint to a full-time union official. That official would be able on behalf of the union to ensure that the application was properly dealt with. If, after this had been done, membership was refused, and the aggrieved person still believed that the refusal was on racial grounds, it would then be open to him to make a complaint against the trade union to an industrial tribunal under Clause 11.
I turn now to Lords Amendment No. 14. This was moved in another place as it was felt that if, for example, a shop steward discriminated in refusing to take up a union member's grievance, the individual concerned would have no remedy under the Bill as in such cases the shop steward would not usually be acting on behalf of his union.
We have given this a great deal of thought and we see serious difficulties with this amendment. We believe that these difficulties have no counterpart in the operation of the other provisions of the Bill because of the special circumstances

in which shop stewards operate when handling the grievances of their members.
A union member from a minority racial group might, say, believe that he was not being allocated to the best paying jobs because of his colour. He might complain of this to his shop steward who would, for example, explore this matter with the foreman. The shop steward might be persuaded that the allocation of work was reasonable but be unable to convince the worker concerned that this was the case. If subsection (3) remained as amended, the worker could subsequently make a complaint to an industrial tribunal alleging that the shop steward had discriminated in failing to resolve his grievance. The shop steward, however, would have taken the proper steps to follow up the complaint of the worker, and it is impossible to see what more he could have done or that what he had done was wrong.
Nevertheless, he would be subjected to close and extensive examination of his actions and motives. Resort to the law in that way could have serious and harmful effects on racial and industrial relations. It might tend to discredit the shop steward in the eyes of the work group to whom he was directly responsible and might well make it more difficult in future to find union members willing to take on the duties of shop stewards.
Some people have the idea that people are "raring" to become shop stewards and to flex their industrial muscles. That is a totally unrealistic view. Most of them are persuaded to do the job; and, indeed, they are reluctant volunteers. They will certainly be less anxious to become volunteers if they run the risk of the penalties that might follow. We must also consider the difficulty of bringing one worker into a face-to-face conflict with another worker in an industrial tribunal. That could well leave an indelible mark on industrial relations.
It has been argued that the amendment only replaces words which are already in Section 4 of the Race Relations Act 1968. There is, however, an important difference between this Bill and the 1968 Act. Under the 1968 Act all complaints of unlawful discrimination, against, say, shop stewards, are made to and investigated by the Race Relations Board.
The Board alone can take proceedings in the courts. Under the Bill an individual worker may make a complaint direct to an industrial tribunal if he believes that he has been discriminated against in employment or related matters.
There are other objections. The handling of a grievance depends to a great extent on the good will with which it is carried out, and a judicial declaration cannot enforce this good will. Secondly, if it so happened that a shop steward was determined to disregard a tribunal decision, there could be serious industrial relations problems stemming from that action. Indeed, there would be a real danger of bringing the law into disrepute without providing any benefit to the individual applicant.
I hope that the Opposition will remember that. I hope that they have learned some lessons from the disastrous consequences of their industrial relations legislation in 1971. They thought at the time that nobody could possibly have been sent to gaol as a result of those provisions. They thought that there would never be any question of a "Pentonville Five" and the intervention of the Official Solicitor. That was not a farce but an industrial relations tragedy.
If a shop steward fails to deal with a worker's grievance and believes the reason for this lies in racial discrimination, the most practicable way to proceed is for the complainant to take up his grievance with the union through his branch or with the full-time officer. It would then be a matter for the union to decise how to press the grievance and how to deal with the steward. This would be more in the interests of the individual complainant and of good race and industrial relations than to invoke the law against a shop steward, who will be the complainant's fellow worker—[HON. MEMBERS: "Reading."] No, I am not reading, but I am speaking partly from a Civil Service brief, if Conservative Members really want to know.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: If hon. Members wish to make interventions I hope that they will do so in a proper fashion.

7.15 p.m.

Mr. Grant: I am speaking from a brief on technical points, but I am using my own words and my own notes. There-

fore, the Opposition can affix these words to me personally.
The House will, no doubt, be aware of the considerable steps which the trade union movement has recently taken to combat discrimination. These have the wholehearted support of the Government. The TUC is involved in a campaign against racialism and has recently set up an Equal Rights Committee and a Race Relations Advisory Committee to promote equal opportunity. This includes work to try to ensure that all trade unionists, including shop stewards, are aware of their responsibilities in this area.
The Government have asked the TUC General Council to examine the question of further steps that may need to be taken to ensure that effective procedures exist to deal with complaints arising from the relationship between individual unions and their members, and that members of racial minority groups are fully aware of those procedures.
The TUC has made it clear that the objections to the Lords amendments are not based on any desire by trade unions to avoid their responsibilities, but are based on a firm belief that they will hinder good relations at work. The Government agree with that conclusion.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I agreed with virtually everything the Minister said, until he felt it necessary to range quite outside the ambit of the Bill and to deal with questions involving industrial relations legislation in an earlier Parliament and, indeed, to raise matters pertaining to the "Pentonville Five". For one moment, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I felt that you would feel obliged to ask the Minister to return to the subject in hand.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I was fully aware that the Minister would immediately return to the subject matter under discussion.

Mr. Griffiths: I knew that you decided to take no action because you foresaw the Minister's return to the paths of righteousness, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
I shall keep my intervention brief, because I wish to put one simple point to the Minister. Many Opposition Members have been provided with briefs and many have read them to the House. I


wish to ask the Minister whether the brief that he read was produced by a civil servant, by his party organisation or by the TUC. Much of what he said—I know that he accepts personal responsibility for it—was derived from that other place to which his party appears to give more attention than it does to the other House of Parliament—namely, the TUC. We do not wish to quarrel about this matter, but if the Minister wishes to make progress on the Bill he will be wise not to import pejorative material involving previous legislation that has nothing to do with this Bill.

Mr. David Price: I wish to deal with a slightly different point, and I shall do so briefly. I thought that the Minister's speech was persuasive in dealing with the difficulties of shop stewards, but surely the logic behind the Government's support of the Bill can apply equally to an employer or to an agent or manager working for an employer.
Let me take as an example the situation at a hospital with which I am familiar but the name of which I shall refrain from mentioning. That hospital employs a number of hospital orderlies and cleaners who come from various West Indian islands. It was considered that in the cause of good industrial relations those workers should be kept grouped together. In other words, those from Nevis and St. Kitts worked in one group and were kept separate from another group who came from Jamaica. As I read the provisions of the Bill, accusations of discrimination could be levelled at the hospital authorities. The hospital authorities found, however, that the workers concerned were happier when working in those groupings. In other words, in the real world things worked out well and there was no basic motivation of the kind of discrimination at which the Bill is aimed.
If the Minister feels that their Lordships are wrong to be as specific in these provisions as to go to individual shop stewards rather than to leave the matter with the generality of the trade unions, surely the same argument applies to employers' organisations.

Mr. Michael Alison: The Minister must by now realise that in future discussions he would be well

advised not to drag in extraneous matter involving earlier industrial relations legislation. That kind of self-righteousness will get him nowhere. He well knows that the Labour Party proposed to do exactly the same thing in its proposals in "In Place of Strife" and in its White Paper at the last General Election. Therefore, it is hypocritical and foolish to bring in such extraneous material.
I must confess that I do not think the Minister has made out a good case in respect of the amendments. I shall recommend my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote in favour of accepting them. The hon. Gentleman argued that if a shop steward refused to process an application for membership he would have no authority to do so and that the complainant would have access to the appropriate authority, namely, the trade union. He argued that the trade union would be able to effect membership and that no detriment would arise. The hon. Gentleman seemed to argue that the shop steward is an irrelevance. In so doing he was not being entirely accurate or fair to his own Bill.
Detriment would arise in the case of a shop steward who raised objections, introduced difficulties or refused to process a coloured worker's application for membership. By acting in that way he would be discriminating, although he might have no authority to do so. The detriment of non-membership could be overcome by going to the appropriate authority, but the fact that such difficulties had been introduced would produce a detriment in the terms of the Bill, in that they would at least hurt the feelings of the individual applicant, the complainant, and be offensive to him. The hurting of feelings is a detriment under the Bill. In Clause 57 a person can be fined if he hurts the feelings of an individual. It would be hurtful to the feelings of an individual applicant if a shop steward raised obstacles, introduced difficulties or acted in a discriminatory manner regarding an application for trade union membership, irrespective of whether he had authority to do so.
The detriment of hurt feelings would remain even after the application had been processed by the appropriate authority, namely the trade union. That detriment could never be erased by the individual going over the head of the


shop steward and having his membership endorsed by the appropriate authority. Therefore, the shop steward has a responsibility and a capacity to damage and cause detriment to the applicant that is not covered by the fact that the applicant can ultimately obtain membership. To that extent we should include shop stewards if we are to include the detriment of hurt feelings, which is a detriment that can result in damages or a fine under Clause 57. To that extent I think that the Minister has not given a full account of the role of the shop steward.
I fully appreciate that we are dealing with an extremely sensitive area—an area in which we all want to do what is best and most constructive. However, as a matter of principle and in terms of achieving a fair deal in practice, it must be right that the Bill should leave no shadow of doubt about what shop stewards have by way of responsibilities and liabilities.
In another place, in arguing against the amendment, Lord Jacques gave a rather vivid example that was slightly different from the one adopted by the Minister. The noble Lord suggested that a union member of a minority racial group—for example, a Pakistani—may believe that he is not being allocated the best paying jobs because of his colour. It was said that he may complain about that to the shop steward. Indeed, the Pakistani may even suspect that the shop steward has been in collusion with the management in determining the allocation of the best-paid jobs or the best places of work within the plant. The shop steward, whatever his real guilt or absence of guilt, may be unable to convince the complainant, after consultation with the firm or the management, that the job allocations have not been unfair and that the complainant has not been offered the lower-paid jobs.
Are we saying that he should have no recourse in those circumstances? It may be that the Pakistani, for example, has strong suspicions that the shop steward has been in collusion with the firm regarding the allocation of jobs, or the kind of work that he undertakes, although he cannot be certain. He may not be satisfied that he has had a fair deal from the shop steward. Are we saying that in that situation he should

have no recourse to the machinery that applies throughout the rest of the Bill and in practically every other situation that can be conceived?
It is exactly that situation of doubt—the feeling that one is not being fairly treated—that demands that we go out of our way to provide access and facilities for the complainant to bring the matter to the notice of the appropriate tribunal or judicial authority. It is an area where there is uncertainty and where racial minority groups may feel that they are getting a raw deal. The Bill exists in order to make special provision for such situations. However, in this narrow area the argument is that even though the complainant may have a strong suspicion that the shop steward has not given him a fair deal, it is such a sensitive area that we must exclude it from the normal processes of testing by a tribunal.
The Under-Secretary of State repeated what Lord Jacques said on an earlier occasion. In fact, the noble Lord gave three reasons why we should not expose shop stewards to the hazards of scrutiny by a tribunal. He said:
It might tend to discourage the shop steward in the eyes of the work group to whom he was directly responsible. It might well make it more difficult to find union members in the future who are willing to take on a shop steward's responsibilities."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 29th September 1976; Vol. 374, c. 494.]
The Minister emphasised that and said that shop stewards are not always muscle men who press forward to get the job. That argument raises a conflict and sounds very much like special pleading. It sounds very much as if the Government have paid considerable heed to the words that Mr. Len Murray uttered in his statement at the end of August. It seems that the influence of the trade unions and of Congress House has been considerable. Mr. Len Murray said:
To make stewards personally responsible would create many industrial relation difficulties without necessarily leading to the grievance being taken up. We are not unwilling to accept our obligations. But we believe we can deal with these problems in the informal way we have done up to now without the introduction of a legal definition that would expose shop stewards to legal action.
That is the argument that we apply to profesional clubs, for example. We say that in this sensitive area it is better to employ informality and common sense.


We say that the climate of opinion and internal pressures bring about the desired result and that the use of formal machinery is not necessary or desirable. That is exactly the point that the Government have taken. They wish to give the trade union movement and shop stewards that degree of freedom when they say that they will not attempt to legislate in this sensitive area.
The nonsense of their position is that other parts of the Bill make the individual prosecution of shop stewards inescapable. However, the Government have excluded that provision from a part of the Bill that is directly relevant to shop stewards. Clauses 32 and 33 make it clear beyond peradventure that shop stewards are exposed to the tribunal procedure and individual prosecution. That is what is so ludicrous. The Lord Chancellor said so in terms. He said:
Subsection (1) ensures that a person who knowingly aids another to do an act of unlawful discrimination is treated as doing that act himself.
He continued:
The clause is also important in relation to Clause 32 which we have just discussed and which makes the employer liable for the unlawful acts of his employee in the course of his employment but, if Clause 33(2) were not in the Bill, the employer would stand alone in taking responsibility for the employee's unlawful act. Subsection (2) makes it clear in a case like that, the employee is treated as aiding his employer, so that they are both responsible for the unlawful act."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 30th September 1976; Vol. 374, c. 737–8.]
The Lord Chancellor said in terms that under Clauses 32 and 33 the shop steward can be liable to individual prosecution in an aiding and abetting situation.
7.30 p.m.
Let us take a situation in which a shop steward is told by the management "We have to declare 1,000 redundancies. It will cause intense bitterness if we retain a lot of recently arrived Pakistanis and sack a lot of white people, so we must devise a formula for the sake of industrial peace, ensuring that the 'last in, first out' principle is applied, and as the Pakistanis have mostly arrived in the last three years we had better specify that those who have are liable to redundancy", and the shop steward agrees. Such a proposition surely gives the appearance of a sense of fair been with the firm for less than five years

play. Yet the shop steward's position is that of aiding and abetting discrimination, either direct and intentional or indirect and intentional. He has responsibility.
But the Government refuse to make the shop steward responsible in the clause dealing with trade unions. They ensure that he is personally responsible under Clauses 32 and 33, having said that it is intolerable that, in the sensitive area of industrial relations, he should be exposed to the tribunal procedure. The Government cannot have it both ways. If they want to exclude shop stewards from responsibility under the Bill, they must amend Clauses 32 and 33. If they want to include them in the Bill, then they should include them in this clause.

Mr. John Grant: By leave of the House, I should like to reply to the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison). Perhaps I should not be surprised at the sensitivity displayed by him and by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) because I mentioned the "Pentonville Five". I assure them, however, that I have no brief from any civil servant on that point. The note I have—which I am prepared to show them—is entirely in my own handwriting. If blame is to be apportioned, I must accept it myself. But I do not think that there is blame to be apportioned. I thought that there was a comparison to be made, and it was a fair comparison. I think that there is undue sensitivity among hon. Members about this, but it is understandable.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mr. Price) for his remarks about the way I deployed the case, but I think that the essential difference between the situation of a shop steward and that of an employer or an agent for an employer is that the shop steward is a volunteer and is elected to his position. I have said throughout that there is a special case to be made in this situation, and I make no apology for it. I think that there is a genuine distinction here.

Mr. Ivor Clemitson: In the clause, surely we are referring to an agent of an organisation of employers and not an agent of an employer.

Mr. Grant: The shop steward is the agent of the people who elect him. This point takes me to the case deployed by the hon. Member for Barkston Ash. In


the end, we come down to a balance of advantage. We see the balance of advantage both in race relations terms and in industrial relations terms in the case I have deployed. That is not to say that there is not a case in the other direction. This is a difficult and complicated area, to which we gave great thought.
We believe, however, that the Lords amendment would do much more harm than good. The hon. Gentleman said that we had paid undue heed to the TUC. I think it was right to pay heed to the TUC because we are talking of workers' representatives, and in so far as we can get a view in respect of their interests we have to take it from the TUC, which approached us and wanted to express a view. It was right to listen to the TUC.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: No one is dissenting from that, but why did the Government take the TUC's argument in one place but not in another?

Mr. Grant: The answer is that the difference between Clauses 32 and 33 and Clause 11 is that, in the first case, although a shop steward may be individually liable, the union would also be liable, whereas under Clause 11 the shop steward could be liable alone, and that is what we are trying to avoid.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment: —

The House divided: Ayes 171, Noes 145.

Division No. 346.]
AYES
[7.37 p.m.


Allaun, Frank
Forrester, John
Mikardo, Ian


Anderson, Donald
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Archer, Peter
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Armstrong, Ernest
Freeson, Reginald
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)


Ashley, Jack
Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Moyle, Roland


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Newens, Stanley


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Gilbert, Dr John
Oakes, Gordon


Bates, Alt
Ginsburg, David
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Golding, John
Ovenden, John


Bidwell, Sydney
Gourlay, Harry
Park, George


Bishop, E. S.
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Parker, John


Boardman, H.
Grant, John (Islington C)
Parry, Robert


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Perry, Ernest


Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Harper, Joseph
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Price, William (Rugby)


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Hatton, Frank
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Buchanan, Richard
Henderson, Douglas
Robinson, Geoffrey


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Hooley, Frank
Roderick, Caerwyn


Campbell, Ian
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Rodgers George (Chorley)


Cant, R. B.
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Rooker, J. W.


Carmichael, Neil
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Roper, John


Cartwright, John
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Rose, Paul B.


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Hunter, Adam
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)


Clemitson, Ivor
Jeger, Mrs Lena
Rowlands, Ted


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
John, Brynmor
Sedgemore, Brian


Cohen, Stanley
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Coleman, Donald
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)


Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Conlan, Bernard
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Silverman, Julius


Corbett, Robin
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Skinner, Dennis


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Kaufman, Gerald
Small, William


Crawshaw, Richard
Lamble, David
Spearing, Nigel


Cronin, John
Lamborn, Harry
Stallard, A. W.


Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Lamond, James
Stoddart, David


Cryer, Bob
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)
Stott, Roger


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Lee, John
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Swain, Thomas


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
McCartney, Hugh
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Dempsey, James
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Doig, Peter
McElhone, Frank
Thompson, George


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
MacFarquhar, Roderick
Tuck, Raphael


Dunnett, Jack
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)


Eadie, Alex
MacKenzie, Gregor
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Edge, Geoff
Maclennan, Robert
Watkins, David


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Walkinson, John


Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
Magee, Bryan
Watt, Hamish


Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Mahon, Simon
Weetch, Ken


Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Wellbeloved, James


Evans, loan (Aberdare)
Marks, Kenneth
Welsh, Andrew


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Marquand, David
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
White, James (Pollock)


Flannery, Martin
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Whitlock, William


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Ford, Ben
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)




Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)
Woof, Robert
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)
Wrigglesworth, Ian
Mr. Thomas Cox and


Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
Young, David (Bolton E)
Mr. James Tinn.




NOES


Adley, Robert
Hall, Sir John
Page, John (Harrow West)


Alison, Michael
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Paisley, Rev Ian


Beith, A. J.
Hampson, Dr Keith
Parkinson, Cecil


Bell, Ronald
Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss
Penhaligon, David


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Havers, Sir Michael
Percival, Ian


Benyon, W.
Hawkins, Paul
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Berry, Hon Anthony
Hayhoe, Barney
Raison, Timothy


Biggs-Davison, John
Hicks, Robert
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Body, Richard
Higgins, Terence L.
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Holland, Philip
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Bottomley, Peter
Hooson, Emlyn
Ross, William (Londonderry)


Brittan, Leon
Hordern, Peter
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Royle, Sir Anthony


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Hunt, David (Wirral)
Sainsbury, Tim


Budgen, Nick
Hunt, John (Bromley)
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Burden, F. A.
Hurd, Douglas
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Carlisle, Mark
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Shersby, Michael


Carson, John
James, David
Sims, Roger


Channon, Paul
Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wans't'd &amp; W'df'd)
Sinclair, Sir George


Churchill, W. S.
Jessel, Toby
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Jones, Arthur (Daventry)
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Jopling, Michael
Speed, Keith


Clegg, Walter
Kershaw, Anthony
Sproat, Iain


Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Kitson, Sir Timothy
Stanbrook, Ivor


Cope, John
Latham, Michael (Melton)
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Craig, Rt Hon W. (Belfast E)
Lawrence, Ivan
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Crouch, David
Lawson, Nigel
Stokes, John


Crowder, F. P.
Le Marchant, Spencer
Stradling Thomas, J.


Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)


Drayson, Burnaby
Lloyd, Ian
Tebbit, Norman


Durant, Tony
Luce, Richard
Temple-Morris, Peter


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
McCrindle, Robert
Townsend, Cyril D.


Elliott, Sir William
Macfarlane, Neil
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Eyre, Reginald
Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham)
Vaughan, Dr Gerald


Farr, John
Marten, Neil
Viggers, Peter


Finsberg, Geoffrey
Mates, Michael
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)


Fookes, Miss Janet
Maude, Angus
Wakeham, John


Forman, Nigel
Mawby, Ray
Wall, Patrick


Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Walters, Dennis


Freud, Clement
Mayhew, Patrick
Wells, John


Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Goodhew, Victor
Miscampbell, Norman
Wiggin, Jerry


Gorst, John
Moate, Roger
Wood, Rt Hon Richard


Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Molyneaux, James
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Gray, Hamish
Monro, Hector



Grieve, Percy
Morgan, Geraint
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Griffiths, Eldon
Morris, Michael (Northampton S)
Mr. John Corrie and


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Mudd, David
Mr. Fred Silvester.


Grist, Ian
Neave, Airey

Question accordingly agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment disagreed to.

Clause 12

QUALIFYING BODIES

Lords amendment: No. 15, in page 8, line 27, leave out subsection (2).

7.45 p.m.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This is an amendment relating to subsection (2). It deals with the question of qualifying bodies. It caused a protracted

and difficult debate in Committee, on Report and in another place. Our view, to which we adhere, is that qualifying bodies would have regard to solid evidence rather than to hints or insinuations. We believe that there is no danger that because of one misdemeanour a person would be barred from his livelihood for ever. However, in view of the strong feelings and representations which have been made on this matter, we are prepared to accept the Lords amendment on this issue, even though we believe that we can and should trust the qualifying bodies to act fairly in these matters.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Clause 23

FURTHER EXCEPTIONS FROM SS. 20(1) AND 21

Lords amendment: No. 17 in page 16, line 20, at end insert:
(3) Section 20(1) does not apply to the provision of facilities or services by a person in his home, not being a place open (for payment or not) to members of the public generally.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment, moved by Lord Monson in another place, would insert a provision that Clause 20(1) does not apply to the provision of facilities or services by a person in his home, it not being a place open for payment or to members of the public generally. Subsection (1) as it currently appears would protect persons from discrimination if services were provided and were available to members of the public or sections of the public. We believe that the noble Lord drew a geographical distinction where the services were issued or provided and that it is quite wrong to do that. The test is what facilities are provided and whether they are provided for the general public or a section of the public. If they are so provided, it seems to me that discrimination ought to be avoided by the provision of the law in this regard.
I can give a number of examples. First, there is the piano teacher who gives lessons in his or her home and who may advertise for pupils. With such an advertisement, it would be wrong for the teacher to discriminate on racial grounds against the pupils. The home is used for many activities other than those of a purely domestic nature. I think of osteopaths, dentists and even solicitors who use a room in their own home for the provision of services to the public or to a section of the public.
We therefore see no reason to amend the law, which, after all, has been the law since the enactment of Section 2 of the 1968 Act, and we believe that the limitation we have introduced in Clause 20 preserves reasonable domestic arrangements whilst preventing discrimination where a person provides services for the public or a section of it.

Mr. Dudley Smith: What about the position of doctors who, as I understand it, are allowed to cross a patient off a list without giving an explanation?

Mr. John: The provision of services cannot be discriminatory on racial grounds. The General Medical Council or general practitioners have the right to remove people from lists without giving reasons for so doing. I would have to look at the example quoted by the hon. Member, but in general I think that the matter as I stated it is a correct statement of the law and a proper statement of principle.

Mr. Ronald Bell: It was with great regret that I heard that the Government would not accept the amendment. I cannot understand the mental processes—if that is the correct expression to use—which led Ministers to that conclusion. I use the term "mental processes" as the correct expression because I feel that this is a matter of bias and prejudice, and not much else. Here we are dealing primarily with people who give classes, teach music, or do something like that in their own homes and who ought to be able to discriminate as they wish in relation to that home when they entertain or teach. The Minister gave no reason why they should not be entitled so to discriminate. He relied on the fact that this provision was within the law and had been since Section 2 of the 1968 Act. The implication was that it should therefore go on being the law.
As one who fought every provision of the 1968 Act, I feel in no way estopped by that argument. Undoubtedly the 1968 Act was a bad Act, which did many things that it ought not to have done. With this Bill, which, after all, is not merely an innovating but also a consolidating Bill, it was right that the upper House should take the opportunity to improve the law as it is, pending the passage of this Bill. The Government ought to look at this matter on its merits. If they think that people should not have the right to discriminate in their own homes they should tell us why they believe that. But it is not a question of whether people should or should not discriminate in their own homes. That is a matter of opinion. The question is whether they


ought to have the right to discriminate if they want to.
Even this Government have not dared to propose that people in their domestic and social lives should not have the right to discriminate—

Mr. Stokes: Not yet.

Mr. Bell: No, not yet. Most of us here probably read the Government's White Paper, and noted the concluding paragraphs. From those we know the lengths to which they considered going in their obsession with the wrongness of discrimination. At every stage of this controversy from the beginning I have maintained not only that people should have the right to discriminate but that they ought to discriminate. I say that I discriminate between all the people that I meet, upon every ground that I can detect. I say that everybody does that, and that everybody ought to. A terribly heavy burden lies upon those who say that the faculty of discrimination should be blind to particular observed facts.
I have never been able to follow the argument that the law should say that the whole of human life is based on discrimination, that that is what life is about, but that one must be blind to certain things. It is not that one must not ill-treat people, but that one should pretend that certain things do not exist as a matter of principle. So I have objected to it on the widest ground and have never sought to shuffle away from it. But in this amendment we are on to a refinement of the prohibition of discrimination. We are saying that this is such hostis humanae generis that it has got to be shot wherever it is seen. One day they will shoot us for discriminating between marmalade and jam, because discrimination is wicked. It is a sort of furor, but not Teutonicus.
The point about this amendment is that it made by a tiny rational exception for what one does in one's home when one is not actually providing entertainment. When it comes to asking people to dinner, one can as yet do as one likes. But, of course, pens are being sharpened for the attack on the anti-social practice of choosing one's guests. However, if one gives music classes in one's own home or gives any other form of instruction, in the

view of their Lordships one should be free to do that without risking the dire penalties provided in the Bill. The Government say that this can never be except in one's purely social life. If one is giving coaching one is providing ser vices and facilities and these should be made available to everybody. I cannot see that.
Let us put out of our mind all questions of race, colour, nationality and citizenship. Beyond that one can discriminate as much as one likes. I could say that I will not have people with red hair in my house, or that I absolutely refuse to teach music to people with green eyes. Among the native British I can discriminate as much as I like, in or out of my house, but when it comes to Commonwealth immigrants I must do what the Government tell me or I shall go to prison or be ruined.
They are mad, absolutely crazy, about coloured immigrants. That is their only concern. They do not give a damn about the British, not even those in Great Britain—and as for any British people in Africa, the sooner they are shot the better. They have an obsessional hostility to the native inhabitants of this country and want to destroy, punish and oppress them in every way they can.
The only good thing about the Government's attitude on this amendment is that it shows them in their most extreme, intolerable and unreasonable guise. I hope that my hon. Friends will right this tooth and nail and support their Lordships in their extremely sensible, tolerant and wise amendment.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. Walter Clegg: It is a long time since an Englishman's home was his castle. It is now at the mercy of all sorts of people, such as taxmen, VAT men and gas and electricity inspectors. Here we have another crumbling of the castle battlements.
There is a difference between an activity, which need not be for gain, in one's own home and an activity in a place of business or some other place to which the public are normally entitled to go.
It may be old-fashioned to say that the home is different from anywhere else and that one should be able to control


what goes on there at the risk of discrimination. I believe that in the Bill the definition of discrimination has been drawn too widely. People should be entitled to do in their own homes some things that they would not be allowed to do in other places in the community. Their Lordships have been very wise, and I fully support them.

Mr. Stokes: I did not intend to speak even briefly, on this clause, but I was so moved by the strength of feeling and common sense displayed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beacons-field (Mr. Bell) that I felt I must support and endorse his every word.
To most civilised people, the family and the home are the most important things in our lives—often more important even than this country, which we all love so dearly. Our home is the place where we say our prayers in the morning and where we return at night to our wives and children. It is the most precious thing we have. Many of us fought for our homes and our wives and children in the war.
Few of us ever dreamt that the day would come when a British Government would say, like Big Brother in 1984, to fathers and mothers, aunts and uncles and sons and daughters, that if they carried out certain activities in their own homes, the iron hand of the State would be upon them, and that their homes were no longer private. It is absolutely shocking.
With so few hon. Members in the House and the hour getting late, not much of this debate will appear in tomorrow's papers, especially the popular papers, but many of our constituents, now sitting in their homes believing them to be private, would be horrified to learn that if the view of another place—-which I believe truly reflects the view of ordinary people—is overturned, their homes will no longer be private.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: May I ask the Minister a few fairly precise questions on this matter? Another place has done us a service in inserting this amendment, and I am astonished that the Government do not agree with it. The amendment provides that a man should be permitted to discriminate in his home in the provision of facilities and services. I wish to ask questions under each of these headings.
If I invited a person into my house to use my typewriter, duplicating machine, library or gramophone, I should be providing him with facilities that he does not have, although I should not be seeking any payment.
If the Government disagree with the Lords amendment, will it be unlawful for me to say that I would not allow to use those facilities certain persons who I did not wish to use them? Could it be held that I was breaking the law on racial grounds if I said, for example, that I would not allow someone from Pakistan or Africa to use the facilities?
The provision of services has already been mentioned, and hon. Members have quoted music teachers and others as examples. I wish to ask about home helps.
Many elderly people are provided with home helps or meals on wheels by their local authorities or other organisations. When an elderly person, possibly a little crotchety, refuses to accept home helps or people from the meals on wheels' service into her home because she does not like their colour, can she be brought before the courts for refusing to allow a service into her home?
I shall not repeat the point about an Englishman's home being his castle, but such sayings are not cliches; they really matter for many people. I end by recalling the saying that there is no place like home. That still means a great deal to our people, but it will not mean the same in future unless the amendment is accepted.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: It is nearly a truism, and would certainly be regarded as a truism in any context except that of the subject of this Bill, that to enact legislation which is not approved as just and reasonable by the general sense of the people is to court not merely the breaking of that law but consequences much more serious than those which the law itself is intended to forfend.
In our existing legislation on this subject and in this Bill, quite apart from the Lords amendments, there is a great deal of matter which every hon. Member knows does not commend itself as fair, just and reasonable to the general sense of the great body of people in this country.
What we are deciding is something very narrow: whether to that content which, for the moment, it is not possible for us to influence or alter we are to add one more aggravation. I use that word against the background which I have just outlined. It would quite certainly be repudiated by far more than 99 people out of 100 as totally unreasonable and unjust to invoke the general provisions and machinery of this Bill in the circumstances which are covered by the Lords amendment and some of which were illustrated by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell).
By rejecting the Lords amendment, the Government are not helping their Bill; they are working against it. They are not supporting the intentions which, misguidedly or not, they mean to achieve in this legislation. I shall tell them and the House what is going to happen. I do not know for sure that it will happen in connection with this or some other part of the Bill when it becomes an Act, but, as sure as night follows day, there will be a breach, of this or that provision and a follow-up of that breach in circumstances and with attendant particulars which will cause widespread indignation, not amongst people whose views and opinions we would be ashamed to share but amongst the great bulk of those whom on both sides we are here to represent. When that happens—it is already starting to happen—this legislation will cease to be an instrument for whatever good it could have achieved. It will turn into the opposite. It will be seen as a sign of the division and divorce between the wishes, opinions and outlook of those who legislate and govern and the great bulk of the people.
There may be a certain lack of proportion in unrolling this prospect when we are concerned only with a minor detail. But it always is a minor detail, an extreme case, almost a freak case, in the administration of unjust legislation which brings about the collapse of what the legislation intended.
All hon. Members can go back over the last 20 to 25 years and recall instances which have suddenly presented themselves to the public as unjust and intolerable and which have been the means of

altering the whole structure of legislation. I remember one which was more instrumental than anything else in causing the repeal of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. It was a case marginal to the possibilities of what might happen under that Act. Yet that event, more than anything else, forced this House to repeal a whole system of law which it had placed on the statute book.
It is exactly such material that we are laying up for the future if we insist on throwing out this Lords amendment. In making this amendment their Lordships—I would not say often, but sometimes, as in this instance—show themselves as being far more in touch than this House with the common sense, in the natural meaning of those words, of the people for whom we are legislating. We shall ill serve the objects of either side of the House and we shall ill serve future respect for the law if we do not accept the amendment.

Mr. Patrick Mayhew: I am going to appeal to the Minister of State to do something to help the rather fast-waning reputation of Parliament. It seems that people are increasingly saying "It does not matter what happens in your debates, because it is all decided by the Whips. The Government make up their mind. You might as well not have a debate or talk about anything else, because the result is unaffected."
The Minister of State has an opportunity here, on a topic quite small in its significance but full of potential importance, as the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said, to show that the Government are alive to the points made in argument. I hope that with the help of my right hon. and hon. Friends I shall be able to persuade him that it would be right to give way on this amendment.
8.15 p.m.
I think that the Minister, in his heart of hearts, knows that the Government have failed to give proper significance to the influence of the home. If example were needed, it could not be more eloquently or succinctly found than in the speech of the Minister of State the noble Lord Wells-Pestell on 12th


October when, referring to the speech of Lord Avebury, he said:
The noble Lord has sought to persuade your Lordships that there is something special about a person's home. So far as the Bill is concerned, the answer is that there may or may not be. It is not good enough just to look at where facilities or services are provided. The question is whether they are provided to the general public or to a section of the general public."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12th October 1976; Vol. 375, c. 217.]
That point was echoed by the Minister of State.
If we are to be realistic, there is no "It may or may not be" about the question whether there is something special about a person's home. If we in this House should ever say that there may or may not be something special about the homes of our constituents, we should be even further removed from the lives that they lead and the standards that they hold than is supposed by the least flattering of observers of Parliament.
We think that this is a worthwhile and sensible amendment. What is more, it is consistent with the scheme of the Bill, as drafted, and with the pattern of exemptions from liability which it already contains. We are happy to support it, and, if truth be told, we rather wish that we had drafted it ourselves. But if the Bill is to have a chance of achieving the high purposes of those who support it and, in particular, of reducing racial tension, it must be realistic. It must be so drafted that the ordinary reasonable man and woman will comply with it, not necessarily with enthusiasm or approval but because it is not a self-evidently unreasonable piece of legislation.
The great pitfall into which so many exalted moral reformers often tumble is that of getting too far ahead of the game. They seem to legislate for people who are not made of flesh and blood. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) and the right hon. Member for Down, South said, the consequence is that people who cannot help being flesh and blood—Indeed, on balance they are glad that they are made of flesh and blood—say "We hear what you say. We have seen what you enact. We admire your lofty ideals. But we are afraid that this law is not for us." Then everybody is worse off, because the law as a whole is brought into contempt.
This is a sensible and realistic doctrine, which the Opposition have urged upon the Government throughout the different stages of the Bill's progress. To do them credit, they have made concessions in the exemptions written into the Bill as drafted. The Government recognise that what they call intimate relationships—I suppose that is as good a term as any—ought not to be subject to the consequences of racial discrimination They said that in their White Paper. So it is that, with rare realism, they appreciate that, for example, small partnerships with fewer than six partners should be exempted from the provisions of the Bill. That appears in Clause 10.
The Government accept that the choice of lodgers in a person's home—here we come to the home—ought to be exempt. That appears in Clause 23.
The Government accept that small clubs, when the clubs provision was in the Bill before their Lordships by happy chance excluded it, should be exempt. That appears in Clause 25.
The Government accept that the choice of domestic servants in the home—not a consideration that one might expect to be at the forefront of a Labour Government's polices—should be exempt. That is in Clause 4(3).
One thing is common to all the exemptions that the Government have seen fit to put into the Bill—the closeness of the relevant relationship. It is the essentially domestic nature of what would have to be controlled. In fact, it is a recognition that where one has a relationship so close to people's sentiments and hearts as that of a home, one cannot control what goes on there by legislation.
The Minister said that the great mistake about the amendment was that the Lords had made a geographical distinction whereas the true test ought to be whether facilities are provided to the general public or to a section of the public. But even that is not capable of being sustained when one considers the exemptions that have been written into the Bill. I take as an example the exemption for choosing a lodger to live hi one's own home. That, if one calls it the provision of a facility or accommodation, is a provision that one offers to the public as a whole, because it is from the public as a whole that one seeks to recruit one's lodgers.
I think that it is this mistake, in the context of the subsection that the Lords have amended, that the Government have made. They have lost sight of what has informed their policy in granting the exceptions already written into the Bill. That concept has made even the Government feel that it would really be penetrating privacy too far to seek to impose on these intimate relationships the sanctions of the Bill.
The amendment deals with a relationship that is no less domestic and no more public than those which the Bill already exempts—the provision in the home of facilities or services; though not goods. We are talking of someone who uses his home not to sell fruit or anything else, but as a place to live. It is facilities and services in the home, and not to the public at large, and to no more than six people.
Why must the elderly lady living alone who offers piano lessons in her home be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Race Relations Commission when a club with, say, 24 members may with impunity discriminate between candidates for admission on racial grounds? Why must that be so? What is the great moral touchstone that leads the Government to exempt the one and to include the other?
It is an exceptionally difficult question to answer. I do not believe that it can be answered, save by the Minister saying, quite honestly, "We have made a mistake and have been taught a lesson in the Lords, for which we are not ashamed to say we are grateful." I am afraid that the only other possible answer is that the 1968 Act made no exemption for someone such as the old lady in my example, and that someone, somewhere in the machine has dug his toes in and said "That is that". However, that is no argument, because if, in the Government's opinion, the 1968 Act said all that needs to be said about race relations and the control of racial matters in Britain, we should all have been saved a great deal of time and trouble in 1976.
As it is, the promotion of this Bill provides an opportunity to remedy what has long been wrong, a lacuna, in the 1968 Act in a manner that is wholly consistent with the scheme and the pattern of this Bill. It is an opportunity that the

other place has taken, and we think that it ought to be supported.

Mr. John: With the leave of the House, I should like to reply to the debate. A number of points have arisen, and I shall try to deal with them all as swiftly as I can.
First, the hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) says that it is the closeness of the relationship that really distinguishes the home from every other part. It is precisely because a person offers goods or facilities to the public or to a section of the public that the closeness of that relationship does not exist. He is offering to a wide section of the public and, therefore, we believe it to be wrong that he should discriminate on racial grounds in so doing.
One can accept—I accept wholly—that where their Lordships have proposed amendments with which, on reflection, we have agreed, we have so moved. The hon. and learned Gentleman will know that we have moved to accept many of them. However, on this issue, and without automatically, as the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) seemed to suggest, barring the Lords from having an accidental flash of vision, we believe that the matter is important. Because it is important, I think that people are glossing over it too quickly.
If a piano teacher or anyone else advertises lessons to a wide section of the public, it is repugnant for a little coloured girl who goes along for her first piano lesson to be told "I am having 25 or 30 other pupils, and you are coloured and cannot come in." Of course that is repugnant, and we believe that it should not happen.
The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) asked two questions. If he refers to the first words of Clause 20, he will see that they refer to a:
person concerned with the provision … of goods, facilities or services to the public or a section of the public".
The hon. Gentleman's first analogy of using a library or using a typewriter was one that was directed to an individual, and therefore it would not expose him to the Bill. The second one that he raised was a refusal by the customer of the home help. The customer of the home help is not a person providing a service and, therefore, does not fall within


the ambit of the clause. The two anxieties that the hon. Gentleman had on this question are answered, I hope, by the fact that neither is within the ambit of the Bill.
I now deal with the words of the right hon. Member for Down, South on this matter, taking in those of the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell). The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield says "I am not tied to the 1968 Act in this Bill because I opposed it." I recognise that he did that. By the same token, however, if it was in the 1968 Act, what the right hon. Member for Down, South said about this provision coming in this Bill as if it was coming in afresh is exaggeration, because it has not led to the sort of upsurge or disenchantment of which he spoke. It has been on the statute book for eight years. There is no reason to suppose that it will be any more unsatisfactory in the future than it has been in the past. I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman inadvertently misled the House when he said that it was a de novo provision and, therefore, by reason of its novelty, would

be an aggravation to the situation. This is something that has been a statutory provision for eight years.

Finally, I recognise that this is in a small compass. It is a point of principle. We believe that the exceptions we have given will take care of all true domestic principles and arrangements. We believe that those who provide goods, services or facilities to the public or to certain members of the public ought not to discriminate on racial grounds. Indeed, their Lordships accepted that where the provisions was to the public in general there should be no such discrimination. What we are arguing about is a section of the public rather than the public in general. I can see no true distinction between a section of the public and the public in general, and I invite the House to reject the amendment.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment: —

The House divided: Ayes 186, Noes 140.

Division No. 347.]
AYES
[8.29 p.m.


Allaun, Frank
Dell, Rt Hon Edmund
Jeger, Mrs Lena


Anderson, Donald
Dempsey, James
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)


Archer, Peter
Doig, Peter
John, Brynmor


Armstrong, Ernest
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Johnson, James (Hull West)


Ashley, Jack
Dunnett, Jack
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Edge, Geoff
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)


Bates, Alf
Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)


Beith, A. J.
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Kaufman, Gerald


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
Lambie, David


Bishop, E. S.
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Lamborn, Harry


Boardman, H.
Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Lamond, James


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)


Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Flannery, Martin
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Lipton, Marcus


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Ford, Ben
Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)


Buchanan, Richard
Forrester, John
McCartney, Hugh


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Campbell, Ian
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
McElhone, Frank


Canavan, Dennis
Freeson, Reginald
MacFarquhar, Roderick


Cant, R. B.
Freud, Clement
McGuire, Michael (Ince)


Carmichael, Neil
Garrett, John (Norwich S)
MacKenzie, Gregor


Cartwright, John
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Maclennan, Robert


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Gilmour, Rt Hon Ian (Chesham)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)


Clemitson, Ivor
Ginsburg, David
Madden, Max


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Golding, John
Magee, Bryan


Cohen, Stanley
Gourlay, Harry
Mahon, Simon


Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.


Conlan, Bernard
Grant, John (Islington C)
Marks, Kenneth


Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)
Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Marquand, David


Corbett, Robin
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Harper, Joseph
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)


Crawshaw, Richard
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Maynard, Miss Joan


Cronln, John
Hatton, Frank
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony
Henderson, Douglas
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Hooley, Frank
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbrida)


Cryer, Bob
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Moyle, Roland


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Newens, Stanley


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Hunter, Adam
Oakes, Gordon




Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Ovenden, John
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Watkins, David


Park, George
Silverman, Julius
Watkinson, John


Parker, John
Skinner, Dennis
Watt, Hamish


Parry, Robert
Small, William
Weetch, Ken


Penhaligon, David
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Wellbeloved, James


Perry, Ernest
Spearing, Nigel
Welsh, Andrew


Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Stallard, A. W.
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Price, William (Rugby)
Steel, David (Roxburgh)
While, James (Pollock)


Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)
Stoddart, David
Whitlock, William


Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Stott, Roger
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Robinson, Geoffrey
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


Roderick, Caerwyn
Swain, Thomas
Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)


Rodgers George (Chorley)
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Rooker, J. W.
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Woof, Robert


Roper, John
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Rose, Paul B.
Thompson, George
Young, David (Bolton E)


Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Thome, Stan (Preston South)



Rowlands, Ted
Tinn, James
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Sedgemore, Brian
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)
Mr. Thomas Cox and


Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)
Mr. Donald Coleman.


Shore, Rt Hon Peter






NOES


Adley, Robert
Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss
Percival, Ian


Alison, Michael
Havers, Sir Michael
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Hawkins, Paul
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Bell, Ronald
Hayhoe, Barney
Raison, Timothy


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Hicks, Robert
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Benyon, W.
Holland, Philip
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Biggs-Davison, John
Hordern, Peter
Ridsdale, Julian


Body, Richard
Hunt, David (Wirral)
Rifkind, Malcolm


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Hurd, Douglas
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Bottomley, Peter
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Ross, William (Londonderry)


Brittan, Leon
James, David
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd&amp; W'df'd)
Royle, Sir Anthony


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Jessel, Toby
Sainsbury, Tim


Budgen, Nick
Jopling, Michael
St. John-Stevas, Norman


Bulmer, Esmond
Kershaw, Anthony
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Burden, F. A.
Kitson, Sir Timothy
Shersby, Michael


Carlisle, Mark
Latham, Michael (Melton)
Silvester, Fred


Carson, John
Lawrence, Ivan
Sims, Roger


Channon, Paul
Lawson, Nigel
Sinclair, Sir George


Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Le Marchant, Spencer
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)


Clegg, Walter
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Speed, Keith


Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Lloyd, Ian
Sproat, Iain


Cope, John
Luce, Richard
Stanbrook, Ivor


Crouch, David
McCrindle, Robert
Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)


Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Macfarlane, Neil
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham)
Stokes, John


Durant, Tony
Marten, Neil
Stradling Thomas, J.


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Mates, Michael
Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)


Elliott, Sir William
Maude, Angus
Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)


Eyre, Reginald
Mawby, Ray
Tebbit, Norman


Farr, John
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Temple-Morris, Peter


Finsberg, Geoffrey
Mayhew, Patrick
Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)


Fookes, Miss Janet
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Townsend, Cyril D.


Forman, Nigel
Miscampbell, Norman
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Moate, Roger
Vaughan, Dr Gerald


Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)
Molyneaux, James
Viggers, Peter


Goodhew, Victor
Monro, Hector
Wakeham, John


Gorst, John
Moore, John (Croydon C)
Wall, Patrick


Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Morgan, Geraint
Walters, Dennis


Gray, Hamish
Morris, Michael (Northampton S;
Wells, John


Grieve, Percy
Mudd, David
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Griffiths, Eldon
Neave, Airey
Wiggin, Jerry


Grist, Ian
Newton, Tony
Wood, Rt Hon Richard


Hall, Sir John
Onslow, Cranley
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Page, John (Harrow West)



Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Hampson, Dr Keith
Paisley, Rev Ian
Mr. John Corrie and


Hannam, John
Parkinson, Cecil
Mr. Anthony Berry.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 25

DISCRIMINATION: ASSOCIATIONS NOT WITHIN S.11

Lords amendment: No. 18, leave out Clause 25.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Merlyn Rees): I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): I think that it will be convenient to discuss at the same time the


Government amendment to the words which it is sought to restore to the Bill, and Lords Amendments Nos. 19, 22, 40, 41 and 42.

Mr. Rees: I apologise to the House for not having been involved in the earlier part of the debate. That was because of other responsibilities which will be temporary and which I hope the House will understand. I wanted to speak on this matter of working men's clubs as a member of working men's clubs, and one or two in particular, for a number of years.
Perhaps I might begin by sketching the background to Clause 25, which has already been debated at some length here and in another place. The House of Lords decided in its judicial capacity in the Charter and Preston Dockers cases that Section 2 of the Race Relations Act 1968 does not apply to the members or associates of social clubs. In 1968 there was, of course, no intention that that measure should apply to
bona fide private members clubs".
However, in these two cases the House of Lords ruled that the test for distinguishing between a club which is in what I might term the public sphere, and hence within Section 2, and one which is in the private sphere is whether the club operates a genuine selection procedure. As a matter of policy, the Government now regard the effects of this test as unacceptable, as we pointed out in the White Paper. I am sure that all right hon. and hon. Members who have been involved in this matter will have read the relevant parts of the White Paper.
Having reached the conclusion that the dividing line which had been drawn between clubs in the public sphere and those in the private sphere was unacceptable, we were faced with the problem of devising a more acceptable one. The solution which is embodied in Clause 25 is that the legislation should apply to all clubs except those with fewer than 25 members, of whatever kind. In other words, we have adopted a criterion of size. We acknowledge that this is a somewhat arbitrary dividing line, but we consider that it is much to be preferred to the selection procedure criterion. The figure of 25 has not been plucked from nowhere, however, because 25 is the minimum

number of members which a club must have if it is to qualify for registration under the Licensing Acts.
I come now to the criticisms which have been levelled at the clause—first, the right to apply tests of "personal acceptability". It has been suggested that the clause will prevent clubs from applying tests of personal acceptability to applicants for membership. This is certainly contrary to the Government's intention, and we do not believe that the clause has this effect. As we said in paragraph 72 of the White Paper,
The Government considers that it is right that all clubs should be allowed to apply a test of personal acceptability to candidates for membership, but it considers that it is against the public interest that they should be entitled to do this on racial grounds.
The Government's position can be summed up as follows. Clubs can certainly require persons to pass the test that as individuals they should be acceptable to a majority of the selection committee, but all except small clubs should not be permitted to say to an applicant "We find you unacceptable because of your race." The issue is one in which there are strong views on each side, and I recommend the House to support the policy embodied in Clause 25.
In another place, Lord Hailsham said that the clause would be unenforceable because it would be impossible to prove that a selection committee had refused to admit someone to membership on racial grounds. There is substance in that point. In many cases it will indeed be difficult to prove that a club has discriminated on racial grounds. That, however, is not a reason for deleting a clause which has its justification in the principle of non-discrimination. We should not over-estimate the difficulties. A club which is simply operating a colour bar on membership might find it difficult to explain away, for example, evidence advanced by the complainant that it had, over a substantial period, accepted 90 out of 100 applications received from white people but none of the 25 applications from black people. Hon. Members should also remember that there have been cases relating to discrimination by clubs.
8.45 p.m.
I am aware of the view that voluntary initiatives are likely to be more effective than the heavy hand of legislation in


eliminating discrimination in clubs. Voluntary initiatives are extremely important and should be encouraged. The law by itself is not enough to influence the minds of men and women. But the Government do not regard voluntary initiatives as a substitute for a clear statement by Parliament on this question or for the provision of legal remedies for those who have suffered this unacceptable form of discrimination.
I am aware that the Club and Institute Union has expressed opposition to Clause 25 and that it has proposed an amendment to its rules to empower the executive committee of the union to deal appropriately with a club which has been proved to have discriminated. I welcome that initiative, but we do not regard it as an adequate substitute for legislation. It should be borne in mind that, large as is the number of clubs affiliated to the Club and Institute Union—about 4,000—it is small in comparison with the 24,000 or so clubs registered under Part II of the Licensing Act 1964, and most of which we expect to fall within the scope of Clause 25.
Voluntary action is valuable. Influencing the minds of men and women is the long-term solution to the problem, but the Government and the country must decide on the basic question of discrimination in working men's clubs. I hope that the House will disagree with the Lords in the amendment.

Mr. Clegg: I declare an interest as a member of many clubs of all kinds. I am president of the North-West Area Conservative Clubs. The Home Secretary says that the clause is aimed at working men's clubs. In many debates we have been told by hon. Members on the Labour Benches that the law should not interfere or intervene in certain spheres. At no time was that more clear than in the discussions on the Industrial Relations Act. Some Labour Members said that that was too sensitive an area for the law to intervene, and that if it did there would be trouble. They put the argument day after day and night after night that the law should not intervene in working men's clubs and that if it did it would do more harm than good.
I turn to the practical way in which the clause will work. There is a misunderstanding, which was apparent in what the Home Secretary said. It is wrong to think that any member of the public may apply to join a club. I know of no working men's club where an applicant for membership does not have to be proposed and seconded by existing members. Therefore, it would be very difficult for the clause to work where nobody in the club would propose or second somebody of a different race who wished to join. It is hard to see how a case could be built up against a club where the membership was determined not to let in anybody of another race.

Mr. Brian Sedgemore: If the hon. Gentleman believes that it would be impossible to found a legal case, or at least to prove it, what is he worried about?

Mr. Clegg: As a lawyer, I am always concerned that the House should not pass unenforceable legislation. The hon. Gentleman's argument was used by Labour Members when they opposed the Industrial Relations Act. They said that it would be unenforceable.

Mr. Martin Flannery: It was.

Mr. Clegg: The hon. Gentleman is entitled to his opinion. If that is what he thinks, he should be on the side of those who support the Lords amendment. We think that the Clause is unworkable. If people make determined attempts to join clubs which do not want them, and eventually secure membership through the law, there will be immense tension within the clubs. How can members cope with a person who has been pushed into membership against their wishes? It would be an impossible situation, causing more tension than if we left the position as it is.
Labour Members argued in Committee that in some way working men's clubs were different from other clubs; that they were not really private but were somehow public. I think that it was said that a social club could form the hub of village life or provide the main social life in a suburb, and that therefore such a club was not a private members' club but something of a hybrid, a sort of public-private club.
I do not accept that argument. It is wrong that a working men's club should be treated in any way differently from any other club. I have knowledge of such clubs' voting procedures and know that they are very careful about whom they invite to join. When I joined a British Legion club I had to appear before the committee and go through the same procedure as I have in other clubs that I have joined.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: To join a British Legion club one would obviously have to have been a member of the Armed Forces at some time. Given that membership of the Armed Forces is the criterion, how does the question whether a man is black or brown, for example, come into consideration?

Mr. Clegg: There are many coloured members of British Legion clubs, because they have the necessary qualifications. They could be honorary members, but that was not my argument. I was saying that it seemed to be argued that a working men's club was somehow different from other clubs. I do not believe that there is any difference at all, because the same principles apply to the Carlton Club as to a working men's club, to White's Club or any other club. Obviously, the main feature in all reported cases concerns working men's clubs—the Preston Dockers' Club and other clubs of that nature. That is why this clause has been put in.
I have explained my objection to using the law in this area. It is counter-productive and will be difficult to operate against a club that is quite determined that it will not have people of other races as members.
As I understand it, we are also considering Clause 26, under Lords Amendment No. 19. That deals with the situation after Clause No. 25 goes. Clause 26 makes it possible to have ethnic clubs, such as the London Welsh in London. I expressed reservations about this clause in Committee. I can see that a case can be made out for having what I would call exile clubs, such as the London Welsh and the London Scottish. If there are any Englishmen in Wales or Scotland who have clubs, that would apply equally to them. But if we take Clause 26 as it stands I think that we shall get into difficulties. It is all right having a

London Welsh club or a Welsh club in London where exiles meet but it is a very different matter to have a club in Wales limited to Welshmen whose grandmothers, for example, were born in Wales.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Of course such things do exist. The Cymmredorion Society is like that and operates in parts of Wales. It keeps me out. But why not?

Mr. Stokes: There is an even more well-known club for Englishmen—the Royal Society of St. George.

Mr. Clegg: I am pleased to hear that the English at least have something.
If we took Clause 26 to its ultimate conclusion we would find ethnic clubs setting up in their own areas—English clubs for the English and Welsh clubs for the Welsh. They could make a qualifying rule that one's grandmother had to be born in Wales, England, Scotland or Ireland. That could provide a whole series of clubs which could make nonsense of Parliament, because it would not be applying the law in the right way.
We want to preserve the London Welsh and the London Scottish and all these other clubs, but if, at the same time, we are presenting a lever to people to get round the Act I think that Parliament is doing itself a disservice. It will create a feeling of tension where no tension or little tension exists. I beg the Government to think again on this. It would be very easy for them to secure this clause with their majority, but it would cause concern. The clause would be difficult to administer and would do more harm than good.

9 p.m.

Mr. Bid well: The weakness of the case of the hon. Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) is his contention that the rejection of the Lords Amendment will cause tension. There is tension. There has been tension for a long time, and especially since the passing of the 1965 and the 1968 Race Relations Acts. Therefore, it is not a question of the reintroduction of tension, because tension already exists. The sober question for us is to determine whether what the Bill does will militate against tension or exacerbate that tension.
I approach this matter with as open a mind as I did in 1968, when we had the


job of passing the Race Relations Act of that year. We are now about to embark on a new stage in seeking to establish racial harmony.
Clubs of the nature dealt with in these provisions often grow up in areas with high concentrations of coloured people who feel antipathy to existing "white men's clubs", if I may so call them. I am sure that the hon. Member for North Fylde and I share a desire to see greater harmony in a multi-racial society in this country.
In Committee many sincere contributions were made stemming from the background experiences of life as hon. Members saw them. The right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) entertained us with his description of the use of white and black balls. That kind of activity applies not only to the kind of club the right hon. Gentleman uses but also to working men's clubs and Labour clubs, where covert discrimination may take place. The new principle will mean that those activities will be open to inquiry. However, the matter may not go much further than that. We are not taking a gigantic leap on this subject, and we certainly do not wish to cause tension.
I understand that many clubs in this category have taken legal opinion on the question of discrimination. I was grateful that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary took time from his busy round of duties—because at present he has a great deal more on his shoulders than his duties as Home Secretary—to address us on this thorny question. Not everybody in the Labour movement is unanimous about the application of the principle of law in this sphere.
In the 1968 debate I agreed with the then Home Secretary, now my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, that it was best not to take the law into this area of club life. Club life is part and parcel of the British way of life and working men's clubs are a significant part of people's activities. The majority of members of these clubs regard any aspect of discrimination on ethnic grounds or grounds of colour as obnoxious. But if minorities in those clubs do not wish to see a change, there is the prospect of the tail wagging the dog.
Part of the argument advanced by the hon. Member for North Fylde dealt with the difficulty of enforcing laws. We have speed limits on the highways and no one in the House would suggest that we abandon them, although it seems that there is a continuous disregard of the 30 m.p.h. speed limit. We must bear in mind that we have had a fuel shortage and an incentive to save fuel, but it has not been suggested that we should abandon speed limits either on the roads or on the motorways.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) is hopeless in his attitude to these matters. However, he is totally consistent. He is totally opposed to any law that seeks to change his assumption that we cannot have black British people. That is his assumption, and he was saying so earlier.
There are some clubs that base themselves on trade union membership, and some of them have practised discrimination based on colour and ethnic origin that is entirely anti-trade union. The trade union movement, however, does not subscribe to any notion that human worth can be based upon the pigment of anyone's skin or on the fact, as I often put it, that they have not chosen their mothers and fathers correctly. In the older days there were some areas where eyebrows were raised if a member of the Labour Party, or a member of a town council, was not a member of the local Labour club. Coloured people are now becoming officers of their trade unions and shop stewards in industry but in many cases they are not freely taken into club life That is a factor that is offsetting the progress that has been made.
Integration is inevitably taking place, although the Press highlights examples of antagonism. However, the Press does not highlight the enormous number of friendships that have been established. If a white worker works alongside a black worker and the white man is unable to take the black man into his club for a drink and introduce him to the membership, notwithstanding that they are both members of the same union branch, that is entirely obnoxious and something that should be eradicated. If we cannot leave these matters to what I would think would be a natural process of fair play stemming from our experiences of the


1968 Act, we shall have to encourage movement and progress by law. When I first came to this place I did not believe that we needed legislation in this area. However, the PEP reports, for example, showed wholesale discrimination.
I knew that the theory of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) would never work. He has been regarded as a crazy man in the light of the proposition he is now making, which is not economically viable—namely, that we give every coloured person £1,000 and send him or her out of the country. If we adopted that policy we should frighten many talented people to death and be left with the residue. Those who had the talents or skills required elsewhere would leave, but perhaps I am straying from the terms of the debate.
As for the question whether their Lordships are right or wrong, I should not wish to put my faith in another place. Some of us want to see it removed altogether. Whatever we may feel about the constitutional issue, I should never put my faith in the ability of their Lordships to make a value judgment as to how these matters affect ordinary people in their everyday lives.
We understand the limitations of the law. So far in this issue, it has been an "egging-on" process. That is why it has been so notoriously gentle. We are now giving the new Commission extended powers, but it will still have to tread with an enormous amount of delicacy. However, I have faith in the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) and his ability to proceed in the spirit that came about in Committee. We had a good Committee stage, and there was a great deal of good will. There is only a narrow difference between us.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will bring himself back to the amendment.

Mr. Bidwell: I think that the balance of experience—and some of us have had considerable experience of this matter—is one the side of rejecting the Lords amendment.

Mr. Dudley Smith: The Home Secretary said that, in the long term, race relations would come right only by education and example. I agree. I think that that is the only way in which race rela-

tions will come right. I have not opposed various points of the legislation on race relations contained in this Bill and in the Acts, but I have never really felt that such legislation would do the job it was designed to do. Unfortunately, race relations have not been improved. In this instance, I believe that we are on the wrong track. The clause will put up the backs of a lot of members of the clubs, and I foresee great difficulty for management committees in dealing with the personal acceptability criterion.
Of course, certain individuals can be described as undesirable for membership. There will be no difficulty in deciding, in such a situation, that a white person is undesirable if the committee genuinely believes that he is undesirable. But what happens if a committee, quite honourably and fairly, decides that a black individual is undesirable? Is he immediately to lodge a complaint with the Commission? I believe that there will be many such cases, and the situation places those who run the clubs in good faith in a particular difficulty.
There is another aspect. Let us suppose that a club, to its credit, decides to open its doors widely to black people and that, because of the local situation, there is an inrush of black people, resulting in a racial imbalance, with more black members than white. When I was at the Department of Employment, we had complaints from factories where the number of black workers had increased until they had become the majority, with the result that white people left. Such imbalance could be created in clubs, with complaints from white people about black takeovers.
By any standard, this provision is a direct interference with a private body, irrespective of what type of club or institution it might be. When the hon. Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell) and I were in Newark, New Jersey, we met an impressive black social worker with enormous experience. He was very realistic. He told us "You can legislate for people to do or not to do certain things, but you cannot legislate for their hearts. You cannot decree that someone should love or like someone else. You can tell him that he must tolerate other people and work with them, but you cannot make him like them unless he wants to do so."
In the longer term, however reprehensible it may be, some people simply do not like black people, and only by education and example can they be made to understand that good race relations are important and relevant. My feeling is that this particular aspect of the legislation will exacerbate the situation and annoy a lot of people. There are quite a lot of people who would welcome black people to their clubs in normal circumstances but who might deliberately refuse them entry immediately we start passing legislation like this.

9.15 p.m.

Mr. Bruce Douglas-Mann: Does not the hon. Gentleman accept that racial discrimination diminishes when white and black people get to know each other as individuals? This fact is borne out by practical experience. The kind of attitude that the hon. Gentleman is presenting in his argument reduces the likelihood of black and white people ever getting acquainted.

Mr. Smith: I agree that when people get to know each other a lot of the antagonism goes. But I still maintain that this should be done on a voluntary and progressive basis. The moment one starts saying "thou shalt", it all becomes counter-productive. People immediately say "Oh, no, I won't", and they then begin to look for ways to get round the law.
Ways and means will be found of getting round the law in respect of clubs, and then this will become bad legislation which will be widely held in contempt. The Home Secretary's original approach of education and example was the right course. That approach should be fully supported, and the framework of legislation should be kept as light as possible. The heavy-handed approach of these two clauses will provoke just the kind of situation we do not want.

Mr. Paul B. Rose: The hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Smith) has pointed out very correctly two areas of difficulty which must be encountered in a pluralistic and democratic society. The problem does arise with ethnic clubs, whether they are Caribbean or Polish. But we are not talking about limited

interest clubs here; we are talking about those which purport to be open to the public. For example, a working men's club certainly does not depend on the pigmentation of the skin. We must delineate very carefully between particular interest clubs and those open to the public at large.
I raised this matter in Committee on the second Race Relations Bill and I put forward that form of wording in order to overcome the difficulty which the House of Lords eventually faced when coming to its decision. The brotherhood of man is fundamental among the ideals of working men's clubs, and the only qualification must be wether a person is a working man.
The second difficulty is the problem of enforcement. The hon. Member is right to point out that if membership is denied to a person because of the perfectly good reason of undesirability, and if that person claims that it is because of the colour of his skin, problems will arise. But this kind of thing is faced every day in industrial tribunals. Those who practise on these tribunals know only too well that one can discover whether there was a bona fide reason which caused an employer to dismiss someone or whether it was because of his colour.
The third matter raised was that of tension. Tension is caused by discrimination, and the greater the number of clubs which discriminate, the more tension there will be. I reject the argument that the passing of legislation of this sort increases tension. Legislation is only one aspect of the matter. It has very rightly been said by the Conservatives that education is important. But legislation is a form of education, and what we enshrine in our legislation is educative. If we state that we have no objection to a colour bar in clubs, in a sense we are educating in the wrong way. Even if we cannot achieve perfection in the enforcement of the law—and, goodness knows, we never do—that does not prevent laws going on to the statute book, because they have an educative quality about them.
Therefore, all in all, there are dilemmas. But if one is serious about combating the evil of racialism in our society and about constructing a society in which discrimination is not sanctioned by authority and is shown to be rejected by authority in


the form of legislation, although that is only part of what we are trying to do, we must come irresistibly to the conclusion that my right hon. Friend is right to seek to reject the Lords amendment.

Mr. Grieve: Let me take up a phrase used by the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose). He spoke of clubs of limited interest, but there was no reference to clubs of limited interest in Clause 25 as it went to the Lords. Clause 25 covers all clubs save those with a membership below 25.
I have three reasons for opposing Clause 25 and for supporting the Lords amendment. First, let me deal with the positive objection. The club is one of the most peculiarly British institutions that exist. We have exported it to all parts of the world where we have been active, and it has won the admiration and sometimes the suspicion of large numbers of our Continental friends. But it is a peculiarly British institution, which is founded upon a community of interest and the enlarged friendship that may come from a community of interest, even though it may embrace many hundreds of men in a working men's club.
It is essentially a private and not a public institution, Even when it is a working men's club in an area such as Preston, or around Birmingham, where my constituency is located, it is still a private institution. If the law intrudes upon the deliberations of those who are deciding who are welcome in a club and who are not, it is cutting at the root and basis of the whole system of clubs as they exist. That is true not only of the Carlton Club and White's but of the Preston Working Men's Club.
I come, secondly, to the negative reason, which I believe is even more important. Whether it is right or wrong thus to intrude, I believe that the ill effects of doing so will be far greater than any beneficial effects that might be anticipated. To intrude thus upon the deliberations of bodies of men who may be few in number—perhaps only 26, 50 or 100—will cause the greatest resentment. It would cause almost as much resentment as a similar intrusion into the family life of any one of us. That is something that we ought not to overlook. The danger of a backlash of resentment

in legislation of this kind is a very great danger indeed.
I respect the view of the hon. Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell). I had the privilege of serving with him for some time on the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, and I believe that he aims at improving race relations in this country. However, we must be on our guard at all times against creating resentment by over-legislation and intrusion of this kind. This is intrusion into an area that is essentially private. That was the argument that appealed to their Lordships in the case that has given rise to this clause.
People form clubs for all sorts of reasons. There are fly-fishermen's clubs and butterfly-collecting clubs. While I was in hospital recently, I was asked whether we had formed a club of hon. Members who had pacemakers in their bodies. I think there are two—my hon. Friend the Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) and myself—but no doubt the Whips will see to it that there are soon far more of us if we continue to have the spate of legislation to which we have been subjected recently.
A club is essentially an organisation of people as friends, or people dedicated to a particular purpose, or getting together for a particular reason. This legislation will intrude upon them and will cause resentment. For those reasons, it is objectionable and, as Lord Hailsham said in another place, it will be virtually unenforceable. The more it is sought to enforce it, the greater will be the resentment caused. I urge the Secretary of State not to oppose the amendment.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: For some of the reasons put forward by the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve), I urge my hon. Friends to reject the Lords amendment. I appeal to Opposition Members to think carefully before they vote against rejection of the amendment. It is possible—though I trust it will not happen for a long time—that hon. Members opposite will form a Government some time in the future. It would be sad if the black community were to associate the Conservative Party with the kind of repressive and antagonistic provisions that would follow the rejection of Clause 25.
The hon. and learned Member for Solihull talked about resentment and a backlash. I remind him that race relations in this country improved considerably for a substantial number of years as people got to know each other as individuals but that relations have deteriorated in recent months with explicit racial antagonisms being expressed by a few hon. Members opposite, whose records are not very commendable in this respect, and a larger number of racially-antagonistic people outside the House.
9.30 p.m.
The great majority of black people live in the deprived centres of our cities in areas where they almost inevitably suffer deprivation in housing conditions, employment prospects and in many other respects. If to that deprivation is to be added that they are positively to be discriminated against either by the suggestion of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) that they should be given £1,000 to go away—which might make them seem welcome members of the community—or by the suggestion which has been made by others that it is all right for a working men's club to say "We are all working men, but we do not want black working men in our club", race relations will inevitably deteriorate, not because of the antagonism of white people but because of the antagonism of black members of the British community towards those who are discriminating against them and who are responsible for the deprivation from which they suffer.
As has been acknowledged, in many areas in this country the working men's club provides the sole source of social life. That applies often not only in the village but in the large town. If people find themselves deprived of membership of the social life of the community, they will be bitterly antagonistic towards those who are excluding them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) rightly pointed out that enforceability is not so important. We have repeatedly carried into law expressions of the desires of the community, and they have to a large extent been honoured in practice. It will be difficult to ensure that a particular piece of legislation is enforced in the courts, if,

indeed, it is necessary to seek to enforce it in the courts. I trust that it will not be necessary.
Once it has been expressed in legislation that it is not right that people should be excluded from membership of a social club because of their colour, the vast majority of social clubs will honour that expression of the law. The majority of people will feel that, as Parliament expressed it, they should now carry that intention into effect. I hope that in carrying that intention into effect, as they will if we reject the Lords amendment, they will not be saying to themselves "The Labour Party"—and, I trust, the Liberal Party—"wanted this repudiation of the entitlement to discriminate to be carried into law, but the Conservative Party was willing that the discrimination should be perpetuated."

Mr. William Whitelaw: Mr. William Whitelaw (Penrith and The Border) indicated dissent.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: I am glad to see the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) dissents from that. I hope he will exercise such influence as he can on his hon. Friends on the Back Benches to ensure that the voting on this issue is not a party matter but that all parties express the determination that there shall not be discrimination. I am aware that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) and others will inevitably go their own way, but most of the parties will be expressing their determination that there shall not be discrimination.
If we allow a working men's club to say that it will not have black working men or a dockers' club to say that it will not have black dockers, we shall continue to generate the kind of racial problems of which we have become so conscious in South London in the last week. If we discriminate against individuals who are in other respects deprived, whatever the background to their presence in this country may be, we shall build up a degree of racial problems in future which will be infinitely more difficult to resolve than those we have now.
As I said earlier in an intervention, racial problems in Britain have been improved. I have extensive knowledge of what has happened in North Kensington. I have lived there for 18 years. I


first went to live there at the time of the race riots in 1958. For a very long time the situation was steadily improving. I believe that it is still fairly good there, nothwithstanding the present problems. The situation got better because people came to know each other as individuals. Instead of there being the black menace that no one knew, people got to know each other and the antagonism could not be sustained against Charlie, who lived upstairs, or Joe, whom one met at the bus stop, or John, with whom one drank in the pub.
As long as white working men's clubs are entitled and and enabled to exclude from their membership those whom they do not know, antagonism will be perpetuated. As soon as those people come into the clubs, it will evaporate and we shall not have the problem.
Obviously, my right hon and hon. Friends will support the Government's motion to reject the amendment. I urge Opposition Members to think very carefully before they vote to retain the Lords amendment.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I fear that the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden (Mr. Douglas-Mann) will be disappointed when it comes to the Division on the amendment, because he will find not that only a few Opposition Members oppose the Government's motion but that we are against it as a party.
What is perhaps equally interesting is that when the 1968 Act was passing through this House, the Labour Party, as a party, was against the extension of that law to clubs. The hon. Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell) has frankly said so this evening. Therefore, the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden should have the sense to realise that this must, at the very least, be a marginal argument.
I have no doubt on which side of the argument I come down. When I say that it is a marginal argument, I am speaking on the assumption that one accepts the basic policy of the Bill that discrimination should be prohibited by law. I do not accept that, as the hon. Gentleman knows. I do not believe in this kind of law. This is where the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) are rather in the same channel of the argument. The hon. Member for Blackley

described this, quite frankly, as an educative use of the law. That is a phrase that he has used in the past, and it has been used by many of his colleagues. I suppose that if I had to reduce to a single expression the reason why I am opposed to this use of the law, whether in relation to sex, race, or anything else, it would be that I do not agree for one moment that the law should be used in this so-called educative way.
What is the law doing? It is enjoining by penalties—let alone the civil procedures; it is a penal code, whatever the procedure—upon the whole citizenry, as a matter of compulsion, the particular views, philosophy and standard of values of one political group. It is no good the hon. Member for Blackley shaking his head. Does he think that the general body of the public does not agree with me rather than with him about the existence of legislation of this kind? I am talking not about the public's attitude to the presence of Commonwealth immigrants among us but their attitude to the use of law in this educative role, whether in relation to sex, race or anything else. In that respect I should be very surprised if I, rather than the hon. Gentleman, did not reflect the public view.
However, be that as it may, we have this specific question of the clubs before us. The last time this arose, in 1968, I took a great interest in the Bill that was going through the House. Any suggestion that clubs might be affected was instantly swept away. We were told that we were being unreasonable in suggesting that, and we were given assurances that clubs would not be affected and that they were private.
Now, the Government come forward with proposals to tread into that private sphere and regulate the activities of the citizen in it. They do so in a strange way. They say that if there are more than 25 people in the club there must be no discrimination on the ground of colour. That is what it comes to. There is something about race as well, but Clause 26 provides that a club circumscribed by the definition of a racial group is permitted. That is not a geographical group. Members of the London Scottish Club do not have to have lived formerly in Scotland, they do not have to speak with a Scots accent or to have been born in Scotland. The words in Clause 26 are "racial


group". So there could be a Yorkshire Caucasian club. Even the United Nations has a list of five recognised races, of which Caucasian is one. As the United Nations calls the Caucasians a racial group it would he difficult to argue in the courts that it was not.
All that is necessary is for the Workington Working Men's Club to call itself the Workington Caucasian Club. That will bring it under Clause 26, and the club is through. That is too silly for words. Clause 26 is necessary because of the Caledonians, the Cymmredorians, the London Dutch, and so on. There has to be an exemption for the racial club, and the exemption makes nonsense of the attempted control. Even with the racial group clubs we must not distinguish on the ground of colour. We do not need to. If the distinction is racial and genetic, we do not need to bring in the Ringelmann chart. It is covered.
What is this nonsense about? Not only is the absurd Clause 25 totally unenforceable but it is aimed only at working men's clubs. It will have no effect in the Athenaeum. Does anyone think that it will? Will anyone bring an action against the Athenaeum because he was refused membership on the ground that his face is black? That is ridiculous. It is hoped to catch the working men's clubs because their arrangements are not so sophisticated.
In the ordinary West End members' club the characteristic rule is that two black balls shall exclude. Almost every members' club has that provision. Two people object, and anonymity is the basis and always has been. It has nothing to do with race. Our practice in England has always been that if two members object to the proposal, the person proposed cannot come in, and that is the end of it. But the names of the objectors are not known.
In other clubs of which I have been a member it is necessary to have a proposer, a seconder and ten assentors. Suppose a person cannot get 12 people to support him, who will be prosecuted—all the rest of the club, because they would not be the 12 men?
The clause is aimed at what one might almost call the Labour Party's working men's dubs, which have dared to disagree

with the intellectualist element in their party—

Mr. Norman Tebbit: Intellectualist?

9.45 p.m.

Mr. Bell: In spoken English it is difficult to use inverted commas. Will my hon. Friend the Member for Chingford (Mr. Tebbit) presume the inverted commas? I have in mind people like the hon. Member for Blackley. I think that makes it clear.
Of course, the ordinary supporters of the Labour Party in the constituencies feel rather more strongly about this than some of us do. The idea that this compulsive procedure will make everybody friends reminds me of a proposal that once came from the Labour Party that if a husband and wife could not agree on the housekeeping money they could go round the corner and ask the magistrate for a casting vote, and they could pin that on the mantelpiece and continue. That is the sort of approach to life that we get from the other side. It is absolute nonsense. It is argued, for example, that when, into a street, there is an incursion of people from outside, in substantial numbers, this leads to great friendship and bonhomie all round. That has not been my experience.
The underlying fact is that we never asked the people of this country if they wanted to be turned into a multi-racial society. They have had it done to them and they resent it. All legislation should be drafted with this basic fact in mind. I, personally, am against legislation, but if we are to have it we must not have things like Clause 25 in it. It will cause deep and absolutely legitimate resentment.
It is not a necessary intrusion. One reason why it is not necessary is that it cannot possibly work. If it cannot work, how can it be a necessary element in a Bill like this? I think the Lords in this, as in other respects, are more truly reflecting the mind of the people than the elected Chamber—a very odd reversal of history. It is the Lords who are protecting the people against pressure groups that operate upon the Labour Party. It is a minority of a minority. It is not even a view of the Labour Party. A pressure group gets hold of it, makes it party policy, and the Whips are applied.


It is no good our speaking here, because we cannot persuade them. They are not here. But when the bells ring they will come in from all parts of the building. I cannot specify which parts, but there are parts which have the nature of a club. They will come in and vote as they are told. It will not necessarily be the way in which they want to vote.
Let us be grateful to the Lords. I hope that my hon. Friends will vote against the Government's proposition. If there were a free vote among Labour Members we would carry the day and the Lords amendments would be reaffirmed. They are being defeated because at the turn of the century the Webbs did a three-card trick on the real Labour Party, and they have had their ears pinned against the wall ever since by the intellectuals, who have nothing to do with the working class at all and have grafted—

Mr. Rose: The hon. and learned Gentleman insists on calling me an intellectual. Will he tell the House how many working men's clubs he is a member of; whether his father worked as an engineer, and whether he was brought up in a working-class area? The hon. and learned Gentleman talks in that way, but he is entirely divorced from working-class life and he ought to know it.

Mr. Bell: That sounds to me like a "Round Britain Quiz". Why the answers that I give to those questions should make the hon. Gentleman an intellectual I cannot understand. Anyway, I shall put the answers in a sealed envelope and send them to the hon. Member.
I had concluded my speech, in fact. I repeat only that I am sure that we should vote with a good heart against this motion. I hope that the Lords amendment prevails.

Mr. Budgen: I have twice voiced my opposition to the extension of this legislation to clubs, and I do not propose to deal with the general arguments again. I wish to pose just one question to the Home Secretary, a question which has been put time and time again in these debates but which no one has previously answered.
I understand the right hon. Gentleman's argument, that he believes that the use of law for educational purposes is a legitimate

additional objective in the use of law—

Mr. Merlyn Rees: Mr. Merlyn Rees indicated assent.

Mr. Budgen: I see that the right hon. Gentleman agrees. But I am sure he will agree that using the law for an additional objective does not cancel the requirement that the law should be enforceable. What happens if, in future, as may well happen in my constituency, a working men's club or a number of clubs decides to defy this law?
I want to make it plain that, although I have opposed the extension of this legislation to clubs, I shall do my level best to persuade them that they have to obey the law, however much I have opposed it and however much they are opposed to it. But what happens in the last resort if an individual working men's club says that it is not prepared to obey this law? Will the 500 members of the Bradmore Working Men's Club, to take an example, be brought before the courts for contempt? Will they be hauled back week after week as they become and more and more debilitated until finally the judge has to give way and say "I am sorry but I shall have to let you out. You have successfully defied the law"?
That is the ultimate situation with which the Home Secretary might be faced. He must face the question of how he will enforce this extension of the law. Until he can satisfy the House that it is genuinely enforceable, he will never persuade anyone on this side to vote for his proposals.

Mr. Whitelaw: We fully understand that the Home Secretary's other duties kept him away from our earlier debates. I have been kept away for similar reasons, so we are together on that. The right hon. Gentleman and I have been in agreement on a number of matters over the years. In this debate, we are in agreement on one point.
I am glad to see the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden (Mr. Douglas-Mann) returning, because I have a point to address to him. I feel strongly that any form of discrimination in clubs on grounds of colour is totally odious and totally against everything that we are seeking to do in this country, that it should be stopped on every possible


occasion and that we should do everything we can to achieve that end. That is the view of this party.

Mr. Rose: All of them?

Mr. Whitelaw: The hon. Gentleman will just have to take it from me that that is so.
I would say to the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden that one's view about this proposal—whether to bring the law into the area of clubs—is not a test of one's view on the whole issue. That cannot be so, and I think that the hon. Member does the whole case no service by suggesting that it is.
The hon. Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell) said very fairly in 1968 that he believed that clubs should not be brought within the ambit of the law because he thought that the natural processes of fair play would produce the desired result. When the hon. Member said that, he was just as clear about the need to stop discrimination in clubs as he is today. Then, however, he decided that he did not want the law; now, he does. There is an argument for saying that the law is separate from the general belief that one has in what one is seeking to do. Hon. Members on the Labour side have decided that the law should operate for clubs, but they did not believe that in 1968.
I have made my view clear from the start. The Government made a great mistake when they decided, particularly after the decision in the Preston case, to bring the law to the clubs. It is a mistake for two main important reasons. First, it will not work; the provision is basically unenforceable. Secondly, it will be counter-productive. Voluntary action was ending discrimination and it would, with pressure, have ended it altogether. Bringing in the law might put back that process.
During the debates in the Lords, a peer said:
I recall when I was in the United States some years ago hearing that the ruling of the Supreme Court on the question of segregation had put back by ten years the educative process on non-discrimination in the United States because there is a pace at which public opinion cannot be pushed. We have to be careful that the niceties of the law, and the refinements that can be introduced in it, can

possibly do more harm than good."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 1st October, 1976; Vol. 374, c. 732–3.]
The speaker was not some Right-wing reactionary peer as depicted by Labour Members in this House. He was Lord Houghton of Sowerby, whom we all knew as a Member of this House, and his view is important.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: The decision of the court in the Preston case reversed the educative process which was already taking place. Because of the decision of the court in that case, the process that was already in train was put back. If we do not have Clause 25, the legislation will be in favour of discrimination. The rest of the law is against discrimination, and to omit Clause 25 is to enshrine discrimination within the law.

Mr. Whitelaw: I do not accept that. If the clause proves to be unenforceable, if it does not work and brings the law into contempt, which I believe it may well do, it will set back the educative process, because it will be seen not to have worked. That is the basis of my case.
I shall explain why I believe that in the end it will be unenforceable. The Home Secretary said that the Government were determined to uphold the test of personal acceptability for clubs. The moment that he makes that statement—and, of course, the test of personal acceptability must be kept for clubs—he undermines the whole basis of the clubs. If the test of personal acceptability means anything, it means that if I do not wish to see a particular man—whatever his colour, his race or creed—in a club of which I am a member, I am entitled to say so. And if I happen to be a member of the committee of that club—
It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Ordered,
That, at this day's Sitting, the Consideration of Lords Amendments to the Race Relations Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. Frank R. White.]

Question again proposed, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Whitelaw: If I happen to be a member of the committee of the club, I am entitled to cast my vote in a particular way, and no member of the club will know how I have done it. If I


decide on the basis of personal acceptability, I do not see how that can be denied. Where, then, stands the enforceability of the clause?
Some Labour Members say that they do not mind about enforceability because the clause will be good for the soul, the educative process or whatever. I see that argument, but it is very dangerous. It could easily be counter-productive, because we all know that there are people who enjoy making trouble. I have discovered in an increasingly long life that there are all sorts of people who enjoy making trouble in all sorts of areas, and they are not all outside this House. If someone wishes to cause trouble under the clause and become a martyr, he can do it by playing ducks and drakes with the whole principle of personal acceptability. I have believed that all along, and I still believe it strongly.
Secondly, there is the question of progress by voluntary initiative. I find the position of the Government and Labour Members on this matter rather curious. When the question of the shop stewards was discussed earlier, we heard that Mr. Len Murray had said "Leave it to us. Let's proceed by voluntary initiatives. Do not bring the law into our affairs." That may have been wise in his case, but if the law must be kept out of that matter why must it be put in here? There is a considerable contradiction.
I believe that voluntary efforts were producing results. What the hon. Member for Ealing, Southall calls the natural process of fair play should be given a further chance. We are making a grave mistake in bringing the law into this area. The Lords were right to take these two clauses out.
I ask the Government to think again. I have made no secret of my view all along that they are making a great mistake here. Because I want to see discrimination in clubs ended altogether, I hope that I am wrong but I still think that it would be right to take the Lords' view and reject the Secretary of State's view.

Mr. Merlyn Rees: With the leave of the House, I should like to speak again.
Coming new to these debates, I was struck by the statement of the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) that the Lords reflected public

opinion. I think that he would be surprised if he knew the views expressed in club life in general. I advise him not to judge club life on the basis of Beaconsfield. I invite him to visit clubs in the North, but not to see them in a Coronation Streetesque way, with people who are not very intelligent and understand only the sort of argument that he puts forward—in other words, that the matter is rather simple.
I do not object to the hon. and learned Gentleman's having a different view—there are different views on this matter—but I found the way in which he couched his argument curiously offensive. [Interruption.] If it was meant to be offensive, there are ways of being offensive without importing a certain priggishness into a remark.
I have no doubt about the bona fides of the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) on this subject. I understand his final remarks. What I say about him goes for most members of his party. In disagreeing on this issue, there is an argument to be made, even though I believe that there is a case for buttressing public opinion by means of the law. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the trade unions. There is a difference here. The right hon. Gentleman has had great experience of trade unions. The trade unions have machinery for dealing with such matters within their organisations. I do not believe that such machinery exists in the area that we are now discussing.
A case for rejecting these clauses is that the development of good race relations needs buttressing by the law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Rose) said, in a sense law is a form of education. I do not believe that the American experience can be translated here. It is not on all fours in terms of the race problem. However, in this respect, to some degree the translation can be done.

Mr. Grieve: Surely the whole of the race relations legislation, of which this is but the latest part, is based to a large extent on the presumption that the American experience can be imported here.

Mr. Rees: I have said that. All I say is that I do not believe that the American experience, from a social class


point of view—black and brown, and so on—is on all fours with that in this country. The black American is older in America than probably 80 per cent. of Americans by origin who have gone there in the past 100 years. Our situation is different. That does not mean that the basic argument cannot be used.
The hon. Member for North Fylde (Mr. Clegg) spoke about Clause 26 and used the argument of the London Welsh Club, and so on. I do not blame him. It was a much beter argument than that of the Caucasian clubs. That was a rather foolish line of argument. In the White Paper foreshadowing Clause 26, we said:
In addition, there will be an exception to enable bona fide social, welfare, political and sporting organisations whose main object is to confer benefits on a particular ethnic or national group to continue to do so.
There is nothing against a West Indian club, but there would be something against a black West Indian club, given the origin of West Indians. Some Tory Members may find this funny, but I do not believe that it is a subject for laughter. It is right for ethnic groups to band together if they wish. If they do, the racial argument does not apply.

Mr. Tebbit: The right hon. Gentleman might be making a bit of a fool of himself by trying to pretend that the ethnic groups to which he has referred would not naturally be groups of the same colour. Would he refer to our proceedings on 8th July, when the then Minister of State said:
I am not sure whether Anglo-Saxon would be regarded as a particular racial group within the meaning of the Act."—[Official Report, 8th July 1976; Vol. 914, c. 1905.]
Is the right hon. Gentleman sure that it would be so regarded?

Mr. Rees: I have not put my mind to the point. There are black West Indians and brown West Indians. I do not believe that is a foolish remark to make. It is easy to make a fool of oneself, as the hon. Gentleman knows from his regular experiences at

Question Time. The Anglo-Saxon point was not the point that I was on.

Mr. Tebbit: You do not know the answer.

Mr. Rees: That may be, but I do not think it is relevant, and I do not think I need put my mind to that point.
In regard to the Government's position, clubs can certainly require a person to pass a test so that the individual may be acceptable to the majority of the selection committee. That was the point I made before the hon. Member for Chingford (Mr. Tebbit) joined us. Furthermore, all but the small clubs should not be permitted to say to an applicant "We find you unacceptable because of your race."
The point was made in discussion that clubs were not affected by the law. I can only tell the House that the law on clubs is about 200 pages long. There is no reason why they should not be affected in this way. These arguments have been dealt with on other occasions, and I am strongly of the view that the Lords amendment should be rejected.

Mr. Ronald Bell: My hon. Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) said that what I said was meant to be offensive. It was not.

Mr. Alison: I withdraw that imputation.

Mr. Bell: It was meant to be a full frontal challenge to the views of the Labour Benches, but I hope that I am never consciously offensive. As for the question of northern clubs, the House may care to know that some years ago members of the Working Men's Club and Institute Union came to me for advice on this matter and I admired those people.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 206, Noes 156.

Division No. 348.]
AYES
[10.12 p.m.


Abse, Leo
Atkinson, Norman
Bishop, E. S.


Allaun, Frank
Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Boardman, H.


Anderson, Donald
Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur


Archer, Peter
Bates, Alf
Boyden, James (Bish Auck)


Armstrong, Ernest
Beith, A. J.
Bray, Dr Jeremy


Ashton, Joe
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Bidwell, Sydney
Buchanan, Richard




Campbell, Ian
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Robinson, Geoffrey


Canavan, Dennis
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Roderick, Caerwyn


Cant, R. B.
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Rodgers George (Chorley)


Carmichael, Neil
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Rooker, J. W.


Cartwright, John
Hunter, Adam
Roper, John


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Rose, Paul B.


Clemitson, Ivor
Jeger, Mrs Lena
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)


Cohen, Stanley
John, Brynmor
Rowlands, Ted


Coleman, Donald
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Ryman, John


Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
Sandelson, Neville


Conlan, Bernard
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Sedgemore, Brian


Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)


Corbett, Robin
Kaufman, Gerald
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Lambie, David
Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Lamborn, Harry
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Crawshaw, Richard
Lamond, James
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


Cronin, John
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)
Silverman, Julius


Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Skinner, Dennis


Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Lipton, Marcus
Small, William


Cryer, Bob
Litterick, Tom
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Cunnlngham, G. (Islington S)
Luard, Evan
Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)
Spearing, Nigel


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
McCartney, Hugh
Stallard, A. W.


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
McElhone, Frank
Stoddart, David


Dell, Rt Hon Edmund
MacFarquhar, Roderick
Stott, Roger


Dempsey, James
MacKenzie, Gregor
Strang, Gavin


Doig, Peter
Mackintosh, John P.
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Dormand, J. D.
Maclennan, Robert
Swain, Thomas


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Dunnett, Jack
McNamara, Kevin
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Eadie, Alex
Madden, Max
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Edge, Geoff
Magee, Bryan
Thompson, George


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Mahon, Simon
Thome, Stan (Preston South)


Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Tinn, James


Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Marks, Kenneth
Torney, Tom


Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
Marquand, David
Tuck, Raphael


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)


Flannery, Martin
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Ford, Ben
Mikardo, Ian
Watkins, David


Forrester, John
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Watkinson, John


Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)
Watt, Hamish


Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Moonman, Eric
Weetch, Ken


Freeson, Reginald
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Wellbeloved, James


Freud, Clement
Morris, Rt Kon J. (Aberavon)
Weish, Andrew


Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Movie, Roland
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King
White, James (Pollock)


Gilbert, Dr John
Newens, Stanley
Whitlock, William


Golding, John
Oakes, Gordon
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Gould, Bryan
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


Gourlay, Harry
Ovenden, John
Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)


Grant, George (Morpeth)
Park, George
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Grant, John (Islington C)
Parker, John
Woodall, Alec


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Parry, Robert
Woof, Robert


Hardy, Peter
Penhaligon, David
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Harper, Joseph
Perry, Ernest
Young, David (Bolton E)


Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Price, C. (Lewisham W)



Hatton, Frank
Price, William (Rugby)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Henderson, Douglas
Radice, Giles



Hooley, Frank
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)
Mr. James Hamilton and


Hooson, Emlyn
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Mr. Ted Graham.


Howeils, Geraint (Cardigan)






NOES


Adley, Robert
Burden, F. A.
Eyre, Reginald


Alison, Michael
Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Fairgrieve, Russell


Arnold, Tom
Carlisle, Mark
Farr, John


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Carson, John
Finsberg, Geoffrey


Awdry, Daniel
Channon, Paul
Fookes, Miss Janet


Bell, Ronald
Churchill, W. S.
Forman, Nigel


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C't'd)


Benyon, W.
Clegg, Walter
Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)


Berry, Hon Anthony
Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Goodhew, Victor


Biffen, John
Cope, John
Gorst, John


Biggs-Davison, John
Crouch, David
Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)


Body, Richard
Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Drayson, Burnaby
Gray, Hamish


Brotherton, Michael
Dunlop, John
Grieve, Percy


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Durant, Tony
Griffiths, Eldon


Budgen, Nick
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Grist, Ian


Bulmer, Esmond
Elliott, Sir William
Hall, Sir John







Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Hannam, John
Miscampbell, Norman
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss
Moate, Roger
Shersby, Michael


Havers, Sir Michael
Molyneaux, James
Silvester, Fred


Hawkins, Paul
Monro, Hector
Sims, Roger


Hayhoe, Barney
Moore, John (Croydon C)
Sinclair, Sir George


Hicks, Robert
More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Skeet, T. H. H.


Holland, Philip
Morgan, Geraint
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)


Hordern, Peter
Morris, Michael (Northampton S)
Speed, Keith


Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Sproat, Iain


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Mudd, David
Stanbrook, Ivor


Hurd, Douglas
Neave, Airey
Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Neubert, Michael
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


James, David
Newton, Tony
Stokes, John


Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd &amp; W'df'd)
Onslow, Cranley
Stradling Thomas, J.


Jessel, Toby
Page, John (Harrow West)
Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)


Jopling, Michael
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Paisley, Rev Ian
Tebbit, Norman


Kitson, Sir Timothy
Parkinson, Cecil
Temple-Morris, Peter


Lamont, Norman
Percival, Ian
Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)


Latham, Michael (Melton)
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch
Townsend, Cyril D.


Lawrence, Ivan
Price, David (Eastleigh)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Lawson, Nigel
Raison, Timothy
Vaughan, Dr Gerald


Le Marchant, Spencer
Rathbone, Tim
Viggers, Peter


Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Wakeham, John


Lloyd, Ian
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Wall, Patrick


Loveridge, John
Ridsdale, Julian
Walters, Dennis


Luce, Richard
Rifkind, Malcolm
Weatherill, Bernard


McCrindle, Robert
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Wells, John


Macfarlane, Neil
Ross, William (Londonderry)
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham)
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Wiggin, Jerry


Marten, Neil
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)



Maude, Angus
Royle, Sir Anthony
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mawby, Ray
Sainsbury, Tim
Mr. Carol Mather and


Maxweil-Hyslop, Robin
SI. John-Stevas, Norman
Mr. John Corrie.


Mayhew, Patrick

Question accordingly agreed to.

Amendment made in lieu thereof to the words so restored to the Bill: In page 17, line 39, leave out from 'section' to 'he' in line 42 and insert:

'(a) a person is a member of an association if he belongs to it by virtue of his admission to any sort of membership provided for by its constitution (and is not merely a person with certain rights under its constitution by virtue of his membership of some other association), and references to membership of an association shall be construed accordingly; 
(b) a person is an associate of an association to which this section applies if, not being a member of it,'.—[Mr. John.]

Subsequent Lords amendment disagreed to.

Clause 28

DISCRIMINATORY PRACTIES

Lords amendment:No. 20, in page 19, line 12, leave out from "applied" to end of line and insert:
included persons of any particular racial group as regards which there has been no occasion for applying it.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment corrects a drafting defect in subsection (1) which was revealed in the other place. In response to the hon. and learned Member for royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew), I am happy, when a helpful amendment is proposed, to accede to their Lordships.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment disagreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendments agreed to.

Clause 43

ESTABLISHMENT AND DUITES OF COMMISSION

Lords amendment: No. 29, in page 26, line 7, leave out "Commission for Racial Equality" and insert "Community Relations Commission".

Mr. John: I beg to move, That the House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may discuss Lords Amendments Nos. 30, 44, 45 and 47 and amendments to Lords Amendments Nos. 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58 and 59.

Mr. John: I shall be very brief because there are very few permutations of names left which have not been examined thoroughly. The name of the Commission as originally placed in the Bill was the Race Relations Commission. However, the Committee felt that this was inappropriate. It was suggested to the Committee that the Commission should be called the Commission for Racial Equality and this was accepted. That was the name when the Bill left the House to go to another place. In another place Baroness Vickers moved an amendment to change it to the Community Relations Commission.
Without being pernickety about this, I should point out that there are dangers in that particular name. We are setting up a new commission with new powers. The Community Relations Commission is the name of an existing body with limited powers and if we retain this name we risk the danger that people will regard the new commission as having the powers of the existing body and being identical in all respects. I am not being disparaging about the present CRC but the powers and functions which it has are not identical to those of the new body and we wish to avoid confusion.

Mr. Alison: Although one of my noble Friends made this change in the name, we believe that the Minister is absolutely right. We do not want to perpetuate the name of the existing CRC in a new body which will have a new rôle, strategy and function. The Government are absolutely right on this point.

Mr. Frederick Willey: The Standing Committee was very concerned about the name of the new commission and anxious to avoid the continuation of the term "race relations". This was discussed at length and we accept the Minister of State's proposal as a fair compromise.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment disagreed to.

subsequent Lords amendments agreed to.

Clause 49

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Lords amendment: No. 33, in page 29, line 17, at end insert—
(3A) Where the terms of reference of the investigation confine it to activities of persons named in them and the Commission in the course of it propose to investigate any act made unlawful by this Act which they believe that a person so named may have done, the Commission shall—

(a) inform that person of their belief and of their proposal to investigate the act in question; and
(b) offer him an opportunity of making oral or written representations with regard to it (or both oral and written representations if he thinks fit);
and a person so named who avails himself of an opportunity under this subsection of making oral representations may be represented—

(i) by counsel or a solicitor; or
(ii) by some other person of his choice, not being a person to whom the Commission object on the ground that he is unsuitable."

10.30 p.m.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): With this amendment we are to discuss Lords Amendments Nos. 34 and 62.

Mr. John: I believe that this matter is helpful in meeting not only some of the criticism made in another place but some of the anxieties expressed in Committee. Lords Amendments Nos. 33 and 34 therefore incorporate the change in this Bill, and Lords Amendment No. 62 incorporates the change in the Sex Discrimination Act.
The amendments would basically give a person against whom a complaint is made the right to information, and I think that the hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) in particular will agree that this goes some way towards meeting the points that he made.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Clause 57

CLAIMS UNDER PART III

Lords amendment: No. 35, in page 35, line 30, at end insert—
(6) In Scotland, when any proceedings are brought under this secton, in addition to the service on the defender of a copy of the summons or initial writ initiating the action of a copy thereof shall be sent as soon as practicable to the Commission in a manner to be prescribed by Act of Sederunt.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this amendment we are to discuss Lords Amendment No. 64.

Mr. John: These amendments concern Scotland, and particularly sheriff court proceedings. The rule-making powers which are capable of being incorporated within the county court rules in England and Wales are narrower in Scotland and have to be incorporated in the face of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65

HELP FOR AGGRIEVED PERSONS IN OBTAINING INFORMATION ETC.

Lords amendment: No. 36, leave out Clause 65.

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This was another matter which raised a lot of problems in Committee and which led to a lot of discussion. It would be wrong at this hour to rehearse at great length the arguments we went through in Committee about the questions procedure. But it is right to suggest that this is a complicated Bill and that it imposes somewhat complicated obligations. This is because, although the subject lends itself to some simple statements, it is rather difficult in race relations to see these matters with quite the simplicity that some hon. Members seem to manage.
I come back to an earlier point. Up to now the victims of discrimination have been able to take their complaints to the


Race Relations Board. That has been their duty, and from that point on the Board has taken over the investigation of the complaints, attempting to get conciliation and a settlement. When none of this is possible the Board institutes proceedings. This Bill seeks to give individuals the right of direct access to legal remedies.
Under this procedure we are trying to give individuals help in giving substance to their rights to avoid litigation which they may lack through their failure to understand how the legislation affects or does not affect their particular case.
During discussions on the Sex Discrimination Bill it was urged upon the Government, although not by hon. Members on the Opposition Front Bench, that the burden of proof should be reversed in order to help the complainant. The Government did not, and still do not, feel that to be the right approach. The questions procedure was devised in the recognition that something needed to be done to sort out the issues at a pre-trial stage so that misconceptions were cleared away and litigation avoided wherever possible.
The clarification of the issues is clearly important where it disposes of unnecessary cases. It is against that particular background that I believe the questions procedure should be considered. It has attracted opposition in the other place. Lord Hailsham was to the forefront of that opposition. He raised again the question of the right of silence in the criminal law. I reiterate that this is not a matter of criminal law. The point to consider on the questions procedure is that, first, the court is enabled to draw an inference but is not required to do so. The relevant word is "may", not "must". It "may" only draw an inference if it considers it "just and equitable" to do so and provided that it considers that the failure to reply, or to reply properly or within a reasonable time was deliberate and without reasonable excuse. It is right that courts should have power to draw inferences without necessarily compelling them to do so. That provides all the safeguards necessary for the respondent. If he has a reasonable excuse for not having answered questions, he will not have an inference drawn against him. Even after that, the respondent has a right to be heard.
It may be helpful if I tell the House about the scanty evidence available from the operation of the questions procedure under the Sex Discrimination Act.
In most of the dozen or so cases in which the procedure has been used, it has led to no further proceedings being instituted because the person administering the procedure was satisfied that she had not been discriminated against. In four cases, the dispute was settled when the respondent conceded that he had discriminated. In only one case was it found necessary to resort to the law.
Great play has been made about the novelty of this procedure, but inferences can be drawn in landlord and tenant legislation when there has been a failure to answer forms. The questions procedure is a necessary part of this legislation. It will avoid unnecessary litigation and is not oppressive to the respondent.

Mr. Carlisle: I was not on the Committee which considered the Bill and I have not read the debates on these matters in full, but I read the speech of Lord Hailsham in another place on this amendment and I am amazed by what the Government are doing. I wonder whether people realise the effect of this clause.
As I understand it, the clause incorporates a new concept into the British legal system and forms of trial in this country. It provides for the first time that those who wish to bring a claim to court may interrogate the proposed defendant without his having the protection of the court, require him to answer questions in advance, use those questions and answers in evidence and use the failure of a defendant to answer questions as a means by which the court may be enabled to draw inference against that person to his detriment.
Many hon. Members opposite were among the most vocal and critical—as was the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson)—when, with a very much more modest method, the Criminal Law Division Committee suggested something similar in criminal law. As the then Minister of State, I was a rather lonely defender of the Committee's arguments.
There is a distinction between those arguments and the arguments being glibly advanced by the Minister. Under the


Committee's report, before a court could draw an inference from a person's failure to answer he would have to be warned that such failure could be used against him. There is apparently no means of warning in this instance.
Secondly, if I remember correctly, the terms of the questions would have to be in a precise form. Subsection (1) lays down the power of the Home Secretary to prescribe
forms by which the respondent may … reply to any questions.
But, turning to subsection (2), we find:
Where the person aggrieved questions the respondent (whether in accordance with an order under subsection (1) or not)".
What does that mean? Does it mean whether he questions him on the forms or in an informal way by letter? It goes on, without any protection for the defendant, to say that if he refuses to answer, or if his reply is evasive or equivocal, the court may draw any inference that it considers just and equitable to draw. That goes far wider than the Criminal Law Revision Committee's report went. The Minister of State said that was perfectly all right and the House need not worry, because the court was not bound to draw conclusions; it only "may" draw conclusions or inferences. In any event, he said, it is safeguarded by those magnificent words "just and equitable".
I have not had a chance to look so far, but if the Minister will look at the words used by the Criminal Law Revision Committee he will find that they were to the effect that the court, if the defendant refused to answer questions and relied on his right of silence, "may"—not "must"—draw such inferences as to the court or the jury seemed "just and equitable".
The defence offered by the Minister of State on this occasion—that there is nothing to worry about because the court only "may" draw inferences and only inferences which are "just and equitable"—was the argument put forward by the Criminal Law Revision Committee which was so strongly criticised by hon. Members on both sides of the House when the matter was debated.
Although I remain basically in favour of the principles advanced by the

Criminal Law Revision Committee and believe that we ought to look at the whole question of rights in criminal cases, I find it extraordinary that the Government, whose many supporters both inside and outside this House were highly critical of those proposals, should suggest in this legislation a similar system, but without the protection that the Criminal Law Revision Committee's recommendations would have provided. I believe that they are bringing a totally new principle into the law by a back door.

Mr. Ronld Bell: I entirely agree with what was said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle). Clause 65, which the other place proposed should be left out, has to be seen as part of the general provisions in the Bill for assisting the complainant.
The first thing that strikes me is that the clause applies only to the person who considers himself to be aggrieved. There is no provision whatever for the respondent to administer questions to the com plainant. It is a totally one-sided procedure. The complainant may interrogate the respondent, but the respondent may not interrogate the complainant.
Time and again the Minister of State has told us that we must not think of this as a criminal procedure. However, as I have said, it is a penal code whether the procedure is criminal or not. If it is a civil procedure, there is not the slightest reason why procedures available to the plaintiff should not be available to the respondent. If the Minister of State wants to rely on this civil procedure argument, he must find it very difficult to resist the claim of reciprocity. If Clause 65 is left out, as their Lordships propose, the question of reciprocity does not arise. If it is left in, it is undoubtedly oppressive.
10.45 p.m.
Clause 65 states:
the Secretary of State shall by order prescribe forms by which the person aggrieved may question the respondent on his reasons for doing any relevant act, or on any other matter which is or may be relevant.
Really! One could hardly have a wider definition than that. The person concerned can interrogate in the most oppressive manner, and he can virtually collect the forms from, I suppose, a labour exchange, a post office or something like that.
These forms, almost by definition, will be used by people who are likely to be of an umbrageous and possibly even of an aggressive character. People who are not of such disposition will usually let things pass. Let it be remembered that under the Bill we are changing the basic procedure. It is no longer the Race Relations Board that will initiate proceedings. It is the individual who will start county court proceedings, so he has a fair head of umbrage going before he reaches Clause 65. That person is literally given carte blanche to write in his questions, and the Secretary of State will have prescribed in general terms within what period the respondent must answer.
It is certainly a novelty. I cannot think of anything remotely close to it in our existing procedures, certainly not in any of the penal provisions.
I repeat that, although this is cast for oppressive reasons into a civil mould, let us remember how harsh it is. I shall not repeat what I have said earlier this evening and on many previous occasions—that the civil procedure was chosen simply to be oppressive. I gave chapter and verse for that.
Then, into that already oppressive arrangement is introduced this oppressive novelty, and it is one-sided. How on earth does the Minister of State justify this? The answer is that he does not justify it at all. He merely says that it will not be quite as bad as it sounds. That is not an unfair summary of his speech. He said that we shall manage, that the court will be reasonable, and that kind of thing. But as for starting from the floor and erecting an argument as to why this innovation should be made, why it should be made solely in relation to the Race Relations Bill and why it should be one-sided, on all that we have heard no argument at all.
I am afraid that the answer is that there is such a frenzy of opposition to discrimination on the part of certain parts of the Labour Party. One has only to mention the word and the Labour Party thinks that anything in relation to it is justifiable. Socialists say "We are talking about people who have or may have discriminated, and one does not have to be gentle with people like that as they are not subscribing to the tenets

of the Labour Party, decided at its last seaside conference. Why should one bother with people like that? They are not Socialists."

Mr. Budgen: I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will withdraw that remark. These views are not decided at the seaside. They are decided in Hampstead and in the places where the permissive intelligentsia of the Labour Party live. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend will, on reflection, withdraw his remark and appreciate that it is the ordinary working people, on the whole, who congregate at the seaside, and they would wish to repudiate any suggestion that they were a party to such affairs.

Mr. Bell: My hon. Friend has made a fair point. I have been unfair to the seaside. Opinions of this sort are what the president of my college at Oxford once described in a warning message as "the great strides of thought which come after midnight". That is what this sort of thing is. It is the airy-fairy erections of late discussion over cups of coffee and so on.
Once somebody is found to be unsympathetic—not tuned into these modes of thought—the attitude is that there is no reason to bother about him. He can be pushed around and oppressed as much as he likes. After all, he is likely to be English, and if that is so, why the hell does it matter? It is almost like what took place after the Norman Conquest when a man could get into trouble if he killed someone but if he could show that it was an Englishman it was all right. It was called "presentment of englishry" and that is what this sort of legislation is all about—we are in trouble if we misuse people, but if we can show that they are British we can escape the rigours of the law. That is the attitude for keeping in Clause 65. Thank goodness we have the Lords to pick it up and throw it out. I hope that my hon. Friends will vote to keep it out.

Mr. Edward Gardner: I know of nothing, and have not heard of anything, brought before the House in the English law to compare with what the Government are attempting to do tonight. It is a scandalous abuse of procedure which can benefit one party and


put the other party, which should be on equal footing, at quite intolerable risk.
If this clause is given effect tonight it will be a legislative aberration which can only do harm to race relations, and it will bring the law which supports it into contempt. I hope that the Government will think again before trying to impose on our English system a procedure that is so repugnant to what I believe is the idea of justice for the majority of people in the country.

Mr. Hooson: I have listened to the most exaggerated language about this clause. Anyone would think that this kind of procedure was unknown to the civil law of this country. How on earth do hon. and learned Members who have made such extravagant speeches justify interrogatories in a civil case?
The sole purpose of this provision is to ensure that if a man thinks he has been discriminated against he can inquire why, for example, somebody has reached a certain decision. If, in fact, a man has applied for a job and is under the mistaken impression that he was discriminated against because of his race rather than his ability, he has the ability under this clause to inquire, by means of certain forms, as to the precise grounds. If that is so, I do not see anything wrong with this provision.

Mr. Mayhew: I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will forgive me. Would he not think it fair to the House to explain that the provision of interrogatories in the civil procedure applies only after a claim has been formulated and proceedings have begun, whereas this procedure allows for interrogatories to be administered before a claim is made?

Mr. Hooson: That is right, but, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, there are provisions in the law whereby one can issue a writ but immediately ask for interrogatories before delivery of a statement of claim. That has very often been done.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Never.

Mr. Hooson: Of course it has.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Virtually never.

Mr. Hooson: I do not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to interrupt on that point—

Mr. Rees-Davies: I will deal with it later.

Mr. Hooson: —or whether he wishes to show his ignorance from a sedentary position.
Of course this is allowable, and there is no great innovation about it. It is simply a question whether this Bill is to be made effective. [HON. MEMBERS: "Ah".] Hon. Members say "Ah" because they are against the legislation. I can perfectly well understand people who say that legislation has no place in good race relations. I do not happen to agree with that view. I think that it has a place. It is sometimes counterproductive, but it is important to ensure, if we have legislation, that it is effective. This case is one of the ways of making it effective.

Mr. Rees-Davies: The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) has invited one to take up this point. I have great pleasure in doing so. I have heard practically all the debates tonight, with one exception. I was not tempted to speak before, because of the ability with which my colleagues dealt with all the points.

Mr. Hooson: They have fallen short this time.

Mr. Rees-Davies: They have put the case extremely well, and anything else said on the matter would only have been duplication.
I want to deal with the matter on the basis that one would be favourably inclined to the general upshot and purpose of the Bill. Even asuming that to be true, one would be wholly against this provision. The law relating to discoveries and interrogatories is absolutely plain. First, one has to establish that one has a case for action. One must issue one's writ and establish to the judge that one has reasonable cause and a general basis in the statement of claim for that action.
Once that is done, within the limits, one cannot engage in what are usually called "fishing interrogatories". One cannot have carte blanche to fish because one thinks one may have suffered, under the law of libel, for instance—a branch of the law in which I may claim to be something of an expert, having dealt with a great number of cases in the field.
A person in this position cannot fish and say "I think I may have been discriminated against." He must produce solid evidence of that discrimination, and based on that, he can then interrogate clearly on specific questions put down to be answered on oath. There is obligation to do so because that course of action is taken and because it has a solid foundation.
It is rare that interrogatories are given until after the defence, until after there has been proper discovery, both documentary and otherwise. This is merely a branch of the law of discovery which enables someone to obtain early by interrogatory what in the ordinary course of events is discoverable from the documents. [Interruption.] If the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery suggests that I am wrong, I will gladly give way.

Mr. Hooson: Of course it is common that interrogatories are normally dealt with after defence, but on certain occasions—for example, where a person has died after an accident—

Mr. Edward Gardner: Oh, really!

Mr. Hooson: —where, in other words, it is virtually impossible to get the evidence save by interrogatories, they are allowed after the writ in the statement of claim.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Yes, but in this case we are dealing not with dead bodies but with someone who presumably is in a position to go ahead on the ground that he has been the subject of discrimination. If he can give prima facie evidence that he has—in the ordinary way, perhaps, he has been sacked or dismissed—he will be able to take action for breach or dismissal or wrongful dismissal or matters of that kind.
11.0 p.m.
The clause goes far beyond anything known in the law of England. It is a disgrace. The judiciary finds it intolerable and consequently it has evaded it. Instead, the Secretary of State will by Order prescribe forms by which the aggrieved person may question the respondent. The Government are seeking to ensure that the aggrieved person shall have all the money and help he needs to enable him to pursue a claim, whilst nothing

will be given to the accused. There will be a procedure under which questions may be put, and if no reply is given by the other person, who has no legal advice, any view which is considered equitable may be drawn. That is not jusetice but farce.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that the commission is charged with helping the complainant to investigate and form his claim, to help in every way by arranging for a solicitor or counsel, but gives no help at all to the respondent?

Mr. Rees-Davies: Yes. It introduces a totally novel feature into our law. I know of no other case where one side is given the advantage not only of being able to interrogate but to receive legal assistance in the preparation of a claim to the disadvantage of the other side. Everyone will recognise that it is a gross injustice from the beginning. Everyone will see that the Government are deliberately put on the side of the person who is pursuing the claim whilst disregarding the other side. It will involve the Government in the very thing that we do not want in this country—taking sides in a judicial issue.
A person aggrieved as a result of discrimination is in a similar position to a person dismissed from a job. The situation is almost analogous to the law of master and servant. Whoever heard of a case where one side is offered money and advised and the other side is given no chance of any help? It is a judicial monstrosity. It is impossible to believe that anyone who has passed the Bar examination can possibly support it.

Mr. Mayhew: I shall express our support for the amendment in a way that will show that the amendment is concerned not with some detail in a forensic game but with the concept of justice and fairness which the Bill purports to represent. The clause would generate injustice and give a unique advantage to those who would benefit from it. Each reason is enough to justify the amendment; taking the reasons together, the case for the amendment is overwhelming.
From the somewhat veiled, not to say obscure, manner in which the Minister expressed his argument, one would not


have thought that the proposal for deleting the clause was as far-reaching as it is. I was therefore glad that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) intervened to explain the exact purposes of the clause. I wonder how many hon. Members previously knew that it provides a system of interrogating a person against whom one thinks one may wish to bring a claim when one is undecided as to any matter that may be relevant to the claim if it is brought—not after, but before one has formulated the claim.
My hon. and learned Friend's intervention was very helpful. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies) pointed out, the procedure is unique in our legal system—for good reason. There is a very good basis for the general rule that in a civil matter one cannot be made to answer questions before a claim can be made. It lies in the principle that one is entitled to privacy, something that I should have thought the Liberal Party would have some interest in. One is entitled to keep one's affairs to oneself until it is shown that they are relevant to a claim that has already been made against one.
If somebody is allowed to survey one's dispositions, which he can oblige one to disclose before he formulates his claim, there is a strong temptation for him dishonestly to tailor his ultimate claim to what he has learnt as a result of his reconnaissance. That is why we have the rule. It is not just an archaic survival of the days when the rules of procedure dominated us. Everybody, save those who wish only to make legislation effective regardless of whether it is fair, will see the justice of that.
In a matter where the sanctions for infringement can be so severe, to be obliged to make such disclosure before any claim is formulated against one is grossly unjust. Before the amendment the Bill provided for just that.
The Minister of State may be preparing to say that here is no need to answer, in much the same tone of voice as he assured us that it was only possible that an adverse inference might be drawn—"might" not "must"—from one's failure to answer. I acknowledge that there is

no absolute obligation to answer the questions, but subsection (2)(b) makes very clear what risk one runs. It says:
if it appears to the court or tribunal that the respondent deliberately, and without reasonable excuse, omitted to reply within a reasonable period or that his reply is evasive or equivocal, the court or tribunal may draw any inference from that fact that it considers it just and equitable to draw, including an inference that he committed an unlawful act.
In other words, it includes an inference tha he infringed the Bill in a sense that might make him liable to the sanction of a fine—for that is what it is in effect—of up to £5,200. This is intolerable.
For the sake of speed, I wish to give a practical example which I gave in Committee, that of
the secretary of a working men's club which a coloured man has tried to join but whose application has been refused, not because he is coloured, but because he is thought locally to be a man of bad character.
We can transpose it and suppose it is a white man of bad character. He may be thought locally, rightly or wrongly, to be a thief or otherwise dishonest. Under this procedure, that man can apply to know the reasons for his rejection"—
by administering interrogatories—
and require the secretary of the club to say why the discrimination was not unlawful.
The secretary of the club may be very reluctant indeed to set out the true reasons, bearing in mind that it is a small club in a small locality. What reason has he to suppose that he will not get into very considerable trouble of a practical sort, or become involved in victimisation, if he sets out the true reasons? He may reply, therefore, in a manner which, in the wording of the clause, is regarded as evasive or equivocal, in which case the court may draw any inference, including the inference that he committed an unlawful act."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 17th June 1976; c. 667–8.]
That shows where we are getting to.

Mr. Hooson: Is not the exact analogy that of a man who dismisses a person and is required, under modern legislation, to give reasons why he dismissed him?

Mr. Mayhew: One may be required to give reasons, but only when proceedings are initiated against one in the manner laid down by law. Here no action has to be initiated before proceedings.
Then we have the title over these clauses:
Help for persons suffering discrimination".


This is help which may be afforded to somebody who considers that he may have been discriminated against in contravention of the Bill in deciding whether to institute proceedings. One does not have to be certain that one is discriminated against before using the investigatory procedure.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Is it not the case that this procedure, when no judicial proceedings are in existence, would not enjoy privilege under the law of defamation?

Mr. Mayhew: My hon. and learned Friend is right.
This is where we are getting to, as shown by practical example, and it is useful to have a practical example to test a proposed Bill. All this is justified by the Minister of State on the ground that it is a complicated Bill imposing complicated obligations. He draws an analogy with a rent officer who may ask questions in certain circumstances and if they are not answered an inference may be drawn. The difference between this example and that of a rent officer is that the rent officer is seeking to find the facts. Under this clause, a party or prospective party to a dispute is obliging, in practical terms, his prospective opponent to declare his position before the case is formulated against him.
The Minister attempts to justify it on the ground that applicants are not likely, unassisted, to get a case off the ground because the Bill is complicated. In truth, it is quite unnecessary. The whole point of the other provisions in this part of the Bill is to see that they are not left to themselves. Unhappily, they will not be troubled, thanks to a vote earlier today, by having to discharge the burden of presenting a case. We went through that on Clause 1(1)(b), in which the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery-shire (Mr. Hooson) voted.
However, that is not all. Thanks to Clause 66, a whole armoury of help is provided, free of charge and exclusive to the complainant: three different modes of assistance. They are
"(a) giving advice;
b) procuring or attempting to procure the settlement of any matter in dispute;
(c) arranging for the giving of advice or assistance by a solicitor or counsel;

(d) arranging for representation by any per son, including all such assistance"

and so on. For good measure, it provides for
(e) any other form of assistance which the Commission may consider appropriate,".
That is all provided for the prospective complainant by Clause 66. Therefore, to argue that this is necessary in addition, to offer the unique privilege of being able to interrogate before a claim is formulated, is to argue in a wholly unrealistic manner. We say that it generates injustice and that it is unnecessary.
Our third and last objection is that it confers a privilege unique to those thinking that they might like to claim that they have been unlawfully discriminated against on racial grounds, a unique privilege because it offers an unfair advantage as against all other claims outside this Bill and its hideous sister, the Sex Discrimination Act.
11.15 p.m.
All this is proffered to this class of claimant, in whose case there is no trigger mechanism. Anyone can come along—without having to establish before a judge or anyone else that he may have a prima facie case—and say "I wish to make use of this procedure. I am thinking of bringing a claim against X, Y or Z, notwithstanding the fact that I have done so half a dozen times already and, in the end, after causing untold expense, trouble and anxiety, been sent packing". The whole thing constitutes a legal abortion.
The Minister of State said that the Government had accepted some of the amendments made by the Lords. They have accepted notably those made to Clause 12 dealing with qualifying bodies taking account of special evidence of bad character—the fact that someone or his servant or agent 10 years ago had committed an act of discrimination. That point, having been hotly contested in Committee and on the Floor of the House, has now been abandoned, the House of Lords having flung it out. Under Clause 45 a substantial amendment has been accepted by the Minister.
I ask the hon. Gentleman, much more in sorrow than in anger, to say, even at this late stage, that the balance of the argument has gone so strongly against the Government that he will make it a


threesome and accept the amendment, which the Lords have done us a service in passing.

Mr. John: By leave of the House. The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) said that he was speaking more in sorrow than in anger. I shudder to think how he sounds when he is speaking more in anger than in sorrow. The hon. and learned Member has made a vehement case which, as usual, suffers from a characteristic over-statement of several points, notably on the issue of the burden of proof which we debated earlier. He knows that the burden of proof is not wholly removed from the complainant. To suggest otherwise is nonsensical.
I say to the hon. and learned Members for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) and South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) that this procedure is certainly novel in that it is new but it is not novel in that it is unique because, although they will not thank me for giving the example, it is contained in the Sex Discrimination Act. I made that clear, and I made clear how the procedure in that Act has worked in a way which—in most of the cases we have been able to monitor so far—has avoided proceedings rather than promoted them.
Hon. Members should bear in mind a little of the history of the Sex Discrimination Act. I believe that the hon. and learned Member for Southport (Mr. Percival) led for the Opposition on that measure. He expressed some anxieties, and revisions were made to the Bill to take account of Lords amendments. When those amendments came before the House they were approved without debate. Hon Members present tonight were Members at that time. They cannot now come here fulminating about the novelty of this measure when they did not oppose that earlier Act which provided for exactly the same procedure.
I was fascinated by the discussion about interrogatories. While I am grateful, as a solicitor, for the help of so many "conferences" to clarify the facts, the analogy with interrogatories is not exact because—and it is not merely to do with the time in the case at which interrogatories are administered—once interrogatories are administered and

answered, they are part of the pleadings of the case. It does not matter that the court has discretion to draw inferences from them, they are on the face of the pleadings and the answers must be taken into account. What is different about this procedure is that it is a discretionary matter. I am sorry that so many hon. and learned Members have cast doubt upon the capacity of the court to draw a just and equitable inference from the facts.
The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells discussed the case to which he referred in Committee—namely, the refusal of a secretary of a working men's club. He gave a number of facts and particularised the case. The overwhelming probability is that the court would find that the reason for refusing to answer was reasonable. That means that there would be no oppression. When the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) intervened to suggest that there would be privilege, the hon. and learned Gentleman did not assent to that proposition because he knew that in Committee he and I had discussed the fact that qualified privilege would be attracted to such answers.
It is an unusual procedure to administer questions, but I believe that it is good as it helps to clarify issues and avoids unnecessary public airings of differences where a little more information could persuade the person who thinks he has been discriminated against that that is not true. It is because I think that it is an aid to the avoidance of litigation rather than an encouragement that I ask the House to reject the amendment.

Mr. Victor Goodhew (St. Albans): I am astonished to hear the Minister of State trying to make a comparison between the Bill and the Sex Discrimination Act. He must appreciate that they are entirely different. He must appreciate that the object of the race relations legislation is to improve relations between races, but I do not suppose that he intends his Sex Discrimination Act to improve relations between the sexes. If he had had that intention, I suppose that he would have called it the Sex Relations Act. That would have been a quite different matter.
The Minister of State is making a mistake by saying in one voice that he


wishes to improve relations between different races and in another that he is making an exception by introducing a procedure to the courts which applies only to people of certain races. This is the mistake that those on the Labour Benches make over and over again. They do not understand that it does not need a lawyer to tell them what this is all about. It only needs an ordinary Member of Parliament, who has people come to see him on these subjects, to give the Minister the answer.
I can tell the hon. Gentleman that of all the people who have come to me and made representations believing that they have been discriminated against, I have not had one who on application to the Race Relations Commission has been successful in establishing that he has been discriminated against. For him now to say—[Interruption.] I do not know why Labour Members laugh. They should treat this as a serious matter.

When we reach the stage when we find that there are many who believe that they have been discriminated against but are subsequently found not to have been, these provisions will only give the impression to the indigenous population that discrimination decisions are being given in favour of immigrants and new arrivals as against the rest of the nation, and that those categories have a right in the courts that does not apply to others. That is something that the Government often forget. If they wish to improve race relations it is high time that they understoood that to make special provisions in favour of the non-indigenous population will only make matters worse.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 191, Noes 152.

Division No. 349.]
AYES
11.25 p.m.


Abse, Leo
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Latham, Arthur (Paddington)


Anderson, Donald
Dunnett, Jack
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)


Archer, Peter
Eadie, Alex
Lipton, Marcus


Armstrong, Ernest
Edge, Geoff
Luard, Evan


Ashton, Joe
Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
McCartney, Hugh


Atkinson, Norman
Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Flannery, Martin
McElhone, Frank


Barnell, Guy (Greenwich)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
MacFarquhar, Roderick


Bates, Alf
Ford, Ben
MacKenzie, Gregor


Beith, A. J.
Forrester, John
Mackintosh, John P.


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Maclennan, Robert


Bidwell, Sydney
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)


Bishop, E. S.
Freeson, Reginald
McNamara, Kevin


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Freud, Clement
Madden, Max


Boardman, H.
Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Magee, Bryan


Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Mahon, Simon


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Gilbert, Dr John
Mallalieu, J. P. W.


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Golding, John
Marks, Kenneth


Buchanan, Richard
Gould, Bryan
Marquand, David


Campbell, Ian
Gourlay, Harry
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Canavan, Dennis
Graham Ted
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)


Cant, R. B.
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Maynard, Miss Joan


Carmichael, Neil
Grant, John (Islington C)
Mikardo, Ian


Cartwright, John

Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Miller, Dr M. S. (Es Kilbride)


Clemitson, Ivor
Hardy, Peter
Moonman, Eric


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefleld)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Cohen, Stanley
Hatton, Frank
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)


Coleman, Donald
Hooley, Frank
Movie, Roland


Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Hooson, Emlyn
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Conlan, Bernard
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Newens, Stanley


Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Corbett, Robin
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Ovenden, John


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Park, George


Cralgen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Parker, John


Crawshaw, Richard
Hunter, Adam
Parry, Robert


Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Penhallgon, David


Cryer, Bob
Jeger, Mrs Lena
Perry, Ernest


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
John, Brynmor
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Price, William (Rugby)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
Radice, Giles


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Robinson, Geoffrey


Dell, Rt Hon Edmund
Kaufman, Gerald
Roderick, Caerwyn


Dempsey, James
Lambie, David
Rodgers George (Chorley)


Doig, Peter
Lamborn, Harry
Rooker, J. W.


Dormand, J. D.
Lamond, James
Roper, John




Rose, Paul B.
Stallard, A. W.
Wellbeloved, James


Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Steel, David (Roxburgh)
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Stott, Roger
White, James (Pollock)


Rowlands, Ted
Strang, Gavin
Whitlock, William


Ryman, John
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Sandelson, Neville
Swain, Thomas
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)


Sedgemore, Brian
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)


Shore, Rt Hon Peter
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)
Woodall, Alec


Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Tinn, James
Woof, Robert


Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Torney, Tom
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Silverman, Julius
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)
Young, David (Bolton E)


Skinner, Dennis
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)



Small, William
Watkins, David
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Watkinson, John
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
Weetch, Ken
Mr. David Stoddart.


Spearing, Nigel






NOES


Adley, Robert
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Page, John (Harrow West)


Alison, Michael
Hannam, John
Page, Rt Kon R. Graham (Crosby)


Arnold, Tom
Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss
Paisley, Rev Ian


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Havers, Sir Michael
Parkinson, Cecil


Awdry, Daniel
Hawkins, Paul
Percival, Ian


Bell, Ronald
Hayhoe, Barney
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Hicks, Robert
Raison, Timothy


Benyon, W.
Higgins, Terence L.
Rathbone, Tim


Berry, Hon Anthony
Holland, Philip
Ridsdale, Julian


Biffen, John
Hordern, Peter
Rifkind, Malcolm


Biggs-Davison, John
Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Body, Richard
Hunt, David (Wirral)
Ross, William (Londonderry)


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Hurd, Douglas
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Bottomley, Peter
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
James, David
Royle, Sir Anthony


Brotherton, Michael
Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd &amp; W'df'd)
Sainsbury, Tim


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Jessel, Toby
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Budgen, Nick
Jopling, Michael
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Bulmer, Esmond
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Shersby, Michael


Burden, F. A.
Kershaw, Anthony
Silvester, Fred


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Kitson, Sir Timothy
Sims, Roger


Carlisle, Mark
Lamont, Norman
Sinclair, Sir George


Carson, John
Latham, Michael (Melton)
Skeet, T. H. H.


Channon, Paul
Lawrence, Ivan
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)


Churchill, W. S.
Lawson, Nigel
Speed, Keith


Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Le Marchant, Spencer
Sproat, Iain


Clegg, Walter
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Stanbrook, Ivor


Cope, John
Lloyd, Ian
Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)


Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Loveridge, John
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Luce, Richard
Stokes, John


Drayson, Burnaby
McCrindle, Robert
Stradling Thomas, J.


Dunlop, John
Macfarlane, Neil
Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)


Durant, Tony
Marten, Neil
Tebbit, Norman


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Mates, Michael
Temple-Morris, Peter


Elliott, Sir William
Maude, Angus
Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)


Eyre, Reginald
Mawby, Ray
Townsend, Cyril D.


Fairgrieve, Russell
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Farr, John
Mayhew, Patrick
Vaughan, Dr Gerald


Finsberg, Geoffrey
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Viggers, Peter


Fookes, Miss Janet
Miscampbell, Norman
Wakeham, John


Forman, Nigel
Moate, Roger
Wall, Patrick


Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Molyneaux, James
Walters, Dennis


Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)
Monro, Hector
Watt, Hamish


Goodhew, Victor
More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Weatherill, Bernard


Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Morgan, Geraint
Wells, John


Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)
Morris, Michael (Northampton S)
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Wiggin, Jerry


Gray, Hamish
Mudd, David
Young, Sir G. (Eating, Acton)


Grieve, Percy
Neave, Airey



Griffiths, Eldon
Neubert, Michael
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Grist, Ian
Newton, Tony
Mr. John Corrie and


Hall, Sir John
Onslow, Cranley
Mr. Carol Mather.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 70

INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED

Lords amendment: No. 37, in page 45, line 13, leave out from beginning to "be" in line 14 and insert:
with the intention that hatred shall".

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This, again, is a matter that has been canvassed at considerable length in Committee, on Report and on Third Reading, before the recess, and in the other place. I do not believe that there is a great deal of novelty that can be imported into the argument at this stage.
Let me remind hon. Members of the effect of what the other place's amendment would be. The words put into the Bill by the other place would return to the Bill the element of subjective intent. This would take it back to Section 6 of the 1965 Act. It would not, however, mean—and Opposition Members who are tempted to make speeches on this matter should remember this—that the idea of stirring up racial hatred would cease to become a crime. It is accepted and is common form between the two Houses at the moment that the idea of stirring up racial hatred shall become a crime.
What the amendment would do is to make the proving of this offence a matter of subjective intent on the part of the person concerned. Section 6 of the 1965 Act was considered at length by Sir Leslie Scarman in his inquiry into the Red Lion Square matter, which was published as a White Paper. I should like to read briefly what Sir Leslie said, because it is important that if hon. Members wish to agree with the other place on this matter they should be clear what it is they are doing. In the opinion of a very distinguished Lord Justice:
The statute law does, however, call for scrutiny. Section 6 of the Race Relations Act is merely an embarrassment to the police. Hedged about with restrictions (proof of intent, requirement of the Attorney-General's consent) it is useless to a policeman on the street.
He ends by saying that Section 6 of the Race Relations Act
needs radical amendment to make it an effective sanction, particularly … in relation to

its formulation of the intent to be proved before an offence can be established.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: Sir Leslie Scarman was calling for a re-formulation of the intent. The Minister of State has brought before the House the abolition of the intent.

Mr. John: If the hon. Member will show a little more patience, I shall deal with that point. I doubt whether the report I have read out shows clearly that that was what was being said. Sir Leslie was calling for a radical revision with a view to strengthening the law as it was. If hon. Members agree with the other place on this issue, they are seeking to keep it in its weak and enfeebled state. The main objection raised by Lord Hailsham was that it conflicted with the fundamental principle of English criminal law that the crime should consist of the actus rens and the mens rea. He said that he was concerned not with summary offences but only with indictable ones under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act and Clause 70 of this Bill.
We have said that we think this departure to be justifiable, and I will not rehearse the arguments for that now. But I think that Lord Hailsham was in error in one of his considerations. Section 5 of the Public Order Act—the Government amendment would have made it Section 6—is the exception which does not need intent. Lord Hailsham said that that was because it was only triable summarily. But he was in error. It is triable summarily or on indictment. That section does not import intent. To that extent I agree with the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that we have proposed something which removes intent in the sense that it only makes the words which are uttered a matter of intent and then the inference is made from the surrounding circumstances as to what the intention was.
He and his hon. Friends must address their minds to one point. If they are at one with Sir Leslie Scarman in believing that Section 6 of the 1965 Act needs to be strengthened if it is to be effective—and the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) has been preaching the virtue of the effectiveness of this legislation—it has to be strengthened from the present form. But the Lords have returned it to the former


Section 6, and we believe that that is too weak and too ineffective to continue to be the law. It is not a matter of stirring up ill-feeling that needs to be visited with the full rigours of criminal law. We have kept to the definition of racial hatred, and we are equally right to say that the existing law needs to be greatly strengthened.
The effusions and emanations which stir up racial hatred go beyond the bounds of honest debate to the sort of ugliness we have seen recently, though, fortunately, not too often. That is why, in the absence of any suggestion of how the clause could be strengthened while keeping the necessity for intent within it, I ask the House to disagree with the amendment.

11.45 p.m.

Mr. Budgen: It must be emphasised that the provisions of Clause 70 are in addition to those in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936. The Act lays down that a man commits a criminal offence when he makes a speech or writes words with an intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned.
I should have thought that the House would agree that the real mischief with which most of us are trying to deal is in relation to speeches or writings about racial matters which might lead to violence. Violence is the criminal element about which we should be concerned.
While Section 5 of the 1936 Act remains, there is no need for legislation along the lines of Clause 70 of the Bill. The more one looks at the clause, the more objectionable it becomes.
The Minister said blandly that the Government preferred to stick to the expression "racial hatred", as though it were a term which is well defined in law and capable of precise meaning. As far as I can see from an admittedly not very detailed perusal of "Archbold", there is no clear judicial interpretation of what "hatred" means. It is capable of very wide meaning.
What does "hatred" mean? Lloyd George's Limehouse speech about the great privileges enjoyed by the rich might have been regarded as stirring up hatred against the rich. If, for the sake of

argument, I make a speech about the special privileges enjoyed by council tenants and say that the system by which they are subsidised by the taxpayer and ratepayer is unfair, it might reasonably be argued that because I was pointing out their special privileges I was inviting the public as a whole to think less well of council tenants.
One might argue that it is wrong for racial groups in this country to have the right to bring fiancés from their country of origin. I have put this view on a number of occasions. It is attacking the privilege of a particular racial group in this country. Does that constitute stirring up hatred against them? I do not know. That may be tested in the courts at some time.
It is clear that the expression "racial hatred" in defining a crime fails to give that element of precision and certainly which ought to be one of the essential elements of any crime which is likely to form the basis of a prosecution against any citizen. That is the point which I wish to make for myself.
Much wider and more important points were made in the other place by my noble and learned Friend Lord Hailsham. I agree with him that it is undesirable to make it a condition precedent to any prosecution of this nature that the Attorney-General should give his consent. That would bring within the political ambit the whole question whether a prosecution of this nature should be made possibly against a political opponent of the Attorney-General of the day. It breaches the whole basis of the British criminal law that any individual may, if he so wishes, bring a private prosecution. It imposes a form of political sanction as a pre-condition to any kind of prosecution under this clause.
It is wrong that the Government should seek to take away the requirement that was previously upon the prosecution to prove an intention against a person accused of stirring up racial hatred. This crime will do nothing whatever to deal with the special problem of the use of words with intent to stir up violence.
This is a dangerous and unnecessary crime to put on the statute book. Indeed, if it had been either necessary or useful in the past, one would have


thought that there would have been more than 19 prosecutions since 1965—unless this offence has been prosecuted frequently since December of last year.
On 11th December last year I asked the Attorney-General how many prosecutions had been undertaken under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965. In a Written Answer I was told:
To date, 19 persons have been subject to prosecution under Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965. Convictions were obtained in 12 cases. One of these convictions was quashed on appeal. In four cases terms of imprisonment were imposed. In one case a probation order was made. In four cases fines were imposed and in two cases there was a conditional discharge."—[Official Report, 11th December 1975; Vol. 902, c. 295.]
Therefore, it does not look as though this crime has been anything other than an embarrassment to those whose duty it is to try to prevent the outbreak of violence consequent upon racial strife.
Crimes such as this achieve only a useful blackmailing point to those who wish to try to stifle adequate discussion of racial matters. It is unfortunate that until this year there have been almost no debates about immigration in this House. In Westminster it has been regarded as rather unpleasant to talk too much about the problems that vast immigration into industrial areas have caused. As a result, we have found that, when anybody has sought to discuss race relations or immigration outside this House, there has been a great wail from the liberal intelligentsia who say not merely that they disagree but that the subject should not be discussed at all. When I say "liberal intelligentsia", I do not mean simply the Liberal Party. I would not accuse members of the Liberal Party of being members of the intelligentsia. There are members of the liberal intelligentsia in all parties.
About a year ago I made a speech suggesting that it was wrong to extend the privilege of a right of entry to male fiancés. A great wail went up from the Indian Workers Association in Wolverhampton. It was good enough to report me to the Attorney-General with a view to letting me prosecuted under Section 6 of the 1965 Act. I do not know what "hatred" means in that section. It may be that the association was right. It just could be that because I was pointing to a particular interpretation of the word

"hatred" a case against me could have been proved. I do not know.
However, I was being threatened with a view to trying to get me to shut my mouth. I know that the assocation was saying "You can say this sort of thing in the House of Commons, where you are privileged, but if you wish to discuss it outside the House of Commons we shall threaten you with criminal proceedings."
This will happen throughout the length and breadth of the land. We in Westminster have made very considerable mistakes in the past in respect of our immigration policy. My father and many of my relatives have lived in other Commonwealth countries for many years. They have spent most of their lives there. On the whole, I was opposed to the 1962 Act. I understand the views of may of those who were reluctant to impose controls.
However, we in Britain, especially we at Westminster, have made substantial mistakes in our immigration policies in the past. It really will not be good enough if we try to bottle up resentments by stifling freedom of speech. This particular crime is designed to stifle that. If it be that the ordinary people of Britain cannot talk about their problems, sometimes in a robust or an offensive way, unhappily their only resort is to violence.

Mr. Rose: I am sorry that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen) should confuse freedom of speech with incitement to hatred, but his statistics underline the weakness of Section 6 as it now stands. Ten years ago, many of us warned, in Committee, of the fact that it was weak because the prosecution would have to overcome two hurdles.
However, it is possible for those supporting the Lords amendment to take one of two positions. There is, first, the fundamentalist position of the hon. Gentleman, opposed to any legislation at all dealing with racial incitement, or there is another position, which is more tenable, and that is one which objects to the removal of the words importing intent. Those are two different positions, and one has some sympathy with the latter.
The problem here is that just as it is difficult in the courts to prove intent, let us say on a charge of receiving, it is even


more difficult here when one receives—as I have done in the past few weeks—leaflets depicting schoolchildren and given to schoolchildren which do no more than show a change in the racial balance in the schools and then go on to tell those children that they are being swamped by immigrants.
One of the difficulties that one faces here is that one is dealing with a situation where not only does the prosecution have to prove first that the words are—
threatening, abusive or insulting"—
that is the first hurdle—but, even given the removal of the Lords amendments, the prosecution will have to show from surrounding circumstances a likelihood.
12 midnight.
There are two burdens on the prosecution. To impose a burden of showing an explicit intent renders it almost impossible, except in the most extreme cases, to sustain a conviction. Hence the fact that there have only been those 19 cases to which the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West referred.
There are weaknesses which many people pointed out, notwithstanding the quite obscene material which many of us have received, and many have seen, over the years from various organisations. On the fundamentalist side we are doing no more than almost every other civilised country in its application to the United Nations—in Europe, to the Council of Europe—under the various conventions. I shall not rehearse those arguments, which were ventilated on Second Reading.
If one looks a the penal codes of almost every other European country, in particular those of Austria and Germany—countries which have known what racial incitement ultimately leads to—they have very strict laws with regard to this. The one which appeals to me most is probably Norway, where there is no more than a reference to people who—
publicly insult or provoke hatred on contempt of a race on account of its creed, extraction or origin, or who threaten such a race or spread false accusations about it.
It merely deals with the act; it does not deal with intent.
If one looks through the penal codes of almost every other European country dealing with this by convention, there is no word about intent because what is

important is the result. What is important here is that one is not stifling free speech and one is protecting the right of a citizen, not merely against violence but against vilification. A citizen surely has a right to protection against vilification on the basis of his pigmentation or racial or ethnic origin—perhaps even more of a right to protection against accusations of being a thief or a rogue under the law of libel and slander.
One poses a basic human right not to be vilified by having jack-booted members of the National Front walking through one's area with an abusive and insulting placard against the other right, which is free speech. If free speech is confused with the—

Mr. Budgen: Would the hon. Gentleman not concede that many of the placards of the National Front might he properly considered from the point of view of prosecution under Section 5 of the Public Order Act?

Mr. Rose: Indeed, I am sure there are some that might be and some that are. There are many which are not susceptible to that and there are many actions which are threatening, abusive and insulting which are permitted under the law at the moment—which are calculated to stir up racial hatred—where it is almost impossible to say that that was the intent because the defendant in the case will always say he was merely ventilating a legitimate argument. No one wants to prevent arguments of that nature and that is why the words "threatening, abusive or insulting" are in the sanction.
But the fundamental basis in this is a protection for every citizen, and that has to be posed against the other right of free speech. What ultimately matters is the fact that if the effect of placards, marches or behaviour is to incite haired and not necessarily violence—because hatred ultimately leads to violence—I believe this proposal is entirely justified. I do not lightly remove the idea of intent. Take the example given in an earlier debate in respect of speeding. One does not have to show that a motorist who is speeding has an intent to injure other people. It follows naturally from the act of speeding that he is a potential danger to other motorists and perhaps to himself.
In this case, with the words or behaviour of themselves, in the circumstances referred to—that is the safeguard—what matters is what can result. During the election, in my constituency, someone nearly lost an eye and others were shot at with shotguns. One realises that such acts of violence are ugly things and that the law needs to be firm about them.
There is no such thing as absolute free speech. One has to choose whether to elevate the licence to incite hatred above the right to be free from the results of that hatred. That is the choice that the Government have to make, and it is not made lightly. Those who have to deal with these things take the question of intent very seriously. I am sure that Lord Hailsham was sincere in what he said.
One has to consider the question of intent to see what is the burden that one has to overcome at the moment. Possibly it is an almost impossible burden, except in a few very extreme cases. For that reason it was necessary to amend the Act. The Lords have wrecked that amendment of the original Act, and I believe that this House should restore it so that we can gain effective control.
It is easy to say as a defence, "What I said was reckless; there was no intent." If recklessness can be a defence, as it could be if one took away—

Mr. Lawrence: No.

Mr. Rose: It certainly could be a defence. If one does not remove the consideration of intent, recklessness becomes a defence.
In those circumstances, it is absolutely necessary to do what the Government are doing in reversing the Lords' decision.

Mr. Lawrence: It does not become a defence.

Mr. Rose: If the burden of the prosecution is to prove an intent to do something, if, after someone has stirred up racial hatred and violence has ensued he says, "I did not intend to do it, but perhaps I was a little reckless," that would be a defence.

Mr. Lawrence: No.

Mr. Rose: I am sorry, but there it is. The burden would be on the prosecution. The Government are right, and the

statistics which were quoted earlier emphasise the need for the strengthening of the original section.

Mr. Hooson: As I listened to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen), I could not help thinking that he was being wise by hindsight. He referred to the paucity of debates on immigration. Between 1951 and 1962, when there was unrestricted immigration under Governments of his complexion, there were very few debates about immigration.
We are concerned now not with immigration but with its results. The legislation is surely designed to achieve, in the shortest possible time, a higher degree of racial harmony than we have previously had. In my experience, certainly in a democratic country, what is right in many people's minds is what the law says is right. That is why the framework of legislation is very important in this sphere.
The House is in a very unhappy position on this amendment. The Government's proposal is far too wide and could lend itself to injustice. But I am dissatisfied with the Lords amendment. The following words would meet the bill:
where, having regard to all the circumstances, he or she must know that hatred is likely to be stirred up".
That would mean that the person would have to be aware that his action was likely to stir up racial hatred.
The question of intention in the amendment goes back to Section 6 of the 1965 Act. We must have regard for the view of Lord Justice Scarman in his report on the Red Lion Square disorder. He said:
Section 6 of the Race Relations Act 1965 needs radical amendment to make it an effective sanction, particularly I think in relation to its formulation of the intent to be proved before an offence can be established".
The Government have removed the requirement of intent altogether, and that goes too far. For that reason, if I must make the difficult choice I prefer the Hailsham amendment. The Government should reconsider the matter and proceed along the lines that I suggest.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: The Minister complains that no one has suggested any other method of strengthening the provisions of Section 6. The only


suggestion he makes is to drop a fundamental principle of English liberty.
It is inconvenient for the police to have to prove that anyone accused of a crime meant to commit it. It means that the police must find evidence that the accused had a guilty intent—and that applies to 99·9 per cent. of all crimes. That requirement on the police and prosecution is vital to liberty but it is that requirement which the Government are seeking to drop in the Bill. For that reason the House should support the amendment.

Mr. Edward Lyons: In this case the prosecution has to prove certain primary facts which have nothing to do with intention; they are set out in Clause 70. The prosecution must prove that there has been publication or distribution of written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting. Alternatively, he must prove that a person has used words which are threatening, abusive or insulting in a public place. Those matters must be proved before considering the next stage, which applies the test which has been applied for hundreds of years in connection with breaches of the peace.
The test of a breach of the peace involves behaviour which is threatening, abusive or insulting whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be caused. That is the test that hon. Members opposite seek to say is terribly unusual and previously unknown in Britain.
Confronted with the difficulty presented by breach of the peace legislation, Lord Hailsham was driven backwards to say that the difference is that breach of the peace is only a summary offence whereas in this legislation prosecution can be either summary or on indictment. He said that he objected to indictment. If that is so, the amendment should be based on deleting prosecutions on indictment and limiting them to summary proceedings. That would bring the matter into harmony with the existing law, but that is not the Lords amendment. We have a trumped-up, misconceived objection that we are doing something which is totally unusual, when in fact it is not. Further—and this is not the case with the breach of the peace legislation—we must have the fiat of the Attorney-

General, which is sparingly given. Accordingly, one would expect very few prosecutions under the clause.
For these reasons, a great deal of fuss is being made about something which does not warrant it.

12.15 a.m.

Mr. Stokes: Not being a lawyer, I am somewhat hesitant to enter the debate. the clause as it was before the Lords amended it has caused considerable disquiet in many quarters, not only among the public but among those who report the news. Before it was amended the clause seemed to me extremely wide. As I came to the House this morning a line of Wordsworth went through my head and I wondered whether an Englishman would be allowed to say it in front of an immigrant after the Bill became law. The line, which will be known to all hon. Members, is:
This is my own, my native land!
Could it be said without seeming to an immigrant to be "threatening, abusive or insulting"? I hope so, but I believe that the effect of the clause, as of all this legislation, is to erode an Englishman's pride in his history and descent. It is no wonder there has been such a sharp decline in national pride. By this legislation an Englishman is constantly made to feel inferior and guilty in any dealings he may have with an immigrant in law. Our grandfathers and even our fathers would not recognise us in the sort of antics in which we have been engaged tonight. Foreigners who admire this country so much think that we are mad in our whole attitude to immigration, and they are right. Free speech is threatened by the Bill and the written word is also under attack.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will keep to the amendment.

Mr. Stokes: Newspaper editors, particularly local editors, are nervous about reporting speeches about immigration. The clause will make matters far worse. I fear that if the clause is passed without the amendment a blanket of silence will soon be placed on the whole subject. Englishmen will once again have suffered a defeat in their own land on a matter which concerns them so vitally.

Mr. Flannery: I shall do my utmost to extricate us from the miserable chauvinism we have just heard from the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes).

Mr. Stokes: That is a compliment.

Mr. Flannery: It is time we made it clear that large numbers of people, especially in the Conservative Party, now use the word "immigration" when they really mean "coloured immigration". The debates carefully skirt that real meaning and make us think that there is a colour bar on the Conservative Benches.
I feel that I am intruding in a nest of lawyers. I speak as a lay person.
When we are talking about a colour bar and the intent to do something which is to do with colour, it is of course difficult, and, of course, people who are opposed to folk who are against a colour bar will rake up all kinds of methods to prove that we must delve more deeply into the mind when things are perfectly obvious. Let me give a case in point.
Some time ago, a programme laughingly called "Open Door" was broadcast, a programme about which I wrote on three occasions to the Home Secretary. It was brutal and naked racialism. It was one of the nastiest pieces of racialism I have ever seen. I hope that many hon. Gentlemen opposite saw it. It would be most difficult to delve into the recesses of the mind of the producer and prove that he had the intention of being racialist, although everybody who saw the programme knew that it was a racialist programme.

Mr. A. J. Beith: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will draw a distinction between the producer of the programme who is employed by the broadcasting authorities to perfom a service for the outside body doing the programme and that outside body, and lay the responsibility properly at the door of the body which put out the programme, availing itself of the facilities.

Mr. Flannery: No. I will not withdraw it. From the inception that was a racialist programme designed to be such and designed to cause precisely the

trouble which we are trying, in this Bill, to stop. We are doing our best to stop it, against the arguments of the Opposition, who are trotting out exactly the racialist argument which we knew would come, and which the other place gave the opportunity to discuss.
The attempt to help the House of Lords in what it is doing here is a reactionary and backward attempt to try to keep racialism going in this country. [Interruption.] It ill behoves the hon. Member for Blaby (Mr. Lawson) to laugh when I am talking about racialism. It is a serious issue, and the Opposition are trying to inject something into this which will hold back progress. He should be fighting for that instead of against it.

Mr. Nigel Lawson: I believe in free speech.

Mr. Flannery: I also believe in free speech and in standing up to those who think of immigration as an issue between white and coloured. The Conservative Party is really talking about coloured immigration. That is the basis of its approach, and I hope that the Lords amendment will be rejected for what it is, a backward and reactionary move.

Mr. Lawrence: Having heard the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Mr. Flannery) I think it timely to remind the House of the exact effect of this clause, to which I would invite the House to accept the Lords amendment.
The effect of the clause is to render a man liable to up to two years' imprisonment when he is innocent of any intention to stir up hatred against any racial group. It will allow the conviction of a man who is genuinely innocent of any racialist intent. The hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr Lyons) said that the clause changes nothing in our criminal law. Lord Hailsham—and he was a very distinguished Lord Chancellor—says this clause subverts a fundamental doctrine of English law. I should have thought that no hon. Gentleman in this House, least of all perhaps if his pretensions are just, like the hon. Member for Hillsborough, would want to introduce into English law a principle which undermines civil liberties.
If there had been a Bill before the House dealing with theft and it was seriously proposed that there should not be an intention to commit theft written into the Bill—that a person innocent of any intention to steal should be convicted of theft—what would the National Council for Civil Liberties have said about that?
I wonder how many hon. Members have received communications from the National Council for Civil Liberties about the fact that a fundamental principle of our law, which is the safeguard of individual liberty in our society, is being taken way. I seem to remember sitting here for many hours during the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions Act, when Labour Members who professed to be speaking in defence of civil liberties said that there was not enough protection in that measure to prevent a person who was merely suspected of terrorist offences being kept in police custody for a number of days. People were being blown to pieces and the National Council for Civil Liberties and those Labour Members who speak for it were saying that we must remember the importance of civil liberties.
We all profess to want civil liberties. What concerns some of us on this side of the House is that sometimes the National Council for Civil Liberties seems to be being used by some Labour Members as an excuse for undermining our society and subverting our institutions. Otherwise, why are they not speaking up now on a clause which takes away the fundamental principle which protects the liberty of the individual in our society, namely the requirement in all serious crime for there to be proved beyond any doubt an intention to commit an evil act?
What is the justification for this proposal? The Government say that it is necessary because Section 6 of the Race Relations Act has not proved an effective sanction. They rely upon what Lord Justice Scarman said in the report of the tribunal examining the Red Lion Square demonstration. But what he said was not that we should abolish intent as a necessary requisite for this kind of offence. He said that we should re-

formulate it. What has happened here is not a re-formulation of intent but an abolition of it. That is something which goes a great deal further than Lord Justice Scarman was suggesting. It is true to say that, perhaps because it is difficult to re-formulate the intent, the distinguished judge did not seek to do so. But he stopped short of saying that he recommended that intention should henceforth be taken away.
I ask the Government to consider this. Not every evil that exists in our society can be cured by law. Sometimes the medicine we seek to adminster to the illness is worse than the illness itself. If the Government cannot produce a stronger case for undermining this fundamental principle of our law than it has done we should be careful before we act. What guarantee can the Government offer that the clause will result in the conviction only of those who are guilty? It is for this reason that the Lords have thought it right to introduce this amendment. I earnestly invite my hon. Friends and all Labour Members who genuinely care for civil liberties to think carefully before brushing this bulwark away. I ask them to uphold this amendment which the Lords, in their wisdom. have put forward.

Mr. Ronald Bell: My hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) put his finger on the basic objection to the Government's attitude here when he said that if we were discussing the law of theft or some other aspect of the ordinary criminal law no one would suggest that the element of intent should be removed. Labour Members would be the most energetic objectors to any such proposition.
Once again we find that a perfectly normal safeguard is being swept away unconcernedly for the same reason—namely, that this is about discrimination on the grounds of race and colour. Underlying the formative attitude of some Labour Members is the belief that when we are talking about colour and discrimination we need not bother about safeguards. They are so much against it that they do not really care about the processes of justice. I have said that about five times tonight, and each time it has been relevant. That is because on each occasion the Government have


been seeking to do something that they would never do in relation to any other sort of offence. They adopt this approach because of a frenzied obsession with this business of colour.
12.30 a.m.
I invite the House to consider what is being done. It is said by the Minister of State and by others that there is sufficient safeguard in the words "threatening, abusive or insulting". There is not. Let us remember the words that are used against any expression of opinion upon immigration or its related subjects that are so profoundly disagreeable to Labour Members. They do not feel that such mild words are adequate; they call such expressions of opinion "obscene", a much over-worked word. Anything that one says about the immigration phenomenon in this country which is disagreeable to the liberal Left is at once condemned as "obscene". The proposed safeguard is not a safeguard.
I remember some of the earlier attempts to pass Bills of this sort through the House. I resisted such attempts by Fenner Brockway and people like that. For example, there were amendments to the Public Order Act along these lines. I remember the Labour Party spokesman asking from the Dispatch Box on such an occasion "It it seriously suggested by Conservative Members that someone should be at liberty to say that coloured immigration into this country should be totally stopped? Is that what they are saying? Are they saying that people should be allowed to express such sentiments? No, of course we must have the Bill to make that sort of thing a criminal offence." That was the nature of what was said by the spokesman for the Labour Party from the Dispatch Box. I have kept the relevant page of Hansard. That shows the danger that people face if they wish to express what seem to me to be perfectly tenable opinions upon this controversial matter.
The words "threatening, abusive or insulting" are no safeguard. It is said that hatred is likely to be stirred up. The hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons) asked why anyone should complain as the words in this so-called safeguard are used in relation to breaches of the peace. But we are

not talking about breaches of the peace; we are concerned with hatred being stirred up. I do not know how we estimate that hatred is likely to be stirred up. It is an impossibly subjective conception altogether.

Mr. Stanbrook: What does it mean?

Mr. Bell: What is hatred? What is likely to be stirred up? My hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stan-brook) questions the meaning of the expression. In fact, racial hatred is not linguistically a possible term. We know about "racial"—of or pertaining to race. What is racial hatred? Hatred that is of or pertaining to race? That is nonsense. It is an inexact colligation of words that, strictly speaking, does not mean anything at all. That being the position, it is a very loose penumbra of an argument that develops around a colligation of two words that do not logically colligate.
We cannot ignore the fact that there are in our society strong forces working to suppress the truth of various matters. There is the National Union of Journalists, which has passed a resolution threatening to expel members who print opinions which may be true but which the union thinks should be suppressed in the interests of harmonious race relations. That has been widely condemned. A letter from the Guild of Newspaper Editors in The Times a week ago about this clause said how dangerous it will be for any editor trying to operate within the law if an objective test, instead of a subjective test, is imported into the question of stirring up racial hatred. There are many other bodies with the attitude of the NUJ. The Community Relations Commission is not exactly a go-getter after truth if the truth is inconvenient to its preoccupations.
Against that background, let us look at the foreground. I remember the processes by which we have arrived at this stage. There was Section 5 of the Public Order Act, which hinged upon the causing of a breach of the peace; then there was the Race Relations Act 1965, which I and others opposed in this respect. That Act got rid of the whole question of breach of the peace, whereby one could say what one lives in England as long as one did not cause or make likely a breach of the peace. That is


the proper test of freedom of speech—not that one's views are disagreeable to other people but that they may cause a breach of the peace.
We left that concept behind in the 1965 Act, replacing it with Section 6 of the Act saying "there shall be" an intent to stir up racial hatred. Now we are dropping intent and saying "You said something which is likely in the circumstances to stir up racial hatred." So the concept is not that of something which will cause a breach of the peace, or something which one intends to stir up racial hatred. It is only something which may do so.
Then we had the White Paper underlying the Bill. In it, the Government said "This is how far we are going in the Bill", which is the position I have described. They added, "We know that there are many who feel that we should go further, but we feel that that is as far as we can go at the moment in circumscribing the freedom of speech. But we are prepared to listen, during the passage of the Bill, to those who feel that we ought to go further and ban absolutely all racial propaganda." So the next stage is when we do not even bother about the test of stirring up racial hatred.
The White Paper says that the tone of discussion on racial matters has changed, that it is now urbane and moderate. But now the Home Secretary says "That is even more dangerous than the extreme language because it is more rational and acceptable, and we may have to act against it because we cannot allow people to be persuaded by rational, urbane, peaceful argument to hold views which we Socialists find repugnant."
This is the new Lysenkoism of the Left. Certain views—the truth is irrelevant—may be outlawed. People who hold views about the importance of genetic factors in life should be silenced. These people are obscene, they are unacceptable and they must not be allowed to speak.
I see this clause, before the Lords amendment, as the second stage in a movement away from breach of the peace, with each stage being a precedent for the next. The third stage is on its way if this clause is restored to the state

in which it left this House for another place.
When this Bill receives Royal Assent the race relations industry will have the public by the throat. We in Parliament can say what we like about race relations and immigration, but those outside the privilege of Parliament are gagged and silenced. It is a scandal and a shame that we should allow this to happen.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: I also have reservations about the provisions of Clause 70, but for very different reasons from the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) and the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes). I find it difficult when talking about certain hon. Members to avoid language which is abusive or insulting. If I were black and talking to a black audience it could be considered that the way in which I was referring to individuals was likely to stir up racial hatred.
I would prefer that the provisions of this Bill redefined the word "intent", rather than removing it altogether. The hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) referred to the desirability of redefining intent, and if the Lords had proposed an amendment which made it possible to infer intent from past conduct or propaganda, such as a number of years of membership of the National Front, it would have been more effective than removing it altogether.
It is very easy to infer intent from newspapers which publish photographs of black defendants but not of white ones. They send out teams of reporters to get stories about black crime, rather than white crime. The courts could infer intent from the conduct of individuals. If the provision proposed by the Lords had been to substitute that instead of removing intent altogether, many hon. Members on this side, myself included, wound have supported them. But the Lords have chosen to remove the provisions of Clause 70 completely. We could have supported them had they gone about this more intelligently and presented the House with an amendment enabling us to tackle the most outrageous forms of incitement to racial hatred. But we cannot do without a provision in the law which enables us


to tackle the obnoxious and distasteful things that are constantly being published and spread about.
Therefore, we must restore the clause. It is unfortunate that the Lords have not given us an opportunity to do this more effectively.

12.45 a.m.

Mr. Lawrence: If the change that the hon. Member envisages were brought about, the word "intent" would have to be in the clause. We cannot presume intent if there is no mention of intent in the clause. The hon. Member is, in fact, saying that provided the word "intent" is construed in the way he wishes he will support the amendment. If he is not accepting the word "intent", he is being quite illogical.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: On the contrary; the Lords have put in a provision which has restored the word "intention". With my provision intent could have been inferred in certain circumstances, but with no provision to enable the courts to decide how intent is to be inferred I feel that a clause such as we have in the Bill is necessary—reluctant as I am to accept it in the grounds of free speech and civil liberty—because the Lords have provided no substitute.
Therefore, we must reject the Lords amendment.

Mr. Carlisle: I want to make only one point. I hope that the Minister will apply his mind to it when he replies. I refer to the effect of this clause on newspapers and the media generally. The effect is to make it an absolute offence to publish any written matter which is insulting and is likely to stir up racial hatred against any racial group in Great Britain.
Like my hon. and learned Friend, I find no difficulty in understanding what is meant by racial hatred. I find no difficulty in thinking of many occasions when speeches made by extremist groups have clearly been likely to stir up racial hatred.
What worries me about the clause is that by removing "intent" it appears to make it impossible for any responsible newspaper or any form of the media safely to report such a speech or occurrence. I question whether that is right.
If we look at the clause we see that we are specifically providing for the fair and accurate reporting of parliamentary proceedings and of judicial proceedings. There is no provision for the fair and accurate reporting of any other proceedings of a public nature. I ask the Minister of State to spell out what he says is the effect of the clause on newspapers, and whether he does not see the danger that they will hesitate to print anything which, although it may be unpleasant, is probably better for people to know is being said at public meetings rather than have it brushed under the carpet.
I see the point of wishing to strengthen Section 5 of the Public Order Act, in view of the comments on Section 6 made by Sir Leslie Scarman, as he then was, but I feel that the way in which the Minister is proposing to do it has in itself certain drawbacks in terms of the free publication of opinion in this country.

Mr. Alison: I share the view, expressed by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Hailsham in another place, that if we reject the Lords amendment we shall be making a major and undesirable departure from the doctrines and principles of English law in the sense that we shall be postulating as a criminal offence an offence for which there was no criminal mind—or, at least, we shall not have to prove that the criminal mind was there.
I believe that that is profoundly unsatisfactory, and that it cannot be tolerated in any circumstances. I speak not as a lawyer; I am not a lawyer, and I do not try to argue this case against the background of great changes in the principles of English law. I argue from the simple and commonsense view that if we provide that a citizen shall be treated and punished as a criminal when there is no criminal intent in what he has done, or in the words that he has used—words which the great bulk of the population feel not to be criminal—we are bringing the whole of Parliament and our civil and criminal law into disrepute.
Here the Government are evacuating consent from the great mass of the population in the kind of laws that we have. It will almost certainly mean the stirring up of overt protest, violence and hostility, not towards a particular minority or


group but towards Parliament and the law-making machinery. It will be forcing the concept of criminality on people when that carries no conviction with them. That is the situation which arises when someone who had no criminal intention is treated as a criminal.
Insulting words will be peculiarly a risk and hazard to which unpolished, uneducated and relatively illiterate people will be exposed. It is the people who are clumsy and uncertain but no doubt entirely sincere in their use and choice of words who will be exposed to the worst kind of hazard. Paradoxically and ironically, it will almost certainly prove to be the West Indian and Pakistani immigrants, with no great command of the English language and with a crude vocabulary at their disposal, who will find themselves caught by this provision in some of the protests they may make about the treatment they receive from the whites. The outcome will be the obverse of what the Government are seeking to achieve.
It is unacceptable to introduce a measure which will treat people as criminal over a sincere and bona fide attempt to express views which are not criminal and which no one in his right mind would consider as such. The real danger will come with the arbitrary nature of the fiat provided in the Attorney-General's permission Groups wish to make quite certain that a particular speaker, letter writer or publisher becomes branded as one who has insulted a racial group in such a way as to be likely to cause hatred. By taking overt action they will make quite certain a fortiori that hatred is clearly stirred up.
It would be necessary for them only to take a parade down a street and throw stones through the windows of the home of a particular individual who repeatedly wrote strong-worded letters to the local newspaper for it to be shown beyond peradventure that hatred had been stirred up. What does the Attorney-General do? Must he wait for hatred and violence to escalate and provide a positive incentive to particular groups to make it clear beyond peradventure that hatred exists before he gives in and brings a prosecution? This is a built-in incentive to groups to demonstrate

Increasingly vociferously until the Attorney-General is forced to take action.
This is the wrong way to proceed. It will cause more violence and dissent than the Bill is seeking to obviate. Certain of my hon. Friends have referred to the words of the President of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors. I make no apology for taking a minute to put upon the record the words that that gentleman used in respect of the likely damage to a free Press. I quote from his letter to The Times on 27th September. He said:
It is to be hoped that the House of Lords will approve an amendment to the Race Relations Bill due to be moved by Lord Hailsham when the Bill comes before their lordships this week. Clause 70 of the Bill, dealing with incitement to racial hatred. inserts a new section to the Public Order Act 1936 which, as it stands, would place newspapers and their editors in an intolerable position.
The implications of this section and in particular of the last paragraph are so serious and uncertain in their effect on newspapers that one can only conclude that MPs had not considered them in any depth during the Bill's passage through the Commons.
In fact, we considered them in great depth.
The phrase 'hatred is likely to be stirred up' would make it almost impossible for an editor to decide whether or not he would be risking prosecution, despite the fact that he might well be dealing with a matter of important public interest. The effect would undoubtedly be to gravely restrict information of events, of speeches, and of statements about which the public have every right to know, and which it is an editor's duty to publish.
Lord Hailsham's amendment would oblige the prosecution to prove intent. … Those responsible for this Bill should remember that a meeting, perhaps attended or witnessed by several hundred people, is an event of public knowledge and public importance, and that no newspaper should be inhibited from publishing a report of it. The same considerations apply equally to written material such as party manifestos or candidates' leaflets.
I ask the Minister to bear in mind the view of this eminent newspaperman that the uncertainty which will be caused if the Government do not accept the amendment will profoundly limit proper reporting and freedom of speech.
The Chairman of the Race Relations Board, Sir Geoffrey Wilson, said in a speech to the Guild of British Newspaper Editors in Bristol—reported in the Bristol Evening Post on 18th October—that any speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) was followed by increased harassment of black people. If that is true,


it means that speeches by my right hon. Friend will automatically be banned from newspapers because the Chairman of the Board has said that they are followed by harassment—an overt expression of hatred apparently stirred up automatically following a speech by my right hon. Friend.
This is a grotesque potential limitation on freedom of publication and speech, and it is entirely unacceptable that editors might be put in the position of being unable to report the speech of a Privy Councillor.
If the fiat is left in the hands of the Attorney-General the whole matter becomes political. If he does not prosecute the right hon. Member for Down, South, it will be because he is partial to him, and if he does prosecute, it will be because he is politically motivated, against the Ulster Unionists or the Conservatives. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not prosecute a Privy Councillor on the Government side, he will be said to be politically motivated. He cannot win. He will be criticised by everyone. It is entirely unsatisfactory that the matter should be left with the Attorney-General in this arbitrary way.

Mr. John: I start by saying to the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes) that, as a Welshman, I believe that the English are declining in only one way—the mis-attribution of quotations. The words ascribed by the hon. Gentleman to Wordsworth were actually written by Sir Walter Scott.
I had hoped that some of the hon. and learned Gentlemen who took part in the debate would have taken up the point made by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen) when he talked about this matter becoming political because consent to prosecution rested with the Attorney-General. He knows that the Attorney-General does not act politically when he gives consent. That is a tradition of British political life which has never been departed from by any Attorney-General of whom I have known. I hope that the suggestion will be firmly quashed.
1.0 a.m.
Thirdly, a number of Second Reading points have been made. Many hon. Gentlemen were in a dilemma whether

they opposed legislation on racial hatred or merely legislation which took out the element of intent. That was pointed out by some of my hon. Friends.
I suggest that the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) should re-read with care what Sir Leslie Scarman said. Sir Leslie Scarman said:
The section needs radical amendment to make it an effective sanction, particularly, I think, in relation to its formulation of the intent to be proved before an offence can be established.
I believe that the clause, as drafted, makes it more effective. It does not make it something which is outside the whole realm of voluntary action. First, a person must, in a public place or meeting, use words which are threatening, abusive or insulting. It must be a case where hatred is likely to be stirred up against any racial group having regard to "all the circumstances". That answers a couple of the points which were made, particularly by the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison), who suggested that a person's lack of command of English might cause him to use inflammatory language. If so, "all the circumstances" would mean that hatred was not likely to be stirred up.
I repeat to my hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham and Morden (Mr. Douglas-Mann) that the evil against which the Bill is aimed is racial discrimination or racial hatred. It is not aimed against racial hatred or racial discrimination practised by people of a particular colour or race. It is aimed at wherever racial discrimination is practised.
The mistake that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) often makes is that anyone of whatever colour or ethnic origin who practises racial discrimination or stirs up racial hatred is liable to the sanctions of this Bill.

Mr. Ronald Bell: No black people have been prosecuted under Section 6.

Mr. John: The hon. and learned Gentleman either speaks in profound ignorance of the facts or he has not researched with care. I can refer him, but will not do so at this time of night, to who precisely were prosecuted because they made black power speeches. Michael de Freitas was one of them. If the hon.
and learned Gentleman would care to receive a letter from me, he might then consider his intervention rather more calmly than he is doing now.

Mr. Bidwell: The hon. and learned Gentleman can read my book.

Mr. John: He can do that, too, but that would be too bracing a glimpse of the truth for his tender stomach.

Mr. Goodhew: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. John: No, I will not give way on this point. I am developing my argument. The hon. Gentleman has been in the Chamber but rarely during the evening and has sought to speak on almost every occasion when he has been present. I am dealing with a serious point made by the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) regarding newspapers, a point which was taken up by the hon. Member for Barkston Ash.
It is true that the President of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors wrote to The Times on 27th September. I am sure that the hon. Member for Barkston Ash will confirm that that was the first approach that the Guild had made to any member of the Committee or the first notice that it had taken of any of the proceedings on the Bill. I am rather surprised at some of the wording. Referring to importing the idea of intent, Mr Tom Cooke, the President of the Guild of British Newspaper Editors, said:
Such an amendment would be a vast improvement and, I feel sure, would be accepted

by editors as a situation which they could live with.
That has been the law for 11 years. Yet nothing in his words leads me to believe that he realised that fact.

When newspapers print the stories of meetings at which words are used that are threatening, abusive or insulting in the circumstances of the clause, they are no more deserving of protection than if they had printed a defamation—except under subsection (2), where court or parliamentary proceedings are given protection.

There is a judgment to be made here as to whether—I address my words particularly to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson)—by approving the Lords' formulation this House will revert to or perpetuate a situation in which the law is too weak to bear upon the case of racial hatred, as Sir Leslie Scarman, as he then was, suggested, or whether by disagreeing with the Lords amendment and reintroducing Clause 70 it will make the law against racial hatred—that most serious and most extreme of all cases—a proper sanction against it so that we may eradicate it and the violence that surely follows it.

Mr. Carlisle: Before the Minister sits down, may I ask him whether he really means—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton): Order. I think that the Minister has resumed his seat.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 175, Noes 142.

Division No. 350.]
AYES
[1.6 a.m.


Anderson, Donald
Cant, R. B.
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)


Archer, Peter
Carmichael, Neil
Dell, Rt Hon Edmund


Armstrong, Ernest
Cartwright, John
Dempsey, James


Ashton, Joe
Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Doig, Peter


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Clemitson, Ivor
Dormand, J. D.


Atkinson, Norman
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Douglas-Mann, Bruce


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Cohen, Stanley
Dunnett, Jack


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Colquhoun, Ms Maureen
Eadie, Alex


Bates, Alf
Conlan, Bernard
Edge, Geoff


Beith, A. J.
Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)
Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Corbett Robin
Ennals, David


Bidwell, Sydney
Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Flannery, Martin


Bishop, E. S.
Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Crawshaw Richard
Ford Ben


Boardman, H.




Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)
Forrester, John


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Cryer, Bob
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)


Buchanan, Richard
Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Freeson, Reginald


Campbell, Ian
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Garrett, John (Norwich S)


Canavan, Dennis
Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Gilbert, Dr John




Golding, John
Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Silverman, Julius


Gould, Bryan
Marks, Kenneth
Skinner, Dennis


Graham, Ted
Marquand, David
Small, William


Grant, George (Morpeth)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Grant, John (Islington C)
Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Spearing, Nigel


Hardy, Peter
Mikardo, Ian
Stallard, A. W.


Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Sloddart, David


Hatton, Frank
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)
Stott, Roger


Hooley, Frank
Moonman, Eric
Strang, Gavin


Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)
Swain, Thomas


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Moyle, Roland
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Hunter, Adam
Newens, Stanley
Thorne, Stan (Praston South)


Jeger, Mrs Lena
Ovenden, John
Tinn, James


John, Brynmor
Park, George
Torney, Tom


Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
Parry, Robert
Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)


Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Perry, Ernest
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Watkins, David


Kaufman, Gerald
Price, William (Rugby)
Watkinson, John


Lamborn, Harry
Radice, Giles
Weetch, Ken


Lamond, James
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)
Wellbeloved, James


Latham, Arthur (Paddington)
Robinson, Geoffrey
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Roderick, Caerwyn
White, James (Pollock)


Lipton, Marcus
Rodgers George (Chorley)
Whitehead, Phillip


Luard, Evan
Rooker, J. W.
Whitlock, William


Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)
Roper, John
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


McCartney, Hugh
Rose, Paul B.
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


McElhone, Frank
Rowlands, Ted
Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)


MacFarquhar, Roderick
Ryman, John
Woodall, Alec


MacKenzie, Gregor
Sandelson, Neville
Woof, Robert


Mackintosh, John P.
Sedgemore, Brian
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Maclennan, Robert
Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
Young, David (Bolton E)


McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Shore, Rt Hon Peter



McNamara, Kevin
Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Madden, Max
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Magee, Bryan
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Mr. Donald Coleman


Mahon, Simon






NOES


Adley, Robert
Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Alison, Michael
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Moate, Roger


Arnold, Tom
Gray, Hamish
Molyneaux, James


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Griffiths, Eldon
Monro, Hector


Bell, Ronald
Grist, Ian
More, Jasper (Ludlow)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Hall, Sir John
Morgan, Geraint


Berry, Hon Anthony
Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Morris, Michael (Northampton S)


Biffen, John
Hannam, John
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)


Biggs-Davison, John
Havers, Sir Michael
Mudd, David


Body, Richard
Hawkins, Paul
Neave, Airey


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Hayhoe, Barney
Neubert, Michael


Bottomley, Peter
Hicks, Robert
Newton, Tony


Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Higgins, Terence L.
Onslow, Cranley


Brotherton, Michael
Holland, Philip
Page, John (Harrow West)


Budgen, Nick
Hooson, Emlyn
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)


Bulmer, Esmond
Hordern, Peter
Parkinson, Cecil


Burden, F. A.
Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Penhaligon, David


Butler, Adam (Bosworth)
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Percival, Ian


Carlisle, Mark
Hunt, David (Wirral)
Raison, Timothy


Carson, John
Hurd, Douglas
Rathbone, Tim


Channon, Paul
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Churchill, W. S.
James, David
Ridsdale, Julian


Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)
Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd &amp; W'df'd)
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Clegg, Walter
Jessel, Toby
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Cope, John
Jopling, Michael
Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)


Corrie, John
Kershaw, Anthony
Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)


Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Kitson, Sir Timothy
Royle, Sir Anthony


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Lamont, Norman
Sainsbury, Tim


Drayson, Burnaby
Latham, Michael (Melton)
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Dunlop, John
Lawrence, Ivan
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Durant, Tony
Lawson, Nigel
Shersby, Michael


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Le Marchant, Spencer
Silvester, Fred


Eyre, Reginald
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Sims, Roger


Fairgrieve, Russell
Lloyd, Ian
Smith, Dudley (Warwick)


Farr, John
Loveridge, John
Speed, Keith


Finsberg, Geoffrey
Luce, Richard
Sproat, lain


Fookes, Miss Janet
McCrindle, Robert
Stanbrook, Ivor


Forman, Nigel
Macfarlane, Neil
Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)


Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Mates, Michael
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Freud, Clement
Maude, Angus
Stokes, John


Gardner, Edward (S Fylde)
Mawby, Ray
Stradling Thomas, J.


Goodhew, Victor
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)


Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Mayhew, Patrick
Tebbit, Norman







Temple-Morris, Peter
Wakeham, John
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)
Walters, Dennis



Townsend, Cyril D.
Weatherill, Bernard
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


van Straubenzee, W. R.
Wells, John
Mr. W. Benyon and


Vaughan, Dr Gerald
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William
Mr. Carol Mather.


Viggers, Peter
Wiggin, Jerry

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 71

LOCAL AUTHORITIES: GENERAL STATUTORY DUTY

Lords amendment: No. 38, leave out Clause 71.

Mr. Jim Marshall: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Clause 71, which was removed by the other place, would impose a statutory duty on local authorities to work for the elimination of discrimination to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups.
This is one of the few Lords amendments that the Government have chosen not to oppose. It is interesting to review the history of the clause. It was imposed upon the Government, against Home Office advice, in Committee on 24th June, with all-party support. The hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane), the chairman-designate of the new Commission, supported it. The Government made no attempt to remove the clause during the Bill's remaining stages in the Commons, but they connived at the House of Lords removing it.
On 5th October 1976, Lord Harris of Greenwich said:
Before I resume my seat"—
some of my hon. Friends might think that he should have resumed his seat earlier—
I should perhaps say that all of us in this House have basically free votes, but if a Division takes place on this particular clause the members of the Government will abstain in the Division." —[Official Report, House of Lords, 5th October, 1976; Vol. 374, c. 1192.]
The Government appear to be using the House of Lords to thwart the will of the House of Commons. That ill becomes a Government which at present is accusing the House of Lords of thwarting important Government legislation. For that reason alone, the clause should be reintroduced.
Local authorities have a unique part to play in formulating the climate of opinion in an area. Officers and elected members come in contact with the problems of the area and they quickly become aware of any difficulties concerning discrimination, equality of opportunity or poor relations between people of different ethnic groups. Good local authorities—and I represent an area which has a good local authority—use that information when formulating social and financial priorities. Other local authorities ignore the information. Such local authorities could be dealt with if all local authorities were under a statutory obligation to carry out these proposals. The Select Committee recommended that course of action.
Clause 19 imposes a general duty in education. What is so particular and specific about education? Local authorities are charged with providing a number of services to ratepayers and I do not see why education should be chosen from all other services provided. Local authorities should have a statutory obligation to promote all the objectives in the legislation through all its services and activities.
Hon. Members might ask—why should a statutory duty be placed upon all local authorities? My answer is that it is unfair for the burden to be imposed upon those authorities with large immigrant concentrations. The burden should be shared. We live in a multi-racial society, whether hon. Members opposite like it or not—and we all have an obligation to promote harmony and good race relations, whether, to quote Lord Hailsham. we live in
the Isle of Sky or in the City of Leicester.
Those obligations could be discharged in a number of ways. Local authorities in general could play a part by channelling funds through the rate support grant mechanism to those with large immigrant concentrations, without increasing the overall level of the rate support grant settlement. They could agree that authorities with large immigrant concentrations deserved more


financial assistance. In this way all local authorities could play a part in solving the kind of problems that the Bill seeks to solve.
I am sure that all hon. Members will agree that it is of the utmost importance that he clause be returned to the Bill.

Mr. Cyril Smith: I compliment the hon. Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall) on tabling the necessary motion to enable the House to debate this matter. I was disappointed that the Government did not choose to disagree with the Lords. I am glad that at any rate some Labour Members have made sure that we have the opportunity to register our disapproval of the Lords' action.
Local authorities can play a major role in race relations. Most of them are anxious to do so. But in this matter of race relations and community relations, as in other matters of good common sense, there are one or two local authorities that may not be very anxious to carry out the functions required to be carried out in their areas. As someone who spent 23 years as a member of a local authority, I know that on occasions it helps if one can, even if opposed by large majorities, quote parts of the law to prove that there is a legal obligation to do certain things.
Whilst I accept that the clause as it was before their Lordships amended it was not very strong, or would not lead to great enthusiasm on the part of local authorities that were not already enthusiastic, the fact that it was in the Bill could strengthen the arms of some councillors and ratepayers who might be prepared to try to force the authority to meet some obligations.
This is the only Lords amendment about which I have received a letter from my local community relations council, which is a very active one. It is obviously aware of every Lords amendment, and this is the only one it has asked me to vote against. The secretary wrote:
I am writing on behalf of this Council to all three local MPs to urge that you will please actively support the reinstatement of this clause to the Bill when it returns to the Commons. This Council believes that this clause is of great importance and will be of considerable help and support to local community relations councils in carrying out their new role as laid down in the Bill.

So far we have had a lawyers' paradise. I have heard little discussion so far about community relations or race relations. I have heard that the law should say this or that, and how some lawyers make sure that it is written one way. That is all to protect the legal profession and is to do with their future, but I am not sure that it is to do with race relations. However, this is something to do with it and to do with community relations. It puts the onus of responsibility in a key area where that responsibility can effectively be used in race relations—local government. Thinking of local government, I would give comprehensive education as an illustration of the fact that there are good and bad local authorities.
In urging the House to rewrite this into the Bill, I am asking them to cater for local authorities which, in my view, are bad authorities and will do nothing unless some law gives the power to push against them and to say "You must do something about that".
I urge the Government to think again about this clause and, if they will not move, I hope that their Back Benchers will support the hon. Member for Leicester, South and make sure that this clause is reinstated.

1.30 a.m.

Mr. Thomas Torney: I associate myself with the remarks of the hon. Member for Rochdale, Mr. Smith). I, too, have had letters about this clause. It is the only one about which I have had letters.
This is an important situation. There has been talk and legal jargon—and here again I go along with the hon. Member for Rochdale. I remember, as a member of the Standing Committee which dealt with this Bill, saying in Committee that we were being discriminated against. Such people as my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell) and myself, ordinary lay Members, were discriminated against in as much as so much legal jargon was being talked.
The words in the Bill about racial discrimination will be wasted if we do not alter the social conditions. Race relations is about social conditions, and while had social conditions exist, no matter how much we change the law and compel people to do this or not do it, it


will be wasted if we do not take some action to change social conditions.
When we look at social conditions we see that there is much delegation of power to local authorities. I fail to understand why the Government have not seen fit to reinstate this clause. Local authorities play such a major part in establishing good race relations and will play a greater part than any law court could or would. That is why I insist that this clause must be reinstated.
I do not take lightly to defeating the Government, but I hope that they will he defeated if they support this Lords' amendment. It is necessary that this clause should go back into the Bill because local authorities are so important.
If the Government are afraid that, when pounds ale so short or so cheap that we cannot afford to spend more money, local authorities will demand more cash, then so be it. If we want racial harmony—and we do—we have to face the fact that more money must be spent. I come from an area in Bradford, a city which has a huge proportion of coloured immigrants. I speak as someone who has served, for the whole of his time in the House, on the Select Committee on Race Relations and I claim to know a little about the subject and about the surrounding conditions which immigrants have to suffer, and about understanding their problems.
We must agree that local authorities have a large part to play. I am not criticising my local authority. Some local authorities do a good job but others may need pushing. This clause may provide the impetus which will make the Gov-eminent provide the extra money which is needed to improve racial harmony and better social conditions. Despite what I know that the Minister will say, I hope that all lion. Members will support this clause.

Mr. Barney Hayhoe: I support the retention of Clause 71. Like the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Smith), I have received representations from my local community relations commission. It is the only clause on which I have received such representations. It is strongly felt that it should be retained.
Having listened to much of the debate this evening, I believe that there is a much better case for preserving the clause and disagreeing with the Lords than there has been for disagreeing with another place on many other matters. Despite the manner in which the hon. Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall) introduced this issue—at one point he went some way towards convincing me that it was not wise to disagree with the Lords—my feeling is that we should disagree with them and retain Clause 71.

Mr. Willey: I moved this clause in Committee. I am obliged to hon. Members for the support that they have given to it. I wish to explain briefly what the issue is for this House.
This clause implements the unanimous recommendation of the Select Committee. It received overwhelming support in the Standing Committee which considered the Bill. The House has to stand up for itself. The Conservatives have to vote with the Conservatives in this House and not with those in another place. That is the only issue, the only division. What is the point of setting up a Select Committee giving it this responsibility and then rejecting its unanimous recommendation?
The Home Secretary's predecessor told the House in July that the Government would stand by this clause. When the Government replied to the Select Committee in September they did not criticise the clause. In those circumstances the Government ought to stand up for the House.
I want to explain why this clause is important. It is important in the context of the Select Committee because the Government accepted our recommendation about community relations officers. It follows from that that we should reinforce the position of the local authority. This stemmed from our report.
The two major factors affecting this decision have already been canvassed. There is no issue upon which more representations have been made. It is the most important issue in the eyes of those concerned with community relations. The Government said in Committee that they had not consulted local authorities. They had plenty of time to do so because the Select Committee took evidence from local authorities.
We are now told by the Community Relations Commission that local authorities from Glamorgan to Camden support this clause. They are acting upon it although it is not yet law. The directors of social affairs in local authorities held a conference recently and strongly supported the clause. We cannot let these people down. We should recognise that they have expressed their views and that this is a provision earnestly required by those concerned with community relations.
I hope that the Government will be able to accept what I believe to be the view of the House. It has not been revealed so far, but the Government have said that if their Lordships left the clause, they would put down amendments. That is reasonable. I suggest that we restore the clause so that if the Government so feel they can table their amendments.

Mr. John: It might be for the convenience of the House if I intervene now. The Government still have reservations about the clause. I want no right hon. or hon. Member to be under any illusion, so I must make it clear that this is a declaratory clause and not one that will bring about any magic change. Nevertheless, I, is clearly the will of the House, as I understand it, that a clause dealing with local authorities should be in the Bill.
Although the Government still have doubts about the value of the clause, they have no doubts about the objects mentioned by my right hon. and hon. Friends and in asking local authorities to achieve the greatest degree of co-operation with the CRCs at local level and with the new Commission. On that basis we are prepared to accept the principle of the clause and, with the permission of the House, to move manuscript amendments which will have a clarifying effect. They conform to the formula at the beginning of the Bill. I think that they are much neater, more acceptable and much clearer in the way in which they bear upon local authorities.

Question put and agreed to.

Mr. John: I beg to move a manuscript amendment in lieu thereof to the words so restored to the Bill: Leave out the first "its" and insert "their".

Question put and agreed to.

Amendment made in lieu thereof to the words so restored to the Bill: Leave out

"work towards the elimination of discrimination and" and insert
make appropriate arrangements with a view to securing that their various functions are carried out with due regard to the need—
(a) to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; and
(b)". —[Mr. John.]

Clause 73

POWER TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF ACT

Lords amendment: No. 39, in page 47, line 27, leave out paragraph (a).

Mr. John: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords Amendment No. 43.

Mr. John: The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) has tried at various stages to suggest that we do not take to heart the deliberations that take place in another place. To prove that we have carefully considered those deliberations and to show that we take note of what is said, I decided not to move the motion disagreeing but instead to move a motion agreeing with the Lords in the said amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendments disagreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendments disagreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment disagreed to.

Schedule 1

THE COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY

Lords amendment: No. 48, in page 57, line 18, leave out from "Commission" to end of line 19 and insert—
9A. —(1) In this paragraph—
the new Commission" means the Community Relations Commission;


present Commission employee" means a person who immediately before the repeal date is employed by the Community Relations Commission established by section 25 of the Race Relations Act 1968;
private pension scheme" means a scheme for the payment of pensions, allowances or gratuities other than one made under section 1 of the Superannuation Act 1972;
the repeal date" means the date on which the repeal of the Race Relations Act 1968 by this Act takes effect.

(2) If a present Commission employee enters the employment of the new Commission on the repeal date and on so doing elects to be covered for his service in that employment by a private pension scheme in which he was a participant in respect of his service in the employment of the Community Relations Commission established as aforesaid, the new Commission may make such payments towards the provision of benefits to or in respect of him under that scheme (or any other private pension scheme replacing it) as may be determined by the new Commission with the consent of the Secretary of State given with the approval of the Minister for the Civil Service; and it shall be the duty of he new Commission and those Ministers in the exercise of their functions under this sub-paragraph to ensure that his rights under the scheme do not become less advantageous than they were when he entered the employment of the new Commission.

(3) Where a person who is employed by the new Commission and is in respect of that employment a participant in a private pension scheme becomes a Commissioner or an additional Commissioner, his service as a Commissioner or additional Commissioner may be treated for the purposes of the scheme as service as an employee of the new Commission."

1.45 a.m.

Mr. John: I beg to move, as an amendment to the Lords amendment, in paragraph (1), leave out "Community Relations Commission" and insert "Commission for Racial Equality".

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take the two following Government amendments to the Lords amendment.

Mr. John: Mr. John: The object is merely to restore the name of the Commission to "Commission for Racial Equality."

Amendment to the Lords amendment agreed to.

Amendments made to the Lords amendment: In paragraph (1) leave out
established by section 25 of the Race Relations Act 1968".

In paragraph (2) leave out "established as aforesaid".— [Mr. John.]

Lords amendment, as amended, agreed to [Special Entry.]

Mr. Whitelaw: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Since all these amendments are consequential on what has happened before, would it be in order to put them all together?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Certainly it would be of the greatest relief to the Chair.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendments disagreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendment agreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendments disagreed to.

Subsequent Lords amendments agreed to.

Committee appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to certain of their Amendments to the Bill: Mr. Merlyn Rees, Mr. John, Mr. Alison, Mr. Bates, and Mr. Whitelaw: Three to be the quorum.— [Mr. John.]

To withdraw immediately.

Reasons for disagreeing to certain of the Lords amendments reported, and agreed to; to be communicated to the Lords.

ELLBRIDGE HORTICULTURAL EXPERIMENTAL STATION

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Thomas Cox.]

1.53 a.m.

Mr. Robert Hicks: I am grateful for this opportunity to raise the subject of the future of the Ellbridge Experimental Horticultural Station at Hatt, near Saltash, and I am obliged to the Minister for his presence, even at this late hour.
In raising this matter I recognise the very real economic problems facing our country, and the fact that this situation demands cuts in the level of public


expenditure. There is a fair measure of agreement among responsible politicians of all political parties about this. I readily appreciate that in the current economic climate no Government Department can claim automatic exemption from the Chancellor's requirements, and that the Ministry of Agriculture has an obligation here like any other Department.
Following the Chancellor's announcement on 22nd July this year, the Ministry made public those cuts affecting it. These totalled £25 million. One of the contributions to the net savings was itemised as follows, and I quote from the Ministry hand-out to the Press:
Postponement of expansion in research and development and miscellaneous minor savings—£2,500,000.
Later I learned to my surprise and disappointment that the Ellbridge Experimental Horticultural Station was to be included in the list of cuts, that this five-acre unit was to be closed at the end of the 1977 cropping season.
Since this news was made public considerable concern has been expressed locally. I have received a large number of representations from both individual growers and representative organisations, such as the horticulture committee of the Cornwall branch of the National Farmers' Union, local NFU branches and the Tamar Valley and Ellbridge Growers' Co-operative. A public meeting was held in Cargreen and as a result a telegram was sent to the Minister of Agriculture. Since then I have been in correspondence with the Minister.
In a parliamentary reply given to me on 20th October 1976 the Minister stated that the total cost of operating this station in 1975–76 was approximately £38,500. Offset against this figure was a revenue of £4,500, derived from the sale of produce. In other words, we are talking about an apparent net saving of £34,000, but I believe that that figure is misleading, since the Ministry has admitted that if Ellbridge is closed an adviser will be based at the divisional offices at Liskeard. This person's salary has still to be met, plus his additional travelling expenses.
Furthermore, it has been argued that, because of the greater area involved and the number of growers that have to be serviced, a second advisory officer could well be required at some future stage.

This would cost the Ministry, in terms of both salary and expenses, probably about £6,000 or £7,000 per annum, so that the quoted figure of net savings by the closure of Ellbridge is very questionable, irrespective of the decline in the quality of servicing and advice that would surely result.
I believe that there a are number of good, sound reasons why Ellbridge should be retained, perhaps in a somewhat different form. I want briefly to outline them to the House.
First, I believe that this specific proposal to close an important centre is totally inconsistent with the Government's own White Paper policy document, "Food From Our Own Resources". Secondly, this station services not only the 128 registered horticultural holdings in the Tamar Valley but a wider catchment area in respect of strawberry growing. It is relevant to point out that many growers in the Tamar Valley are family units and that a close liaison has evolved over the years between these growers and E11-bridge
Thirdly, closure would mean growers in my constituency having to use either Rosewarne, near Camborne—about 60 miles away—or Efford, in the constituency of Lymington, which may please my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch and Lymington (Mr. Adley), who, I see, is present. Efford is 150 miles away. It may be suggested on good grounds that neither alternative is environmentally and climatically suitable to reflect the needs and requirements of the Tamar Valley.
My fourth point concerns the number of grower visits. In 1975 there were over 1,200 such visits to Ellbridge, a firm indication of the value of the station to local growers. If one compares that figure with grower visits to other stations one observes a much higher use of Ellbridge.
My fifth point concerns employment. Nine people would be affected. I do not claim that they would all lose their jobs, but Ellbridge is situated within the South-Western Development Area, a district of very high unemployment. The figures issued this week from the Department of Employment show a further increase in the South-West assisted areas.
My sixth point is that Ellbridge has over the years worked up a first-class


reputation, not only for protective crops but, more recently, in respect of the small glass unit. It is an available centre for the training of the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service staff. Appointment to Ellbridge gives a member of the Ministry considerable experience in administration, in contact with people and in respect of the advisory and experimental work.
In addition, it has been suggested that Ellbridge has been chosen for the axe because 18 per cent. of the resources of the Ministry's allocation for research and development is concentrated in the South-West and Wales, yet this combined area is responsible for only 6 per cent. of the horticultural produce of England and Wales. I seriously question that latter figure. But surely the criteria upon which such decisions should be made must include the cost-effectiveness of the individual station involved and the number of growers served.

Mr. John Stradling Thomas: There is a very serious point concerning, the distance involved, the mileage and the relationships. We are faced with the situation in my constituency that in addition to Ellbridge in the South-West, Clepra Park is to be closed. I have corresponded with the Parliamentary Secretary and with the Minister of State, but I have received a blank-wall response. It means that the whole of Wales and Monmouthshire will be totally deprived of an experimental station. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. Hicks) said, the distances involved are considerable. In the replies that I have received there seems to be a total inability on the part of Ministers to realise the importance of the relationship among growers, not just in Wales and Monmouthshire, but in Bristol. Gloucestershire and a wide area of the western part of the South-West.

Mr. Hicks: I certainly agree with my hon. Friend about the distances.
I have made what I believe to be a strong case based on objective reasoning for the retention of the Ellbridge experimental centre. I do not expect the Minister to announce tonight the instant reversal of his earlier decision. That would be too much to hope for. But I want him to consider agreeing to suspend

any final judgment until he has had the opportunity personally to investigate the possibility of changing the role and function of Ellbridge by placing a greater emphasis on demonstration rather than experimentation. I believe that that would provide for easier management. It would reduce costs on the one hand and increase revenue on the other. By that course of action it should be possible to reduce the net cost—which the Minister said was about £34,000, although I believe it to be less—to about £15,000 to £17,000 a year.
If this were possible, the Ellbridge station would still be making a contribution to cuts in public expenditure and, at the same time, a valuable service to the Tamar Valley horticultural industry would be retained. The service is appreciated by growers and once an asset like Ellbridge is destroyed, it is far more difficult to replace it.

2.5 a.m.

Mr. Robert Adley: Despite the fact that some of my hon. Friend's constituents may find their way into my constituency, I support his case and admire his efforts.
The Tamar Valley, as anyone who knows it will confirm, is a unique area. Some of the savings which Government Departments put forward are often mythical and there is frequently no deduction of the removal costs involved.
In my constituency, we suffer a reverse manpower flow in the removal of SRDE in Highcliffe to Malvern. I urge the Minister to examine my hon. Friend's pleas very carefully.

2.6 a.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Gavin Strang): I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Hicks) for raising this matter as it gives me the opportunity to clarify some of the issues associated with the closure of the Ellbridge sub-station. First, however, I should say how much I appreciate the concern that the hon. Member and his hon. Friends have shown on behalf of the horticultural industry. The hon. Gentleman has also written to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. I have great sympathy with the concern expressed by the


horticulturists in the area about this decision and can assure them that it was taken only after very full consideration of all the facts.
Some emphasis has been laid on the marginal nature of the savings that will be achieved by this measure. But the Ministry has to make its contribution to a reduction in public expenditure. A Department such as mine cannot put together a significant package without aggregating items which individually might be described as "chicken-feed". Our contribution to the manpower economies required of the Government service can best be achieved by looking for savings that can be made without detriment to the essential needs of the industries we serve. We are satisfied that this is the case here.
Ellbridge is a sub-station of a major centre which is also in Cornwall, situated at Rosewarne near Camborne, and which is remaining in being. The essential needs of the South-West will be met by the remaining experimental horticulture stations which will, if necessary, defer other work in their programmes to accommodate the transferred work.
The Ellbridge Advisory Committee will be meeting early next month and will consider closely this aspect of the closure. My officials will attend that meeting to join in this assessment of the on-going work needed and where it should be done. As evidence of our firm intention to effect a smooth transition, the Chairman of the Ellbridge Committee has been invited to serve on the advisory body for the Rosewarne Experimental Horticulture Station and I am delighted to say that he has accepted.
The main experiments on the substation have been concerned with outdoor bulb flowers, tomatoes and cucumbers under glass and plastic structures and early strawberries. Work on outdoor bulb flowers is already a major part of the Rosewarne programme and any outstanding work from Ellbridge could be transferred there. Rosewarne and the Efford Experimental Horticulture Station in Hampshire both work on the main crops under glass and plastics. Consequently, the only crop which presents a problem is early strawberries where the crop response under the peculiar climatic conditions of the area cannot exactly be simulated else-

where. Experimental work on early strawberries is however carried out at Efford Experimental Horticulture Station.
It might be helpful if I spent a few minutes setting this question in perspective by giving a few facts about our experimental centres. There are 11 experimental horticulture stations, including the sub-stations, and the net cost of operating them in 1975–76 was about £1,700,000 compared with the somewhat lower figure of £1,500,000 for the 13 experimental husbandry farms. The value of the horticultural industry in England and Wales in the same period was about £500 million compared with some £5,000 million for agriculture. I think that these broad figures indicate that horticulture is very far from being neglected, in terms of research and development investment from Exchequer funds. It is a most important part of our industry and is given priority that reflects this importance.
The Ellbridge sub-station was established as a full experimental centre by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1954 to cater for the special conditions of the Tamar Valley and East Cornwall in which soft fruit, especially strawberries, early vegetables, flowers and glass crops were grown. The sub-station has a much longer history as a demonstration centre, because it was first set up in 1926 by the Cornwall County Council. In the early 1950s there were 1,200 growers in the area but today there are only about 250. The length of the centre's history, spanning half a century, adds to the natural concern expressed by those who regret its closure.
The hon. Gentleman fairly argued that the centre might be reduced, but remain in being as a demonstration unit. It may be that the pre-war role of the centre prompted that alternative proposal.
Ellbridge has in the past mounted some demonstrations and growers were welcome to see on-going experiments. But its main purpose, as with the other centres, has been to generate new information which was then incorporated into the regional experimental/demonstration programme. Demonstrations are often mounted by ADAS in conjunction with commercial growers. I understand, for instance, that, as promising new strawberry varieties emerge from the national fruit trials, the Tamar Valley adviser will arrange for trials to be carried out on


commercial holdings to test their suitability under the local climatic conditions. Plans to this end and financial provision, have already been made by the local ADAS. Thus, it will be possible to ensure that information is available to growers through the standard ADAS procedure, whereas to retain the station for demonstration purposes only would incur continuing overhead costs.
I think that I should respond to the hon. Gentleman's statement regarding an advisory officer. Indeed, he suggested that there might eventually be two advisory officers for the area. The advisory officer is already there and at present allocates only 10 per cent. of his time to Ellbridge. There has been no suggestion of a second advisory officer. I must emphasise that the advisory effort of ADAS in this part of the country is not affected.
Concern has also been expressed about the rundown and closure of the experimental centre at Cleppa Park in Wales. We appreciate that the decision is naturally regretted by horticulturists directly interested and concerned. The advisory committee there will shortly be meeting to consider what priority work should be transferred elsewhere. For example, experiments with bedding plants are well known and of national interest and may have a claim for transfer to a suitable station elsewhere.

Mr. John Stradling Thomas: Where?

Mr. Strang: The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I should prefer the advisory committee to meet and deliberate on this matter first. I should then be happy to write to him and explain what we propose to do. There is no intention on our part to end valuable and important work. It is a question of working out the most appropriate way of carrying it out elsewhere where it can be justified.
I turn now to the effects of the Ell-bridge closure on the people concerned and the question of redundancies. ADAS officers, who are subject to mobility as part of their normal conditions of service, will be redeployed to fill vacancies elsewhere arising from normal wastage. The six full-time and one part-time horticultural workers consist of three apprentices who will move at the end of their apprenticeships, two workers who have already

reached the Civil Service retirement age, and two others who will be advised of vacancies at other experimental centres, the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, and other Government Departments in the locality, so that they may apply for them if they so wish.
I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman was suggesting that somehow we could avoid these difficulties when taking harsh decisions of this nature. However, I assure the hon. Gentleman that every effort is being made to avoid any hardship and disturbance to local staff. I make it absolutely clear that I should be very anxious to hear if any particular difficulties arise with regard to the personal circumstances of the staff, which is something of great concern to me, and if they are not adequately taken care of.
I hope that what I have said makes it clear that all aspects of the question were examined with great care before the decision to close Ellbridge sub-centre was taken. The essential research and development needs of the horticultural industry in general and that part of the country in particular will be suitably catered for. Indeed, I regard the research and development effort as a prime constituent of the work of the ADAS.
The total R and D effort at horticultural centres, which is very substantial, will not, overall, be significantly reduced by the closure of Ellbridge. I know that the number of growers in the Tamar Valley may, since the 1950s and for a number of reasons, have shrunk considerably. I also know that the value placed by these growers on ADAS assistance is no less than in the rest of the country. But I am confident that their needs will continue to be met by the ADAS.
I am glad that when he opened the debate the hon. Member for Bodmin acknowledged that the Government's policy of containing the level of public expenditure and of reducing the public sector borrowing requirements, which is leading to these difficult decisions, is not opposed by the Opposition. On the contrary, it is fair to say that the most overriding and forceful criticism being made of the Government by the Opposition at present is that we are not making sufficiently effective cuts, that we are not really cutting back substantially on public spending in the way demanded by the


needs of the economy. The hon. Gentleman recognised and acknowledged this, so I know that he will appreciate that if further cuts in public expenditure are to be made, and if the advisory services in agriculture have to be cut—and we must acknowledge that very substantial cuts were made by the previous Conservative Government—it is inevitable that we must take these very difficult decisions.
I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is quite legitimately and properly taking up what he regards as a very important matter for his constituency, and something that he regards as a real setback to the local horticultural industry. This is naturally something that causes him concern. These are very difficult decisions for Ministers. However, if we did not do this we should have to save the money elsewhere.
I am glad that hon. Members have not found it easy to put forward counter-suggestions about where we can make savings in the agricultural sector. I do not think that they would suggest for a moment that somehow in this exercise we could exclude agriculture completely, or that we could exclude the horticultural side of the industry.
However, I give the hon. Member for Bodmin this final assurance. If there is

anything that I can do to help to reduce or mitigate the difficulties created by this closure at Ellbridge, or, indeed, that at Cleppa Park, I shall certainly be happy to look at it. But it would be quite wrong for me in this debate to raise any false hopes about the Government being able to make any basic reappraisal or modification of their policy with respect to this painful containment of public expenditure.

Mr. Hicks: If the advisory committee at Ellbridge puts forward proposals at its next meeting for a bigger role for the demonstration side, could the whole situation be looked at again?

Mr. Strang: I shall try to be helpful to the hon. Gentleman. Our officials will be attending that meeting with the advisory committee and they will be bringing back to me a report of the discussions at that meeting. I can certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that we in the Ministry will give careful consideration to everything said at that meeting.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty minutes past Two o'clock.